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NUMBER ONE

DISCHARGE UNDER SECTION 14
SUB. c(2) AND (3) OF THE
CHANDLER ACT

S

KNEELAND A. GODFREY*

ECTION 14 Sub. c(2) and (3)
follows:

of the Chandler Act reads as

"The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the
bankrupt has * * * (2) destroyed, multilated, falsified, concealed,
or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records, from
which his financial condition and business transactions might be
ascertained, unless the court deems such acts or failure to have
been justified under all the circumstances of the case; or
(3) obtained money or property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or publishing or causing to
be made or published in any manner whatsoever, a materially
false statement in writing respecting his financial condition;
* **

YY1

* LL.B., University of Wisconsin, member of the Milwaukee Bar.
111

U.S.C.A., See. 32, C(2) and (3).
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The matters embraced in the foregoing provisions have received
considerable attention by the Federal Courts, and there are numerous
authorities construing the sections involved. It would appear that the
Bar generally has not given sufficient attention to the rights afforded
both the bankrupt and the creditors and also to the duties of the bankrupt under these sections. The hazards involved to the bankrupt in
obtaining a discharge are great and the penalty to him, denial of his
discharge, may be very severe in many instances.
I.

SUB. c(2)-FAILURE TO KEEP PROPER BooKs

Both Congress and the courts have indicated a disposition towards
increasing the strictness of compelling the bankrupt to properly account
for his assets under this section of the Act. The Act originally provided
that it was necessary to establish that the bankrupt's destruction or
concealment of adequate records, or his failure to keep them, was
with "fraudulent intent to conceal the true financial condition and in
contemplation of bankruptcy."
In 1903 the Act was amended and omitted the word "fraudulent"
and also the phrase "in contemplation of bankruptcy," and in 1926 the
Act was amended to its present form to provide that books must be
kept "from which his financial condition and business transactions
might be ascertained; unless the court deems such failure to have been
justified under the circumstances of the case." It was realized that the
former provisions made it practically impossible to prevent a discharge
under this provision, in view of the fact that it was necessary to establish that the destruction of books or the failure to keep books was done
with intent to conceal and in "contemplation of bankruptcy." Both
Congress and the Courts have come more and more to realize the necessity of the keeping of proper books in any business in order that the
business might be successfully conducted. Many businesses have failed
because of inadequate bookkeeping and bankruptcy has thereby
resulted.
Under the present Act the burden of proving the intent to conceal
has been taken from the objecting creditor or the trustee, and the
burden of proving justification is placed upon the bankrupt. There is
thus indicated on the part of Congress a purpose to lodge with the
bankruptcy court a reasonably wide judicial discretion in the matter,
and the cases have indicated this wide discretion on the part of the
Bankruptcy Court. A finding by the trial court will not be upset unless
there is an absolute abuse of discretion and the finding was clearly
erroneous.
Where the creditor has shown an absolute lack of any adequate
records, the burden of satisfying the Court that the failure to produce
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them by the bankrupt was justified is on the bankrupt.2 Under subsection (c) it is necessary only that the objector show to the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which would prevent his
discharge, and then the burden of establishing otherwise is upon the
bankrupt.
The making of false entries is of course an absolute ground for
preventing the discharge of the bankrupt under this subsection. The
mere neglect to keep books, or inadvertence or mistake in keeping books
showing the bankrupt's financial condition, is under many circumstances
not sufficient grounds for the refusal of the discharge. It is of course
not necessary that the bankrupt, in every instance, keep a set of books,
and this is particularly true in the case of wage earners who are not
involved in any extensive financial transactions. It has been consistently
held that this class of bankrupts need not establish the keeping of
books in order to obtain a discharge.3 Where, however, a salaried
employee has borrowed extensively or made extensive loans to his
relatives or family, it has been held that his failure to properly record
the transactions in an adequate manner is ample grounds to prevent
the discharge.4
The failure to keep books in the case of a clergyman receiving
money from several sources and borrowing considerable sums was held
to be grounds for denial of a discharge. 5
It is generally held that the nature and not the size of the bankrupt's business or enterprise determines the necessity of keeping books
and records, and the facts in every case must be scrutinized closely in
order to determine the necessity of a bookkeeping system. The rule is
stated as follows:
"What will justify that failure depends largely upon how extensive and complicated the bankrupt's business is-a cobbler will
succeed with much less than a manufacturer-but the important
change is that since 1926 no moral obliquity need be shown.
Honesty is not enough; the law demands as the condition of a
discharge either that the bankrupt shall produce such records as
are customary to be kept by a person doing the same kind of
business, or that he shall satisfy the bankruptcy court with adequate reasons why he was not in duty bound to keep them."0
A recent case arising in this district and decided January 28, 1942,
is that of John Henry Marx, Bankrupt,7 in which the Circuit Court
2
3

White v. Schoenfeld, 117 Fed. (2d) 131 (1941).
In re Perkins, 40 Fed. Supp. 114 (D.C., NJ. 1941); In re Pinko, 94 Fed.

(2d) 259 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938).
4In re Bank, 34 Fed. Supp. 706 (D.C. N.Y. 1940).

5In re Northridge, 53 Fed. (2d) 858 (D.C. N.Y. 1931).
6 White case, note 2.
7 125 Fed. (2d) 335 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
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of Appeals held that Marx, a real estate broker, engaged in the general
real estate business, was not entitled to a discharge by reason of his
failure to keep books. In 1935 he was hopelessly insolvent and in 1936
he engaged in the purchase and sale of property in the name of his
daughter, and to protect himself against garnishment he began to take
bank accounts per himself as trustee or some similar designation.
He paid no regard to the source of the moneys and deposited them all
together in the same account, and actively drew on the account for
every purpose. He kept no books of any kind, and the bankrupt's
records were at variance with his own bank records and checks. He
kept no copies of income tax returns which he had filed, and the
returns of three of these years had disappeared from the assessor's
office. Under this set of facts the Referee found that the bankrupt was
not entitled to a discharge. In affirming the order based upon the
Referee's findings, the Court stated as follows:
"What books of accounts or records satisfy the requirement of
section 14c (2) are, of course, not a constant. In each case they
are a function of the nature of the particular bankrupt's business
transactions and financial condition. What would suffice in one,
would be hopelessly unsatisfactory in another. Yet, the absence
of articulated mechanics does not leave a broad area of uncertainty in which all must wander with no idea of whether they
would be entitled to a discharge if economic misfortune should
overtake them. Records or books of accounts are but the means
to an end, the ascertainment of the bankrupt's financial condition and his business transactions, and any records which meet
that end are satisfactory. They should show in some way his
loss and gains, and present a satisfactory explanation of the
receipts and disbursements. This condition precedent to discharge strikes at otherwise non-demonstrable fraud, for no
longer does the successful objecting creditor have to prove the
absence or inadequacy of the records was with intent to conceal; the bankrupt must now really have the necessary records
or explain why the circumstances of his case excuse his failure.
By no longer requiring proof of such intent, the statute has narrowed the bankrupt's road to the salutary discharge. * * * Now,
whenever a section 14c (2) objection to the discharge is raised,
the bankrupt's records must be adequate, unless excused by circumstances, or the discharge will be denied. With this considerable penalty upon inadequate books or records, perhaps the adequacy of the records kept will increase and thereby at least help
remove whatever causal relation exists between inadequate bookkeeping and bankruptcy.
"The statute lodges in the bankruptcy court a reasonably wide
judicial discretion in determining whether the failure to keep
books of account or records was justified under all the circumstances of the case, and the determination of that question will
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not be disturbed on appeal except in case of abuse of such
discretion."8
In the case of In Re Herzog,9 a set of books was kept, but transactions by a partnership and a corporation were so intermingled and
the books were in such shape that not even an auditor could ascertain
the financial condition of the bankrupt, who was interested in the
corporate and the partnership affairs. The only excuse offered by the
bankrupt was ignorance to differentiate between corporate and partnership activities. It was held that this was no excuse and that ignorance and honesty are not a sufficient justification where a bankrupt was
conducting a business as extensive as the one involved in that case.
It can readily be observed, therefore, that an attorney representing
a bankrupt must be careful to protect the bankrupt's rights by establishing either that the nature of the business did not necessitate the
keeping of books or that the books which the bankrupt kept were
adequate to determine the bankrupt's financial condition at all.times.
II. SECTION 14 SuB. c(3). FALSE STATEMENTS IN WRITING
In order to establish that a bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge
under this subsection, it is necessary to consider five essential elements,
to-wit:
(a) Statement must be in writing.
(b) It must be materially false.
(c) Bankrupt must have knowledge of the falsity.
(d) Property must be obtained or credit extended.
(e) Creditor must have relied upon the statement.
(a) Statement in Writing Regarding FinancialCondition
Statements under this section must be in writing and must involve
the financial condition of the bankrupt. The most common form of
statement is a financial statement given to a creditor for the purpose
of obtaining property or an extension of credit. The most common
form of falsity in statements is as to the concealment or overstatement of general accounts or of money borrowed, which is understated. In many cases the bankrupt will give a statement in which he
disregards family obligations, and at the time of the bankruptcy the
member of the family will then file a claim for the amount of the
indebtedness.
It is held that the issuing of bad checks does not constitute a false
statement in writing.10 A false statement means more than a mere
8 See Rosenberg v. Bloom, 99 Fed. (2d) 249 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938) ; Nix v. Stern-

berg, 38 Fed. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930).
9 121 Fed. (2d) 581 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
10 Robinson v. Williston & Co., 266 Fed. 970 (C.C.A. 1st, 1920) ; In re Rea Bros.,
251 Fed. 431 (D.C. Mont., 1917).
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representation. Although the debt represented by the bad check is not
dischargeable, that fact in itself is not sufficient to prevent the discharge of other obligations of the bankrupt. In the case of chattel
mortgages, it has been held that a bankrupt giving a chattel mortgage
on property which he does not own is not entitled to a discharge, as
the chattel mortgage constitutes a false statement in writing,"
2
On some rather unsound reasoning it was held in In Re Hudson
that a chattel mortgage does not constitute grounds for denying the
discharge, it being stated in that case that the debt represented by the
chattel mortgage comes under a non-dischargeable debt and is not a
ground for discharge, in view of the fact that the two are inconsistent.
This case was referred to in the Powell case and the court stated that
it felt the reasoning of the Hudson case was rather unsound.
There was formerly considerable conflict in the holdings regarding
the question as to whether or not commercial reports were false statements within the Act. The question seemed to turn upon whether or
not the agency obtaining the statement actually represented the subscribing creditor at the time the statement was given by the debtor.
There can be no question, of course, that where the agency is constituted the bankrupt's agent to circulate a false statement, which the
agency obtains in making a special investigation for the subscriber,
the bankrupt would not be entitled to a discharge.'" It has, however,
been more recently held that statements given to credit companies do
constitute false statements in writing within the meaning of the Act.' 4
In the Muscara case' 5 the Court states as follows:
"The test, therefore, is whether the agency to which the false
statement was made was in fact the representative of the person
who, receiving the statement, extended credit. From the very
nature of its occupation, a mercantile agency is the representative or agent of its subscribers in the business of obtaining for
them credit ratings of persons with whom they propose to have
dealings, and when a false statement is made to such representative and is communicated to the subscriber with the result that
the subscriber relying upon it, sells property and extends credit
to one who becomes bankrupt, then the situation contemplated
by the provision arises. If the amendment of 1910 did not thus
enlarge the provision, then it did not change the law from what
the courts had interpreted it to be before the addition of the
word 'representative'."
1In re Powell, 22 Fed. (2d) 239 (D.C. Md., 1927).
Fed. 778 (D.C. Ala., 1920).
is 6 Am. Jur. 796.
'4 Weinberg v. American Shoe Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 557 (C.C.A. 5th, 1926).
12262

15 In re Muscara, 18 Fed. (2d) 606 (D.C. Pa., 1927).
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It would therefore seem that under the present Act statements
made to credit reporting companies and circulated to their subscribers
do constitute false statements in writing.
(b) Materially False Statements
Insignificant omissions of liabilities from a statement are not sufficient to constitute grounds for the denial of the discharge. The failure
to list a contingent liability, which is doubtful, has been held not to
render the statement false and it has also been held that an omission
of an equal amount of assets and liabilities does not of itself make the
statement materially false. However, the mere showing of a substantially correct balance of assets over liabilities was held not to excuse
understating both of them. 6 The question as to whether or not the
falsity is material, of course must be governed by the amount involved and the circumstances in each case. Of course, if the omission
of a liability which is contained in the statement would show the insolvency of the debtor, this would obviously be sufficient to render the
statement materially false.
(c) Knowledge of Falsity
While the Act does not provide that there must be any intent on
the part of the bankrupt, it would seem that the bankrupt must have
knowledge of the falsity of the statement, either actual or implied,
in order to bring it within this section. The rule has been stated as
follows:
"In consideration of the primary and ordinary meaning of the
word 'false' and of the general characteristic of personal misconduct that attaches to all but one of the other specified grounds
for denying a discharge, and because there is no good reason
why an incorrect statement innocently made to one creditor
should bar the discharge of the bankrupt as to all his other debts,
whatever be its effect as to the debt of that particular creditor,
the word 'false' as here employed is not merely equivalent to
'untrue' or 'incorrect,' but it connotes a guilty scienter on the
part of the bankrupt, and requires that the written statement
made for the purpose of obtaining credit shall be knowingly and
intentionally untrue in order to constitute a bar to the bankrupt's discharge. Ordinary negligence-as, for example, merely
signing as a matter of form a blank which has been filled out
incorrectly by another, under extenuating circumstances and
without any intent on the bankrupt's part to deceive-does not7
seem to be contemplated as ground for refusing a discharge."'
16 In re Maaget, 245
17

6 Am. Jur. 7934.

Fed. 804 (D.C. N.Y., 1911).
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As held in Third National Bank v. Schatten,18 the provision "false
statement in writing" implies that the statement is knowingly false or
made recklessly without the owner's belief in its truth and with
purpose to mislead or deceive. It has been held that actual knowledge of the falsity and conscious intent to deceive are not essential to denying the discharge on this ground where the bankrupt makes no effort to verify the facts and does not inquire into
omitted liabilities, and in conformity with this holding it has also
been held that the bankrupt's failure to read a statement dictated by
the manager of the creditor, where the language of the statement was
unambiguous, did not relieve the bankrupt from the falsity of the
statement. 19
It will therefore be noted that it is not necessary to establish absolute knowledge on the part of the bankrupt of the falsity of a statement, but that any reckless indifference in making the statement is
sufficient.
(d) ObtainingProperty or Extension of Credit
The fourth essential element to the denial of a discharge on this
ground is that the bankrupt must have obtained property in some form
or the extension of time to pay an existing obligation. It had been held
prior to the 1926 Amendment of the Act that the extension of credit
on a present indebtedness was within the Act, but this holding was
probably erroneous under the former provisions. The Amendment of
1926 expressly provided for the renewal of credit and the Chandler
Act so provides.
There was at one time some conflict in the authorities as to whether
or not the bankrupt who gave the false statement must be the recipient
of the property or credit, in order that the discharge be denied. These
cases usually arise out of a stockholder giving the statement to obtain
money for the corporation in which he is interested. This question was
definitely settled, however, in Levy v. Ind. Fin. Corp.,2 0 wherein the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court to the effect
that the property need not be obtained by the bankrupt, but it was
sufficient that a corporation in which the bankrupt had a substantial
interest obtained the property.
There was also some conflict in the cases as to whether or not a
surety's obligation on a bond furnished to the bankrupt is "Property"
within the meaning of the Act. It has now been definitely settled that
a surety bond was "property" within the meaning of the Act.2'
If after the false statement was given there never was a larger
amount due the creditor than at the time the statement was given and
18 81 Fed. (2d) 538 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936).
19 See In re Strauss, 4 Fed. Supp. 810 (D.C. N.Y. 1933); In re Carlton, 29 Fed.

Supp. 754 (D.C. Ohio, 1938).
U.S. 281, 72 L.Ed. 572 (1927).

20 276
21

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 78 L.Ed. 176 (1933).
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in making application for new credit, the bankrupt partially reduced
the indebtedness, such circumstances do not prevent the denial of a
discharge on this ground.
(e) Reliance by the Creditor
A concise statement on this point is contained in Remington on
Bankruptcy,22 as follows:
"The false statement must have been relied on, and if it was not
relied on in parting with the property, the discharge will not be
barred.
"But reliance may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the
mere facts that the statement was asked for and furnished as a
basis of credit, and that the goods were supplied within a reasonable time thereafter are sufficient proof that the creditor
parted with the merchandise on the strength of the representation, in the absence of adequate rebutting evidence."
-"It is a sufficient 'reliance' if the decision to give the credit was
induced by the false statement, or that, had the truth been
stated, the credit would not have been given. If the reliance was
not upon the false statement, but rather upon the fact that
payments of preceding invoices had been made or dividends on
the stock sold had been received, it is not a sufficient reliance
to bring the case within the statute.
"It is not necessary, however, that the false written statement
shall have been the sole thing relied on, nor that the credit
shall have been obtained solely on the written statement; thus,
a discharge will be denied where the false statement was accompanied with a deposit of securities, if the credit would not have
been extended had not the statement also been given. For,
usually, there are many other things also taken into account and
relied upon in giving credit, as, for example, the health of the
applicant, his industry, etc., etc., but such other reliance is no
defense, if the statement was one of the material elements in
the extending of the credit.
"Long lapse of time between the making of the statement and
the extending of the credit naturally tends to weaken the likelihood of reliance being had upon the statement when the credit
was granted."
There is a presumption that where credit is given, the creditor
relied on the statement, this being particularly true if the credit is
extended immediately following the giving of the statement. The
burden of proof is then upon the bankrupt to establish that the credi23
tor knew the truth and could not have relied on the false statement.
Where the creditor insists upon and obtains security before extending credit, it has been held to indicate the lack of reliance on the
creditor's part, but the making of an independent investigation does
24
not establish the lack of reliance on the false statement.
22
Vol. 7, Par. 3338, 5th Edition.
2

3Widder v. Seiff, 94 Fed. (2d) 6 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).

2473 L.Ed. 593, note.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AFFECTING SALES OF GOODS
LLOYD J. PLANERT*

H

ISTORICALLY, the Wisconsin Statute of frauds affecting sales
of goods is derived from the English statute enacted in 1677.1
The English legislation was incorporated into our statutory law in
1849 and has since remained there without substantial change or amendment. 2 The purpose of the Wisconsin statute 3 is the same as that of
the English statute, namely to prevent fraud by avoiding the enforcement of baseless sales through perjured oral testimony, the means provided by the statute being a requirement of written or otherwise adequate evidence of the transaction. 4
The Wisconsin statute provides that no contract to sell or sale of
any goods or choses in action of the value of fifty dollars or upwards
shall be enforceable by action unless 1) a contract to sell or sale valid
at common law is shown, and 2) the statute of frauds is satisfied in
one of three specified ways. 5 These three alternate methods of complying with the statute are as follows: 1) the buyer must "accept part
of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and
actually receive the same" ;6 or 2) the buyer must "give something
in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment" ;7 or 3) there must
be some "note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale ...
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf." S Until
the making of a contract to sell or sale and a compliance with one of
the three specified means of satisfying the statute has been proved, no
recovery can be had on the alleged contract; the defendant can withdraw without liability.) This is a firmly established rule and cannot be
derogated or abrogated by any custom or conduct of the parties in
prior transactions. 10
* A.B., LL.B., Member of Wisconsin Bar.
1Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; 29 Car. Ic 3.
2 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 375 (1913).
3 Wis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04.
4 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904); HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. VI, pp. 384, 386.
5 Wis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1); Coastwise Petroleum Co. v. Standard Oil

Co., 19 A. (2d) 180 (1941); Green v. Penn. Steel Co., 75 Md. 109, 23 Atl. 139
(1891); Hearn v. Ruark, 148 Md. 354, 129 AtI. 366; Record Mfg. Co. v. Massey, 151 Md. 348, 133 AtI. 836 (1926).

6 Wis.STAT. (1941)
7 Idens.
8 Idem.

§ 121.04(1).

9 Supra, note 5.
10 Coastwise Petroleum Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 19 A. (2d) 180 (1941).

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

While the statute seems clear enough, yet its application to many
and different transactions has naturally given rise to varying questions
and divergent views of solution. A consideration of some of these
questions and the interpretation which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and the courts of other jurisdictions have placed upon the statute, is
the purpose of this paper.
A question that arises at the outset in a cause involving the statute
of frauds, is one of pleading, namely, whether the statute must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense or may be relied on under a denial of
the contract of sale. The authorities are thoroughly divided on this
question, some declaring that advantage may be taken of the statute
under a simple denial of the contract, 1' while others following the
English rule,' 2 require it to be affirmatively pleaded. 3 The Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
likewise require the Statute of Frauds to be set up as an affirmative defense.'14 Since under the wording used in the statute "shall
not be enforceable by action" a transaction is not entirely void
without a writing but merely unenforceable' 5 it would seem that the
authorities requiring the statute to be affirmatively pleaded present
the sounder view. While Wisconsin in Flatley Brothersv. Beauregard,6
seems to have aligned itself with the states holding that the statute
need not be affirmatively pleaded, it should be noted that this decision
is expressly based on a second version of the statute of frauds found
in the Wisconsin Statutes at the time of that decision in 1927, namely
Section 241.03 which provided that any contract in violation of the
statute of frauds shall be "void." Section 241.03 was repealed in 1931"
so that when the question again comes up for determination, Wisconsin probably will align itself with the states and the Federal Rules
which require the statute to be affirmatively pleaded.
" Connecticut Practice Book, 1934, No. 104; Flatley Bros. Co. v. Beauregard, 192
Wis. 174, 212 Wis. 262 (1927) ; Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie (1921) 270
12

Pa. 221, 113 Atl. 202; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Eiseman (1927) 290 Pa.
486, 139 AtI. 147; Quinn-Sheperdson Co. v. Triumph Farmers' Elevator Co.
(1921) 149 Minn. 24, 182 N.W. 710.

Order 19 Rule 15, The Annual Practice (1936) p. 361.

Civ. Prac. Act N.Y. 242; Kottler v. New York Bargain Home (1926) 242
N.Y. 28, 150 N.E. 591, reargument and motion to amend remittitur denied
242 N.Y. 568, 152 N.E. 430; Morrison v. Holmes & Volz, 241 App. Div. 907,
271 N.Y.S. 1040; Widmeyer v. Crane, 121 Misc. Rep. 309, 200 N.Y.S. 875;
Abraham v. Durward (1920) 46 N.D. 611, 180 N.W. 783.
24 Rule 8 (c).
15 West v. Kenny (1920) 229 Ill. App. 49; Webster v. Condon (1924) 248 Mass.
269, 142 N.E. 777; Maddaloni Olive Oil Co. v. Aquino (1920) 191 App. Div. 51,
189 N.Y.S. 724; Webster-Tapper Co. v. Eastern Hay Co. (1916) 39 R.I. 482,
98 Atl. 50; Abraham v. Durward (1920) 46 N.D. 611, 180 N.W. 783.
16 192 Wis. 174, 212 N.W. 22.
'3

17 1931 c. 470. s. 8.
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As to the subject-matter within the statute,' an examination of its
provisions discloses that it includes two types of contracts, namely, a
"contract to sell" and a "sale"; it also reveals that the statute is applicable to two definite classes of subject matter, namely, "goods" and
"choses in action." The statute 9 therefore can apply to four different
situations, namely, to a contract to sell goods, to a sale of goods, to a
contract to sell a chose in action and to a sale of a chose in action.
The significance of each of these four key concepts will next be
considered.
The connotation that is to be given to a "contract to sell" and a
"sale" as used in the Uniform Sales Act offers no difficulty inasmuch
as both terms are defined expressly in the Act.20 The distinction between the two terms is a fundamental one. In the case of a "contract
to sell," the seller merely agrees to transfer the property in the goods
to the buyer; the actual transfer takes place at some future time. In the
case of a "sale," the seller actually transfers the property in the goods
to the buyer as of the time of the sale.
These absolute terms, namely, "contract to sell" and "sale," are
qualified by the succeeding words "of any goods or choses in action." 21
The first of these two words, namely "goods," as construed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court include any personal property in existence
at the time of the making of the contract, and also personal property
not ready for delivery or even existent at the time of the making of the
22
contract provided that it need not be made especially for the buyer.
That "goods" means "personal property" is apparent from the following expression of the Wisconsin Supreme Court: "The alleged contract in question was one for the sale of personal property and so
comes within the statute of frauds.... "2-3 Particular illustrations are
the holdings of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the following
subjects of contracts to sell or sales are "goods" within the statute of
frauds: wheat, 24 land scrip,22 trees, 2 6 logs, 27 potatoes,28 and the sale of
one-fourth of an interest in a boat. 29 The latter decision indicates that
18 WIs. STAT.
19 Idem.
20 Wis. STAT.

(1941) § 121.04.

(1941) § 121.01. "Contracts to sell and sales.
(1) A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees to
transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
(2) A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the sellers transfers the
property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price."
21 VIS. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).
22
ldei. § 121.04(1) (2); Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
23 Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920).
24 Hooker v. Knab, 26 Wis. 511 (1870); Nichols v. Mitchell, 30 Wis. 329 (1872).
25 Smith v. Bouck, 33 Wis. 19 (1873).
28 Hawkinson v. Harmon, 69 Wis. 551, 35 N.W. 28 (1887).
27 Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885).
28 King v. Graef, 136 Wis. 548, 117 N.W. 1058, 20 L.R.A. (n. 5) 86 (1908).
29
Brown v. Slauson, 23 Wis. 244.
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Wisconsin regards even the sale of an interest in a chattel as personal
property and thus "goods" within the statute of frauds. Whether or not
corporate stock is "goods" within the statute of frauds has been an
issue of considerable controversy in some jurisdictions, but the matter
is definitely settled in Wisconsin, corporate stock being without question included in the term "goods."30 "There may be some doubt arising
from the decisions elsewhere" says the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit "as to whether 'corporate stock' is 'goods' as used in
the Statute of Frauds, but for Wisconsin the question is settled by
decision....

1

The statute of frauds 32 itself is authority for the statement that
"goods" includes personal property even though not ready for delivery
or in existence at the time of the making of the contract. It is to be
noted, however, that not all cases in which personal property is involved are held to be within the statute of frauds. The statute expressly
excludes from its scope contracts to sell and sales of goods that are
"to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer, and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business.
.. "3 This provision marks the distinction between contracts for manufacture and sale which are by this provision excluded from the operation of the statute of frauds, and contracts of sale only where there is
nothing for the seller to do but to tender the property, which are within
the statute. Although this enactment would seem to present no special
difficulty, yet a full appreciation of its import especially in view of
some broad language in the cases 34 requires a consideration, not only
of the determinative Wisconsin decisions, but also an examination of
the history of this "exclusion" clause.3 5 Due to border line cases between contracts for manufacture and sale which are not within the
statute and contracts of sale only which are within the statute, there
was much conflict of authority in various jurisdictions as to the rule
by which to determine whether a contract was within one class or the
other, this conflict resulting in the development of three specific rulesthe English Rule,3a the New York Rule,35b and the Massachusetts
30

Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920) ; Backus v. Taplin,
81 Fed. (2d) 444 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
31 Backus, ibid.
32 WIs. STAT. (1941) § 121.04.
3 Ibid. § 121.04(2).
34 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904) ; Boyington v. Sweeney,
77 Wis. 55, 45 N.W. 938 (1890) ; Wiger v. Carr, 131 Wis. 584, 111 N.W. 657
(1907).
3
5 Wis. STAT.

(1941)

§ 121.04(2).

35a Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S.272, 101 E.C.L. 272, 121 Reprint 716, 23 E.R.C. 191.
35b Warren Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N.Y. 586, 23 N.E. 908 (1890) ;
Alfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461, 2 Misc. 123 (1892);
Seymour v. Daris, 4 N.Y. Super 239.
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Rule. 35C Under the English Rule if the contract is intended to result
in the transfer of a chattel in which the vendee had no previous property, then, although work and labor are to be done on such chattel
before delivery, the contract is within the statute of frauds.35d The
New York Rule states that an agreement for the sale of any commodity
not in existence in solido at the time, but which the seller is to manufacture or put in condition to be delivered is not a contract of sale
within the statute of frauds, 58 but, if at the time of the agreement
the commodity sold substantially exists in its ultimate form,3 5 or is to
be procured in substantially its ultimate form from others,3-g then,
even though acts remain to be done in finishing it, the agreement is a
contract of sale within the statute of frauds. The Massachusetts Rule,
is as follows: "A contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such
as the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or
procures for the general market, whether on hand at the time or not,
is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the statute applies. But on
the other hand, if the goods are to be manufactured especially for the
purchaser, and upon his special order, and not for the general market,
the case is not within the statute. . . . ,,6 The difference between the
three rules is well stated in an Oregon case3 7 as follows: "By the
Massachusetts rule, the test is not the existence or non-existence of
the commodity at the time of the contract, as in New York, or whether
the contract will ultimately result in the transfer of the title of a chattel from vendor to the vendee, as in England, but whether the article
is such as the manufacturer ordinarily produces in the course of business, and for trade, or as the result of a special order and for special
purposes. If the former, it is regarded as a contract of sale, and within
the statute; if the latter, it is held to be essentially a contract for
labor and material, and, therefore, not within the statute.... ,,as
Under the English Rule, Missouri has held contracts to make a
coat and vest of peculiar design and pattern, 89 and to make a
number of special drawings 40 to be contracts for the sale of goods
and within the statute of frauds. Such contracts would be held to
be contracts for skill and labor and, therefore, not within the scope
of the statute of frauds under the Massachusetts Rule.
35c
35d
35e
3

Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450 (1874).

Supra, note 29.

Warren Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N.Y. 586, 23 N.E. 908 (1890).
5fAlfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461, 2 Misc. 123 (1892).
35g Seymour v. Davis, 4 N.Y. Super 239.
36 Supra, note 31.
7

38

Heintz v. Burkhard, 29 Ore. 55, 54 Am. St. Rep. 777 (1896).

Ident.
a9 Schmidt v. Rozier, 121 Mo. A. 306, 98 S.W. 791 (1906).
40 Lesan Advertiz. Co. v. Castleman, 165 Mo. A. 575, 148 S.W. 433 (1912).
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The Massachusetts Rule, being a part of the Uniform Sales Act,41
is the most generally accepted American doctrine.' It has been adopted
44

43
by thirty-three of the forty-eight states, namely, Alabama Arizona
4 5

Arkansas
51

California

4 6

47

Connecticut,

48

Delaware,

Idaho,

9

50

fllinois,

Indiana, Ioway Kentucky,53 Missouri, 4 Maryland, 55 Massachusetts,, 6
59
Nevada,60 New Hampshire, 61
Michigan, 57 Minnesota5 s Nebraska,
New Jersey,6 New York,63 North Dakota, 64 Ohio, 65 Oregon,6 . Pennsylvania, 67 Rhode Island, 68 South Dakota,
72

mont,

Washington,

Columbia,77

73

7

Wisconsin,

4

69

Tennessee 7 0

Utah71 Ver-

and Wyoming ;75 AIaska,

the Dis-

78

and Hawaii have also accepted the Act. In the
trict of
79
Meinicke case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court referring to the Massachusetts Rule lays down the conforming interpretative Wisconsin
"exclusion" rule as follows: "We are inclined to think that the rule
announced by Chief Justice Shaw ... and followed in Goddard v. Bin4

1WIs.
STAT. (1941) § 121.04(2).
42 Supra, note 37.
43 Hassey v. A. C. Alleyn Co., 306 Ill. App. 37, 28 N.E. (2d) 164 (1940).
44

Iden.
1den.; Cape County Milling Co. v. Morris, 137 Ark. 430, 208 S.W. 792 (1919);
Moore v. Camden Marble Works, 80 Ark. 274, 96 S.W. 1063 (1906).
46 Supra, note 43.
47
Supra, note 43; Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn. 508, 79 Am. Dec. 229 (1861).
48
Supra, note 43.
49 Supra, note 43.
50
Supra, note 43.
51
52 Supra, note 43.
Supra,note 43.
53
Supra, note 43.
54 Supra,note 43; Crockett v. Scribner, 64 Me. 447 (1875).
55 Supra, note 43.
45

56 Supra, note 43.
57

Supra,note 43; Ericsson Mfg. Co. v. Caille Bros. Co.; 195 Mich. 545, 162 N.W.
81 (1917) ; Willebrandt v. Sisters of Mercy, 185 Mich. 366, 152 N.W. 85 (1915).
c8 Supra, note 43.
59 Supra, note 43.
6
oSupra, note 43; O'Neil v. N. Y. Mining Co., 3 Nev. 141.
61
Supra, note 43.
62
Supra, note 43.
63
Supra, note 43.
6
"Supra, note 43.
65
Supra,note 43.
66 Supra, note 43; Courtney v. Bridal Veil Box Factory, 55 Ore. 210, 105 Pac. 896
(1909).
67 Supra, note 43.
68 Supra, note 43.
69

Supra, note 43.

70
71 Supra, note 43.

Supra, note 43.
Supra, note 43; McDonald v. Webster, 71 Vt. 392, 45 Atl. 895; Scales v. Wiley,
68 Vt. 39, 33 Atl. 771 (1895).
7 Supra, note 43.
74Supra,
note 43; Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
75
Supra, note 43.
76
77 Supra,note 43.
Supra, note 43.
72

789 Supra, note 43.

7 Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
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ney,... is entitled to our confidence and respect. We, therefore, hold
that, while an executory contract for the sale of an article for the
price of $50 or more may be within the statute, notwithstanding such
article does not at the time exist in solido, yet where such contract is
to furnish materials and manufacture the article according to specifications furnished or a model selected, and when without the special
contract the thing would never have been manufactured in the particular manner, shape, or condition it was, then the contract is essentially
for skill, labor, or workmanship, and is not within the statute."80 The
legal basis upon which the Massachusetts Rule is founded is stated as
follows by the Wisconsin Court: Contracts for the purchase of goods
that are to be manufactured especially for the buyer and that are not
suitable for sale on the general market are not within the statute of
frauds because such contracts imply "that the application of such labor
and capital in the execution of the agreement is to be accepted as the
work of the manufacture processes, contingent upon the thing, when
produced, corresponding to that ordered. The result is that, as soon
as the process of manufacture commences the contract is no longer
wholly executory. When the article contracted for is ready for delivery
and the situation is such that it might then form the subject of a sale
within the meaning of the statute, the real contract has been substantially performed upon one side. To allow the statute of frauds to then
interfere with the final consummation of the agreement would be a use
thereof to perpetrate fraud instead of to prevent fraud." 81
Wisconsin, under the Massachusetts Rule, has held the following
contracts to be contracts, not for the sale of goods, but for skill and
labor, and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds: a contract for
a specially-built carriage,8 a contract for the publication of an advertisement in a newspaper, 8 a contract for iron-work to be manufactured
according to a particular design,84 a contract for specially-made matting,85 and a contract for the purchase of certain lithographs and en88
gravings to be made according to a specific design.
However, one Wisconsin case,87 as a result of its general language,
causes a quaere to arise as to whether the Wisconsin "exclusion"
clause's8 should really be limited to goods that are to be manufactured
especially for the buyer or whether this enactment should also embody
80 Idem.
81 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904).
82 Supra, note 79.

83 Goodland v. LeClair, 78 Wis. 176, 47 N.W. 268 (1890).
84 Heintz v. Burkhard, 29 Ore. 55, 54 Am. St. Rep. 777 (1896).
85 Supra, note 81.
86 Central Lithographing & Engraving Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis. 170, 43 N.W. 1124
(1882).
87 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904).
88 Wis. STAT.

(1941) § 121.04(2).
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contracts for the sale of any goods that must be manufactured in the
future. In the case in question, namely, the Gross case, 9 the court uses
the following language: "That statute (statute of frauds) relates only
to the executory sales of property; not to contracts for the manufacture and sale of property. Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427. .." Accepting this general statement as it stands, it would seem that the Wisconsin "exclusion" clause is meant to include all contracts wherein the
goods must be manufactured in the future regardless of whether these
goods are to be manufactured especially or in the ordinary course of
the seller's business. However, in view of the fact that the court cites
the Meinicke case 90 as authority for its general statement, and in view
of the fact that the case concerns specially made matting, it is apparent
that the court referred only to goods that were to be manufactured
especially for the buyer and which would not be suitable for sale in
the ordinary course of the seller's business. That such is the rule is
thoroughly established by the words of the statute9 itself and the
Hansen case. 92 In that case the court held that a contract for the sale
and delivery of logs was a contract for the sale of goods within the
statute of frauds even though it was necessary for the vendor to cut,
transport and deliver the logs to a certain place. The court spoke as
follows: "The logs were an ordinary article of traffic, like lumber, or
other merchandise, and stand upon the same ground. It could not with
propriety be said that the contract was for special skill and labor. ...
If any other construction were allowed to be given to the opening words
of the court in the Gross case, 94 Wisconsin would not be following the
Massachusetts Rule at all, but rather would be applying the New York
Rule, namely, the non-existence of the article at the time of the contract. General language is found in other Wisconsin cases9" also, but,
in all of these cases the Meinicke case 98 is cited as authority for these
general statements. Thus, it is apparent that the court is really referring
only to goods which are manufactured by the vendor especially for the
vendee and which are not saleable on the general market and that
Wisconsin accepts the Massachusetts Rule.
Besides those contracts which are declared not to be within the
statute of frauds because they fall under the express "exclusion" provision of the statute,97 there is still another type of contract which is
99 Supra,note 87.
90 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
9
921 Supra,note 88.
Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885).
9
3Idem.
94
Si.pra,note 87.
9
5 Boyington v. Sweeney, 77 Wis. 55, 45 N.W. 938 (1890) ; Wiger v. Carr, 131
Wis. 584 (1907).
96
9 Supra,note 90.
7WIs. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(2).
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declared not to be within the statute although personal property is
involved, namely, those contracts in which the personal property is but
incidental to common services18 or employment99 or a compromise
agreement. 100 In the Agnew case' 0' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that a promise to fill lots with dirt was a contract for services and not
a sale of property and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds even
though the transfer of title to the dirt was involved. The Wisconsin
court in a later case'0 2 held that a contract authorizing another to act
as agent and purchase property from a third person was not within the
statute of frauds. In arriving at its decision the court reasoned as follows: "The distinction involved in the employment of one as an agent
to obtain for the principal something which he has not is in close
analogy to that in an employment to manufacture for another that
which at the time of contracting has no existence." In the Mygatt
case'03 the court held that an agreement between two execution creditors, each of whom claimed priority, to allow the property of the
debtor to be sold under one execution and to divide the proceeds equally
is not a sale at all but a compromise of the conflicting claims of the
parties in respect to their priority of levy, and, therefore, not within
the statute of frauds. Another Wisconsin case 04 presented the question
Whether an oral contract between two vendees to jointly purchase a
stock of merchandise and sell part of the goods and then divide the
proceeds and the balance of the goods between themselves was a contract within the statute of frauds. The court held that the contract was
not within the statute of frauds because "the parties do not stand in
the relation of seller and buyer. They agree to buy jointly and to divide
what they buy." In other words, there is no contract to sell or sale at
all; it is merely a contract to divide the interests growing out of a
joint purchase.
The second class of subject-matter to which the statute of frauds
is applicable, is "choses in action." By "choses in action" is meant any
"rights to personal things of which the owner has not the possession but
merely a right of action for their possession." 10 5 The Alexander case'0 6
involving an order drawn upon the county treasurer is a good example
of a sale of a chose in action. The only reason that "choses in action"
are expressly designated in the present Wisconsin statute of frauds is
93 Agnew v. Baldwin, 136 Wis. 263, 116 N.W. 641 (1908).

99 Wiger v. Carr, 131 Wis. 584, 111 N.W. 647 (1907).
100 Mygatt v. Tarbell, 78 Wis. 351, 47 N.W. 618 (1890).
01 Supra, note 98.
102 Supra, note 99.
103 Supra, note 100.
104 Stack v. Roth Bros. Co., 162 Wis. 281, 156 N.W. 148 (1916).
105 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 323; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Crews, 51 Okla. 144, 151 Pac. 879 (1915).
' 0 6 Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 45 N.W. 21 (1890).
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to avoid any mistaken conception that choses in action are not to be
included within its scope.
The next key word of the statute, 10 7 namely, "of the value of fifty
dollars or upwards," further limits the scope of the statute of frauds,
restricting its scope to contracts to sell or sale of goods or choses in
action of the value of fifty dollars or more. 08 However, regardless of
whether the vendee is purchasing a full or partial interest in the property, the contract. is within the statute if the value of interest purchased is fifty dollars or over. 0 9 The value limit of the Wisconsin
statute is taken from the original English statute of frauds fixing the
limit at £10, which roughly translated corresponds to $50. It has been
suggested, that constantly rising price levels during the last two centuries have gradually made the statute applicable to smaller and smaller
sales and that the limit should be raised. The Uniform Sales Act, as
recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, fixes the
limit at $500 and this amount is fixed in most of the jurisdictions which
have adopted the act. However, the Wisconsin Legislature, notwithstanding the recommendation, has seen fit to retain the original limit.
Having considered what contracts are within the statute of frauds,
we next inquire what must be done in order to 'comply with the statute
if the contract in question is governed by it. Although the statute1,,
itself states the three alternate modes of compliance, yet a consideration of the decisions is necessary in order to properly interpret these
statutory requirements.
The first of the three alternate methods of satisfying the statute of
frauds is expressed as follows in the Wisconsin statute: "the buyer
shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be
sold or sold, and actually receive the same."" While the statute specifies acceptance and receipt as necessary requirements to satisfy the
statute, yet the words of the statute "actually receive the same" necessarily include delivery of the goods on the part of the seller."" There
could be no actual receipt on the part of the buyer unless the vendor
delivered the goods. Therefore to constitute a valid sale by a compliance with the first method, there must be 1) delivery of the goods;
2) receipt of the good; and 3) acceptance of the goods. 13
107 Wis'

STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).

108 Weston v. Dahl, 162 Wis. 32, 155 N.W. 949 (1916).
109
Gerndt v. Conradt, 117 Wis. 15, 93 N.W. 804 (1903).
0

"3 Supra, note 107.

21" Supra,note 107.
1'12Friedman v. Plous, 158 Wis. 435, 149 N.W. 218 (1914) ; Mellen Produce Co.
v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).

113 Supra, note 112; Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885); Bacon
v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227 (1877); Pike v. Vaughn, 34 Wis. 499; Smith v. Bouck,

33 Wis. 19 (1873).
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Considering the term "delivery," the decisions show that it must be
such a transfer of possession as the property is susceptible of ;114
mere words are not sufficient to constitute delivery." 5 A constructive
or symbolic delivery may satisfy the necessary transfer of possession
to constitute delivery in the case of articles incapable of actual manual
delivery. However, in such case the thing done to effect the transfer
and delivery must be such as to put the goods as fully in the actual
physical control of the buyer as of any other person.1 16 The Mahoney
case" 7' illustrates this rule. In that case an oral contract was made -for
the sale of the stock of a certain company but no stock had as yet been
printed or issued. However, after the making of the contract, the
seller (owner of all the stock) ceased to act as secretary, treasurer and
general manager, and he transferred his checking right to the buyer;
he took no further part at all in the management of the corporation.
The buyer took over the company, appointed his own manager, and
drew checks upon the company's funds in the bank. The issue in the
case was whether there was a sufficient delivery to satisfy the statute
of frauds. The court spoke as follows: "In view of the nature of the
subject matter sold it is difficult to see what more could have been
done to perform the contract. The certificates of stock were not printed
so could not be delivered. . . . The nature of the subject matter of
the sale in this case did not permit of a manual delivery, but delivery
so far as possible was made by plaintiff stepping out and the defendants stepping in. This constituted delivery and acceptance.""" However,
actual manual delivery of the goods is necessary in those cases where
such delivery is possible.'" Moreover, delivery of the goods is not
sufficient in itself to take the contract out of the statute of frauds; the
delivery must be under and pursuant to the contract." ° However, it is
not necessary that all of the goods be delivered in order to constitute
a sufficient delivery; a delivery of a portion of the goods will suffice.' 2
As to the time at which delivery must be made, proper delivery can be
made either when the agreement is made or afterwards.' 2 In certain
circumstances no semblance of an actual physical transfer of the goods
is necessary in order to constitute delivery although actual physical
114Supra, note 112; Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Machowsld, 171 Wis. 420, 177
N.W. 509 (1920).
:15Supra, note 112.
116 Mellen Produce

Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).
Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920).
11s Idem.
"1

1 9 Supra,note 116.
120 Libman v. Fox-Pioneer Scrap Iron Co., 175 Wis. 485, 185 N.W. 551 (1921).
121 Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Paley, 203 Wis. 447, 233 N.W. 619 (1931) ;
Gedanke v. Evaporated Milk Co., 215 Wis. 370, 254 N.W. 660 (1934) ; Gano
v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 1, 27 N.W. 628 (1886); New Richmond
Roller Mill Co. v. Arnquist, 170 Wis. 130, 174 N.W. 557 (1919).
122 Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615.
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transfer is possible. For example, where a person sells his property to
his bailee ;123 where the vendee constitutes the vendor his bailee of the
goods and the vendor thereafter holds these goods as bailee ;124 where
the vendor writes a notation to the effect that he holds the goods as
bailee for the vendee and vendee accepts this instrument ;125 where
the vendee of all the merchandise in a store places a sale sign across
the front of the building, takes the key and assumes control of the
store ;126 where the original vendee resells the property to the original
vendor before any delivery is made under the original sale.12 7 In the
Snider case'2
-1 the Wisconsin court said that "a person can.sell his property to his bailee and make a good delivery thereof without actually
taking the property into his own possession and then returning it to the
possession of the vendee." The court reasoned as follows: "The law is
founded in' reason and common sense, and requires the performance
of no such useless acts to make a sale valid."' 29 In the Janvrin case 30
the court stated that "parties contract without writing for the sale of
goods exceeding fifty dollars in value. There is no payment and no
delivery. The contract is void by statute. But the vendor says to the
vendee, 'I deliver the goods'; and the latter replies, 'I accept them, and
desire you to store them for me as my bailee,' and the contract is good!
.. If such a delivery and acceptance are actually made, it satisfies tle
letter of the statute." The Wisconsin court, in a later case,' 3 1 spoke as
follows: "It would seem that the giving of a written receipt for the
goods by Limits (seller), acknowledging that he held the goods subject to the order of the company, and the acceptance of such receipt
by the company, was a sufficient delivery and acceptance of them by
the company to take the case out of the statute." In an even more recent
case' 22the court held that: "His (buyer's) sign spread across the front
of the building was a public declaration that a delivery sufficient to
effect a sale had been made. His taking and retaining possession of
the key to the premises in which the goods were found, the assuming
control thereover, the subsequent sales by the clerk, all furnish ample
support for the conclusion . . . that there had been a delivery and

acceptance." On the question of retained possession by a repurchasing
vendor and delivery, the Wisconsin court set down the rule that the
retained possessions was equivalent to delivery; "no further delivery
123 Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N.W. 814 (1883).
' 24 Janvrin v. Maxwell, 23 Wis. 51, 82 N.W. 298 (1868).
125 Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71 Wis. 529, 37 N.W. 825 (1888).
26 Hansen v. Knutson Hrdw. Co., 182 Wis. 459, 196 N.W. 831 (1924).
' Couillard v. Johnson, 24 Wis. 533 (1869).
12s Supra note 123.
129 Supra, note 123.
130 Supra, note 124.
131
Supra, note 125.
' 32 Supra, note 126.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

was practicable or necessary in order to take the transaction out of the
1' 33
statute.
The Wisconsin cases are very much in accord on the question of
delivery with the exception of the Silkman case' 34 The Silkman case
is out of line with the tenor of a number of Wisconsin cases, but it is
especially at variance with the Snider case.2 5 The court in the Silkman
case says, that "the fact that the goods are already in the A's (buyer's)
possession under a prior understanding does not amount to a delivery
or acceptance. There must be some affirmative act of his to take the
case out of the statute."'" 8 A redelivery by the vendee to the vendor
and another delivery by the vendor to the vendee under the circumstances disclosed in the Silkman case would seem to be just such "useless acts" as the Snider case' 37 declared to be unnecessary.
The next two requirements under the first method-of complying
with the statute of frauds, namely, acceptance and receipt, can best
be considered together. The meaning of "acceptance" is stated in the
statute itself as follows: "There is an acceptance of goods within the
meaning of this section when the buyer, either before or after delivery
of the goods, expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming the
owner of those specified goods."'3 s The Wisconsin case of Friedman v.
Pious 3.8 9 points out the difference between acceptance and receipt and

a later Wisconsin case' 40 further defines receipt: "The statute seems to
separate acceptance from receipt and provide that the former requirement may be satisfied by words or conduct, while the latter presupposes
a delivery by the seller and requires some intentional act of receipt on
the part of the purchaser .... Mere words are not sufficient to establish ... receipt."' 41 "Obviously there can be no actual receipt on the
part of the purchaser in the absence of some affirmative action on his
42
part. Actual receipt cannot result from passive or negative conduct."'
However, a physical delivery is not always necessary to constitute receipt. If the nature of the subject matter of the sale is not such as is
capable of manual receipt, any constructive or symbolic receipt is sufficient to transfer possession and constitute a valid receipt. 43 'There
may be a transfer of possessions although the property remains with
the seller.... But in such case title and possession must be in the unre-

'33 Supra, note 127.

H. Silkman Lumber Co. v. Hunholz, 132 Wis. 610, 112 N.W. 1081 (1907).
135 Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 56, 14 N.W. 814 (1883).
188 Supra,note 134.
'3 Supra,note 135.
'8sWis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(3).
ISO Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435 (1914).
140 Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Machowski, 171 Wis. 420, 177 N.W. 509 (1920).
334J.

141
2

Supra,note 139.

Supra,note 140.
4
1'
Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).
14
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stricted control of the buyer, so as not to permit .or recall or recision."' 44 As to the time at which acceptance and receipt can be made,
it is evident from the statute (121.04) and the cases 45 that acceptance
,can be made either before or after the contract, and that receipt can be
made either at the time of the making or after the making of the contract. The Mellen Produce Co. case"4 6 states that "to enable acceptance
and receipt of part of the goods to vitalize the oral contract, it is not
necessary that they occur at the time the contract was made." The
Amson case 47 is to the same effecL Moreover, the fact that the vendee
has previously canceled the oral contract will not prevent the operation
of the acceptance and receipt theory if the vendee subsequently receives
and accepts the goods and gives the vendor no notification of rejection
within a reasonable time. 4 s However, where an owner makes an oral
contract of sale with one party and later makes a written contract of
sale with a bona fide third party, any subsequent delivery, acceptance
and receipt under the oral contract of sale after the execution of the
written contract is of no effect and does not take the prior oral con49
tract of sale out of the statute of frauds.
In many cases one of the two requirements is present but the other
is missing, and, as a result, 50 the contract fails. For example, in an
Illinois case the vendee received shares of stock manually but gave no
expression by word or conduct of his assent to become the owner of
the stock. The court held that that was a receipt but no acceptance.
In the Mellen Produce Co. case,' 5 ' the vendee inspected the lumber in
the vendor's yard and said it was satisfactory, but he left the lumber in
the vendor's yard and did no affirmative act in regard to it. The court
held that there was an acceptance but no receipt. However, the court
did point out that if the vendee had left some one in charge of the
lumber for him and thus obtained unrestricted control of title and

possession, there would have been a valid receipt even though the
lumber remained upon the vendor's land. A New York court' 12 held
that despite the fact that the vendee signed a receipt for the delivery
of needle-books as "in good order" and said "It is all right," and even
though the needle-books were left on the sidewalk in front of the
2" Supra, note 143; Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, 276 Pa. 404, 120 At. 396
(1923); Urbanski v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, 84 At. 317 (1912); Castle v.
Swift & Co., 132 Md. 631, 104 Atl. 187 (1918).
5
14 Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615; Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W.
754 (1920).
146
Supra,note 143.
' 47 Amson, Supra, note 145.
'14 James Talcott, Inc. v. Cohen, 226 Wis. 418, 275 N.W. 906 (1938).
-19 Gehl Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Hammond-Olsen Lumber Co., 184 Wis. 221, 199
N.W. 147 (1924).
150 Stewart v. Wis. Bridge & Iron Co., 17 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
'5' Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).

'52

Alfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461 (1892).
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buyer's place of business, nevertheless, there was no receipt within
the meaning of the statute of frauds. In the Spear case' 53 the vendor,
in pursuance of an oral contract, delivered stock to the vendee, but
the vendee, not having the purchase price with him, handed the stock
back to the vendor and told him to send the stock to a certain bank
with a draft drawn upon the vendee for the price. The court, in
deciding that there was no receipt and acceptance, held that the vendee
merely agreed to buy the stock and to accept and pay for it afterwards
at the bank. In the Roberts, Johnson, and Rand casel54 the vendee left
a shipment of defective shoes at a railroad depot for two and one-half
months and gave the vendor no notification of rejection. The court
held that there was neither an acceptance nor a receipt. In this regard,
the point is often made that delivery by the vendor to the railroad and
receipt by the railroad constitutes a delivery, acceptance and receipt
by the vendee. However, the decisions 55 show that delivery to a carrier for conveyance to the vendee is prima facie an actual receipt by
the vendee, a carrier being the vendee's agent to receive the goods
-but that the carrier is not the vendee's agent to accept the goods.
In the Weinrich case' 56 the New York court specifically states as follows: "Assuming that the delivery to the carrier was equivalent to an
actual receipt by the buyer, there has been no acceptance of the goods
..." However, inasmuch as acceptance and receipt need not be contemporaneous, and, since delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to
and receipt by the vendee, it would seem that if the vendee accepted
the goods by word or conduct before delivery to the carrier, then, upon
delivery to the carrier, the statute would be fulfilled.
The question is often raised whether a manual receipt of goods by
.the vendee is not always 'de facto' such conduct as to constitute an
"acceptance." This quaere is answered in the Bacon case 57 as follows:
"We think the question. must be answered in the negative. To hold
otherwise would be to hold that the words "accept" and "receive," as
used in the statute, are synonymous ....

When the seller gives to the

buyer the actual control of the goods, and the buyer accepts such control, he has actually received them. Such a receipt is often evidence of
an acceptance, but it is not the same thing. Indeed, the receipt by the
buyer may be, and often is, for the express purpose of seeing whether
he will accept or not." In order that a receipt may constitute an acceptance "there must be a vesting of the possession of the goods in the
vendee as absolute owner, discharged of all lien for the price on the
153 Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192, 52 N.W. 97 (1892).
.54 171 Wis. 420, 177 N.W. 509 (1920).
'S Hancock Knitting Mills Co. v. Weinreich, 262 N.Y.S. 837, 147 Mics. 235
(1933); Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass. 447, 7 Am. Rep. 545 (1870).
2 Hancock, Supra, note 155.
'5 Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227 (1877).
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part of the vendor, and an ultimate acceptance and receiving of the
property by the vendee, so significant that he shall have precluded himself from taking any exception to the quantum or quality of the goods
sold." 158 However, if the vendor delivers goods to the vendee in pursuance of an oral contract and if the vendee receives these goods with
intent to accept them in case they should agree with the sample, and if
they do actually agree with the sample, this is a complete "acceptance"
even though the vendee subsequently refuses to accept the goods.
The intention of the vendee to accept if the goods agree with the
sample, concurring with the fact that they did so agree, is held to
constitute a complete acceptance. 15 9
"Part perforpiance" is often spoken of as a method of satisfying
the statute of frauds. 160 However, this term designates no separate
manner of complying with the statute but is rather a form of compact
terminology for expressing the idea that a delivery, acceptance and
receipt have takdn place. 16 1
Whether or not oral "repurchase agreements," that is, promises to
repurchase the property from the vendee at the option of the vendee,
are rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds depends wholly
upon who makes the "repurchase" promise. If the vendor owner himself makes the "repurchase" promise as a condition of the sale, the
"repurchase" agreement is valid because "the whole constitutes but an
entire original contract that is sufficiently performed to take it out of
the statute of frauds" ;162 the agreement of the vendee to purchase and
the agreement of the vendor owner to repurchase are parts of an original and entire contract constituting a conditional sale, and the delivery
of the property and the payment of the purchase price satisfies the
statute of frauds. 16 3 Part performance is the ultimate basis for holding
such an agreement valid. If the vendor is selling goods as agent of
another, and, as part of the contract of sale enters into an individual
agreement to repurchase the goods, this "repurchase agreement" is
valid because "the contract between the agent and buyer is in the
nature of a contract of indemnity, which is neither a contract for the
sale of goods, ware, and merchandise, nor a contract to answer for
the debt default or miscarriage of another hence not within the statute
158 Idem.
'159IdeMin;

Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671 (1870).

160 Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920) ; Cotterill v. Stevens,

10 Wis. 422 (1860) ; Hankwitz v. 'Barrett, 143 Wis. 639, 128 N.W. 430 (1910) ;
Hoberg v. McNevins, 169 Wis. 486, 173 N.W. 221; Gano v. Chi. & N. W.
Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 1, 27 N.W. 628 (1886).
161 Idem.
162 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; Hankwitz v. Barrett,
143 Wis. 639, 128 N.W. 430 (1910).
63 Vohland v. Gelhaar, 136 Wis. 75, 116 N.W. 869 (1908); Hassey v. A. C.
Alleyn & Co., 28 N.E. (2d) 164 (1940).
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of frauds.' 6 4 The "repurchase agreement" is an original undertaking
made upon a valuable consideration and to subserve the business or
pecuniary purposes of the vendor agent. 65 The question of the enforceability of this type of "repurchase agreement" was merely raised by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Korrer case,' 66 but was expressly
1
' 8 If the
answered by the court in the cases of Lingelback 67 and Hull.
"repurchase promise" is made by a third person, this agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds even though made at the time
of the sale and even though it is an "inducing cause thereof because it
is a separate,' distinct and independent agreement from the contract
69
between the parties to the sale consummated.'1
The second method of complying with the statute of frauds is stated
in the statute as follows: "give something in earnest to bind the corftract, or in part payment.'1 7 0 Although the statute contains a disjunc-tive, yet in effect and to all intent and purposes it offers but one manner of compliance-namely, the giving of any personal property,
money or otherwise, as a part of the purchase price.' 71 This construction is placed upon the statute because the two key words of the disjunctive are practically synonymous. 72 "Today," said a New York
court, "the giving of earnest and part payment are practically synonymous. Some overt act is what the framers wanted in addition to
words of mouth. The statute places no limitation on the manner in
which payment shall be made... . The payment may be in the form
of any personal property. 'The statute requires that he should pay some
part of the purchase money. No doubt it must be taken, in its spirit,
to mean anything or part of anything given, by way of consideration,
which is money or money's worth. But the object was to have something pass between 'the parties besides mere words; some symbol like
earnest money'.'' 1 7 3 "Whatever may have been the meaning of the word
'earnest' its statutory meaning is part payment. . . . 'Earnest' seems
understood to be a part of the price'."' 1 4 However, part payment can
be made in many different ways other than by the manual transfer of
money or personal property. For example, a promise to pay the seller's
creditor, accepted by the latter, who thereupon discharges the seller, is
Lingelbach v. Luckenbach, 168 Wis. 481, 170 N.W. 711 (1919).
Hull v. Brown, 35 Wis. 652; Cooper v. Huerth, 156 Wis. 346, 146 N.W. 485.
166 Supra,note 162.
167 Supra,note 164.
168 Supra, note 165.
169 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; Becher v. Kreul,
164
'18

173 Wis. 273 (1921); Felton v. Cherkasky, 234 Wis. 223, 290 N.W. 591 (1940).
(1941) § 121.04(1).
R. Ablett Co. v. Sencer, 224 N.Y.S. 251, 130 Misc. 416 (1927).
" Idem.; Weidner v. Hyland, 216 Wis. 12, 255 N.W. 134 (1934).
173 Iden.
17oWis. STAT.
'71 Charles
2

174

Groomer v. McMillan, 143 Mo. App. 612, 128 S.W. 285 (1910).
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a part payment within the statute ;175 the fact that the buyer gives credit
to the seller on the debt he owes the buyer is "as much a payment for
them (the goods purchased) as though the money had been paid over
for them."' 76 The actual surrender of the seller!s promissory note by
the buyer; as part of the purchasd money foi goods purchased, is also
77
such a part payment as will take the sale out of the statute of 'frauds.
Nevertheless, in order to constitute part payment, the payment must
run primarily'from the vendee to the vendor.17 For example, neither
the payment of a commission by a vendor to a broker for selling property, nor the transfer of the property by the vendor to the purchaser
constitutes the giving of "something in earnest to bind the contract, or
in part payment."' 9 The quaere concerning whether the giving of a
check is payment within the statute of frauds is answered. as follows
by the Missouri court: "Nothing is better settled than that a check is
not payment, but is only so when the cash is received on it. There is
no presumption that a creditor takes a check in payment arising from
the mere fact that he acceptes it from his debtor. The presumption is
just the contrary. Where payment is made by check drawn by a
debtor on his banker, this is merely a mode of making a cash payment, and not giving or accepting a security. Such payment is only
conditional, or a means of obtaining the money. In one sense the holder
of the check becomes the agent of the drawer to collect the money
on it; and if it is dishonored there is no accord and satisfaction of the
debt."8 0
_As to the time within which the payment of some portion of the
purchase price must be made in order to comply with the statute, all
of, the Wisconsin decisions' 8 ' hold that such "payment . . . must be
made at the time the contract was entered into, and a subsequent payment does not meet the requirements of the statute," except "where
there is a distinct, intelligent reference by both parties, where the payment is made, to the previous void contract, and a declared intent to
make the agreement valid and binding according to the tenor of the
previous negotiation; there the sale may be deemed made in fact 8ats2
that time, and the requirements of the statute are fully satisfied."'
However, in view of the fact that all of these decisions are based upon
the previous version of the statute of frauds which expressly stated
75 Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis. 423 (1860).
276

Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71 Wis. 529, 37 N.W. 825 (1888).

17

Sharp

v. Carroll, 66 Wis. 62, 27 N.W. 832 (1886).

SSchwanke v. Dhein, 215 Wis. 61, 254 N.W. 346 (1934).
79
80 Idem.
o Supra, note 174.

181 Bates v. Cheesbro, 32 Wis. 594 (1873) ; Kerhof v. Atlas Paper Co., 68 Wis.
674, 32 N.W. 766 (1887) ; Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 45 N.W.
21 (1890); Crosby Hrdw. Co. v. Trester, 90 Wis. 412 (1895).
182 Bates, Supra, note 181.
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that the part payment must be made "at the time" of the making of
the contract, and also declared that unless the statute was complied
with the contract would be "void,' 183 these cases are not determinative
in construing the present statute. New York, however, has had occasion to decide upon this very point under the present statute, and, in
so deciding, spoke as follows: "The Legislature has enacted the Uniform Sales of Goods Act as the law of this state.... It will be noted
that the requirement for part payment to be made at the time is
omitted, thus changing the law of this state.... In my opinion, it is
now the law of this state that neither acceptance, receipt nor part
payment need be contemporaneous with the making of the contract,
but may occur at any time thereafter, if under the contradt and prior
to its revocation."184 In another case involving the identical issue, the
New York court stated that "the amendment of the statute of frauds
has eliminated the requirement that the part payment must be made
'at the time' of making the contract."' 8 5 In view of these decisions construing the Uniform Sales Act, it can be said with reasonable certainty
that in Wisconsin, as in New York, neither delivery, acceptance, receipt
nor part payment need be contemporaneous with the making of the
oral contract if made under the contract and prior to its revocation.
The third and most common method of satisfying the statute of
frauds is expressed as follows in the statute: "unless some note or
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party
to be charged or his agent in that behalf."' 8 6 In considering this manner of complying with the statute, it is to be noted that this clause
refers not to a written contract but to a written note or memorandum
of the existing oral contract. The interpretation to be placed on the
two key words' "note or memorandum" is stated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as follows: "It is not necessary in order to take the
contract of sale out of the statute of frauds that there be a formal
written contract, nor is it necessary that the written memorandum be
complete in one writing .... It is well established that a complete contract, binding under the statute of frauds, may be gathered from letters, writings, and telegrams between the parties relating to the subject
matter of the contract and so connected with each other that they may
be fairly said to constitute one paper relating to the contract, though
only one of the papers may be signed by the party to be charged. ...
However, it must appear from the several writings, without resorting
183 Supra, note 181.

184

Gordon v. Witty, 198 App. Div. 333, 190 N.Y.S. 381 (1921).

Meyers v. Kaufman, 110 Misc. Rep. 321, 180 N.Y.S. 403 (1920).
88 Wis.STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).

185
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to parol evidence, what the contract is.'' 8 7 Letters, 18s receipts, 8 9 order
93
92
9
deeds,'1 wills,'
blanks, 190 statements of account,' ' notes," checks,

pleadings, 9 6 advertisements,'19 7 records of municipal affairs, 198 telegrams 99 and memorandum books200 have all be held to be notes or
memorandums within the meaning of the statute. As to the actual contents of the note or memorandum, it must state 1) the parties, and
their respective identities ;201 2) the consideration or price, if the price
has not been paid; if the price has been paid, it need not be specifically
stated ;202 3) the subject matter of the contract ;203 and 4) the signature of the person to be charged.2 0 4 In regard to the description of the
subject matter of the goods, Wisconsin holds that the memorandum of
a sales contract need not describe the goods so minutely and exactly
as to exclude the possibility that other goods than those intended will
fall within the words of the writing; no more is required than that
there be reasonable certainty. 20 As to the time when the note or
memorandum must be made, the cases hold that they may be made at
any time before the action is brought. 00 Further, it is not necessary that
20 7
they be made with the intent of making a note or memorandum.
Concerning the issue of whether or not the note or memorandum must
be delivered in order to satisfy the statute, Williston, citing Wisconsin
authority, 208 says as follows: "Since the memorandum need not itself
be a contract and intent to make it is not requisite, it should follow,
187

S.T. Edwards & Co. v. Shawano Milk Products Co., 211 Wis. 378, 247 N.W.

465 (1933); Western Metals Co. v. Hartman I. M. Co., 303 Ill. 479, 135 N.E.
744 (1922); Singleton v. Hill, 91 Wis. 51, 64 N.W. 588.
188 Hawkinson v. Harmon, 69 Wis. 551, 35 N.W. 28 (1887) ; Schmoll v. Wheeler,
242 Mass. 464, 136 N.E. 164 (1922).
'9 Wis. Club v. John, 202 Wis. 476, 233 N.W. 79.
190 Pearlberg v. Levishon, 112 Misc. 95, 182 N.Y.S. 615 (1920).
'91 Davis v. Arnold, 267 Mass. 103, 165 N.E. 885 (1929).
192 Phillips v. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633 (1876).
193 Harper v. Battle, 180 N.C. 375, 104 S.E. 658 (1920).

194
Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437 (1877).
3.95 N aylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S.W. 117 (1912).
196

Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291 (1913).

197 LaForme v. Bradley, 77 N.H. 128, 88 Atl. 1000 (1913).
198

McManus v. Boston, 171 Mass. 152, 50 N.E. 607 (1889).

199 Tarbell Co. v. Grimes, 84 N.H. 219, 149 Atl. 73 (1930) ; St. Edwards Co. v.
200
20
1

Shawano Milk Products Co., 211 Wis. 378, 247 N.W. 465 (1933).
Weiner v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 298, 10 N.W. 433.

Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 162 N.E. 4 (1928) ; Frank v. Ettringham,
65 Miss. 281, 3 So. 655 (1888).

Weidner v. Nat'l. Fisheries Co., 173 Wis. 559, 181 N.W. 719; Choate v. Hoogstraat, 105 Fed. 713 (C.C.A. 7th, 1901) ; Coxe v. Milbrath, 110 Wis. 499, 86
20 N.W. 174 (1901).
3 Kronfeld v. Natelson, 187 N.Y.S. 449 (1921).
204WIS. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).
202

205

Zimmerman Bros. & Co. v. First Nat'l. Bank, 219 Wis. 427, 263 N.W. 361

(1935).
2(6 Louisville
Trust Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Ky., 3 F. Supp. 909 (D.C. Ky. 1933);

Fellows Box Co. v. Mills, 86 N.H. 267, 167 Ati. 153 (1933).

208 Idefll,
Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437 (1877).
207
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especially in view of the fact that neither the original statute, nor its
successors, mentions delivery, that a writing retained wholly within
the control of the party to be charged, but which complies with the
other requirements of the statute, should be a sufficient memorandum.

20 9

Any writing by hand, or printed, or typewritten is sufficient to
satisfy the qualifying term "in writing."210
As to the nature of the signature required by the statute, any signature in the form of writing, stamping, printing or typewriting .is
sufficient to meet the calls of the statute if made with the intention of
authentically and finally adopting it as one's own.211 Ii is to be noted
also that, in view of the fact that the note or memorandum is not a
contract, it is not compulsory that both parties to the contract sign; it
is necessary only that one party sign, namely, the party to be charged
or his agent. 212 Moreover, "for the purpose of satisfying the provisions
of a statute requiring a note or memorandum to be signed by the
party to be charged or by his agent,.a memorandum signed by a properly authorized agent with or without indication of the existence or
identity of the principal is sufficient to charge the principal."21 3 On the
question of whether or not the agent must be authorized in writing it
is held in the Kreutzer case214 that in the absence of statutory requirement, an agent need not be authorized in writing to sign a note or
memorandum of a contract for a sale.
Having considered what contracts are within the scope of the
statute of frauds and the three alternate methods of satisfying the
statute the question arises as to who can raise the statute of frauds
as a defense. This is answered in Wisconsin by two cases-the
Draper case21 5 and the Gehl case.2 1 From a reading of these cases it is

evident that the defense of the invalidity of a contract of sale under
the statute of frauds is a personal defense and is not available to
strangers to the contract. Like usury, infancy, and various other
defenses, it can only be relied upon by parties of privies. 1 7 Consequently, where a vendor, by written contract, sells hay to vendee A and
209
210

II WILLISTON, CONTRACTs, No. 579A, p. 1666.

Garton Toy Co. v. Buswell Lumber & Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 341, 136 N.W. 147

(1912).

211Idem; 54 Wis. 214, 11 N.W. 534; 56 Wis. 292, 14 N.W. 465; 104 Wis. 614,

80 N.W. 530; Lee v. Vaughn Seed Store, 101 Ark. 68, 141 S.W. 496 (1911).
WIs. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1); Bogigian v. Booklover's Library, 193 Mass.
444, 79 N.E. 769 (1907).
213Dodge v. Blood, 299 Mich. 369, 300 N.W. 121 (1941), Estate of Kaiser;
Krause v. First Wis. Trust Co., 217 Wis. 4, 258 N.W. 177 (1935) ; Kirschbon
v. Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178, 29 N.W. 907.
214 Kreutzer v. Lynch, 122 Wis. 474, 100 N.W. 887 (1904).
215 Draper v. Wilson, 143 Wis. 510, 128 N.W. 66.
216 Gehl Bros Mfg. Co. v. Hammond-Olsen Lumber Co., 184 Wis. 221, 199 N.W.
147 (1924).
217 Supra,note 215.
2 12
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later sells the same hay to vendee B by an oral contract, vendee A
cannot raise the statute of frauds in regard to the oral contract between the vendor and vendee B.214 Vendee A is a stranger to the
oral contract. But, where the vendor makes an oral contract of sale
to vendee C first and then sells the same property to vendee D by a
written contract, vendee D can raise the statute of frauds as to the
prior oral contract619 because by making this subsequent written contract of sale the vendor "de facto" repudiated the previous oral contract. The vendor, upon making this subsequent written contract,
said, in effect, to vendee C, "Our contract is unenforceable because
not in writing and I am repudiating it. Therefore, vendee D is not
raising the statute of frauds to question the validity of an oral contract to which he is a stranger; he is merely availing himself of the
fact that the vendor used the statute of frauds to repudiate a prior
oral contract of sale which he, the vendor himself, had made with
vendee C in regard to the same property which he later sold to vendee
D by a written contract.
Concerning the question of oral modification of a contract within
the statute of frauds, the authorities are in accord that no oral modification of the essential terms of a contract required to be in writing
is permitted.22 0 However, no case holds that a collateral agreement
referred to in a contract required to be in writing must be regarded as
22
an essential element of such contract, or that it is within the statute. '
Consequently, a collateral agreement as to wages can be orally modified
though contained in a written contract of sale which, under the statute
of frauds, is required to be in writing.2 22 However, there is one basis
upon which an oral modification of the essential terms of a written
contract within the statute of frauds is permitted, namely, upon the
doctrine of estoppel.2 3 One party to a contract cannot invoke the
statute of frauds to close the door to a trap in which the other party
may be caught by reason of having relied upon an oral agreement
made between the parties. 224 For example, where the parties to a written contract within the statute of frauds make an oral agreement
extending the time for delivery, and the seller relies upon the oral
agreement and would have made delivery within the time specified
218
219
220

Supra,note 215.
Supra,note 216.

Gutknecht v. C. A. Lawton Co., 231 Wis. 413, 285 N.W. 411 (1939) ; Hansen
v. Gunderson, 95 Wis. 613, 70 N.W. 827 (1897); Saveland v.. Western Wis.
Ry. Co., 118 Wis. 267, 95 N.W. 130 (1903) ; Schaas v. Wolf, 173 Wis. 351,
181 N.W. 214 (1921); Gether v. R. Connor Co., 196 Wis. 25, 219 N.W. 373

(1928).

Gutknecht, Supra, note 220.
Gutknecht, Supra, note 220.
Hirsch Rolling Mill Co. v. Milw. & Fox River Valley, 165 Wis. 220, 161 N.W.
22 4 741 (1917).
1dernt
221
222
223
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in the written contract if he had not relied on this oral agreement,
the buyer is estopped from asserting that this oral modification of
the written contract was invalid under the statute of frauds.' 5
Whether or not the statute of frauds is a just and equitable law
has often been questioned. It has been asserted that the statute has
outlived its usefulness and is out of place amid the changed legal and
commercial conditions of today.22 6 This viewpoint has its foundation
in the fact that some of the original reasons for requiring the writing,
such as the interest disqualification of the party to a lawsuit have now
disappeared and that it appears to furnish opportunity for a fraudulent defendant to avoid an honest bargain on the mere technical defense
of the statute. However the Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken a
favorable attitude toward the statute, the court expressing itself in
Korrer v. Madden 27 as follows: "The statute of frauds sometimes
works hardships, but it is the law as written by our lawmaking power,
and it is the duty of the courts to enforce it in all cases which come
fairly within its scope. ,Our statute is substantially taken from Statute
29, Cor. II, which has stood the test of over two centuries of time and
change. The English statute was incorporated in our statute law in 1849
and has since remained there without substantial change or amendment. This is pretty substantial evidence that the good which it has
accomplished far outweighs any wrong that has resulted from its
operation.

' 8
22

225 Ide .
226
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152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913).
22S Idem.
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NOTES
DENIAL OF COUNSEL TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
IN STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS AS A VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS
Does the clause of the 14th Amendment assuring to every person due process before he can be deprived of life, liberty or property,
require that a state court, in all criminal cases, provide counsel for
an indigent defendant?
Assistance of counsel in criminal cases is clearly set forth in the
Bill of Rights, Sixth Amendment, of the federal Constitution which
provides:
"In all criminal prosecution the accused shall enjoy the right
* * * to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
But the Bill of Rights is applicable to the Federal government only
and consequently this provision has application only to criminal trials
in the federal courts and not in state courts.' However, the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment while it incorporates none of the specific
guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment and other provisions of
the Bill of Rights2 has been interpreted as safeguarding certain of the
fundamental rights embodied in the Bill against invasion by the state,
one of which is assistance of counsel in criminal cases. 3 But the guarantee is not an absolute one. Whatever conclusion to the contrary
may fairly be drawn from expressions of early text writers as well
as expressions found in the cases 4 it is now settled law that an indfUnited States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467, 487, 14 L.Ed. 755; Twitchell v.
Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321, 325, 19 L.Ed. 223; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131,
166, 8 S.Ct. 21, 22, 24, 31 L.Ed. 80; In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200. 219, 8 S.Ct. 482,
492,31 L.Ed. 402; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U.S. 394,397, 8 S.Ct. 443, 444, 31 L.Ed.

454; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 34, 35, 10 S.Ct. 424, 425, 33
L.Ed. 801; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263, 24 S.Ct. 650, 652, 48 L.Ed.
965; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 172, 26 S.Ct. 189, 190, 50 L.Ed. 421;

Betts v. Brady, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1116.

2Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 292, 28 L.Ed. 232; Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 44 L.Ed. 597; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S.
258, 24 S.Ct. 650, 48 L.Ed. 965; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct.
14, 53 L.Ed. 97; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969;

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674; Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288; Betts v. Brady, supra.

3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 L.Ed. 158, 53 S.Ct. 55 (Ala. 1932);

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 292 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660.
4"The presence advice and assistance of counsel," is said by Story to be
necessarily included in "due process of law." STORY, CoNSTrTUTION, p. 668.
That provision (Sixth Amendment) "was inserted in the Constitution
because the assistance of counsel was recognized as essential to any fair trial
of a case against a prisoner." Ex Parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, cited
with approval in Powell v. Alabama, supra.
"What * * * does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our
own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel
when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. * * * Even the

intelligent and educated layman * * * lacks both the skill and knowledge

NOTES

gent prisoner in a state court has no absolute right to assistance of
counsel in his defense, and a denial of counsel does not in every case
violate due process, but each case depends upon its own particular circumstances. Broadly speaking, due process is violated where there is a
"conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." 5 But to determine whether there is such a lack of fundamental fairiess each case
must be tested by an appraisal of all the facts and asserted denial of
due process will be sustained only where the Supreme Court is satisfied on the whole record that the accused tried without counsel has
been handicapped by such fact and has not had a fair trial.
What then are the circumstances disclosed by the record which will
lead to the conclusion that the trial was or was not offensive to due
process?
The factors upon which the Supreme Court of the United States
based its decision in Betts v. Brady,8 that the refusal of a trial court to
appoint counsel for a defendant charged with robbery was not a denial
of due process, were these: the age of the defendant, the degree of his
intelligence, prior convictions familiarizing him with court procedure,
and the simplicity of the issue before the court. Said the court: " * * *
the accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years old,
of ordinary intelligence and ability to take care of his own interests on
the trial of that narrow issue." (The simple issue in this case was the
veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the defendant, the
only defense in the case being an alibi.) "He had once before been in
a criminal court, pleaded guilty to larceny and served a sentence and
was not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure."
In reaching its decision in Smith v. O'Grady that due process had
been denied to a defendant charged with burglary, the Supreme Court
took into consideration the degree of intelligence of the accused, and
the fact that there were no prior convictions. The decision was based
also on the false statements of law enforcement officers inveigling the
accused into pleading guilty by promising him a light sentence. Another
factor leading to the court's decision was the policy of the state
(Nebraska) in which the crime was committed, the state law requiring
appointment of counsel for a person on trial for the offence involved."
"The circumstances under which petitioner asserts he was entrapped
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel in every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence." Powell v. Alabama,
supra.
5
6 Betts v. Brady, supra.
Betts v. Brady, supra.
7 Smith v. O'Grady, 61 S.Ct. 572, 312 U.S. 329, 85 L.Ed. 859 (Nebraska, 1941).
8 Nebraska, General Statutes, 1873, C. 58 (437).
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and imprisoned in the penitentiary are wholly irreconcilable with the
constitutional safeguards of due process. For his petition presents a
picture of a defendant, without counsel, bewildered by court processes
strange and unfamiliar to him, and inveigled by false statements of
state law enforcement officers into entering a plea of guilty."
The bases for the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama9
were the policy of the state in which the crime occurred in respect to
appointment of counsel, the age of the defendants, the intelligence and
amount of education of the defendants, the nature of the crime committed, and the particular incidents of the trial. From these elements
the court drew its conclusion that the defendants had been denied due
process of law, although counsel had volunteered a few minutes before
the trial to act in their behalf. "The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiments, haled back and forth under
guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with
especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, were
thus put in peril of their lives within a few minutes after counsel for
the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them." "Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.
To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities." According to the Constitution of the state of Alabama the accused shall enjoy
the right to have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions;
and a state statute requires the appointment of counsel for a defendant
who is financially unable so to provide for himself. In this case the
State Supreme Court held that these provisions had not been violated.
The Supreme Court of the United States could not interfere with this
holding; but it could, and did, decide that refusal to appoint counsel,
under the circumstances, amounted to a denial of due process. "All
that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital
case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of
due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment
at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving
of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."
An illustration of a State court reaching different conclusions as to
the fairness of trial had without counsel, upon consideration of different circumstances disclosed by the record is afforded by the cases of
Smith v. State1 ° and Coates.v. Smith." The cases were decided by the
9 Powell v. Alabama, supra.

lo Smith v. State, 25 A. (2d) 681 (Maryland, 1942).
11 Coates v. Smith, 25 A.(2d) 676 (Maryland, 1942).
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same court in the state of Maryland within a short time of each
other. In each case the elements of age, previous criminal record,
experience in -court procedure, and amount of protection afforded by
the court during the trial were considered. The charges in both cases
were robbery and assault. In Smith v. State the accused was thirty
years of age at the time of the trial, had served a jail sentence and
sentences in the state penitentiary, was familiar with criminal trials,
and was well protected, as the record showed by the court during the
trial. The court refused to reverse the conviction. The defendant in the
case of Coates v. Smith, on the other hand, was only nineteen years
of age, had had no experience in court procedure, and was given little
or no protection by the court during his trial. Confessions not properly
introduced were used against him. In drawing its conclusion in the
latter case the court said: "* * * the prisoner although vicious, was
young and ignorant and unaccustomed to court procedure and apparently incapable of taking an active part in his trials. The penalties
hanging over him were severe. The more revolting the crime and the
worse the situation appears for him the more necessary it is that he
have the protection of his legal rights. As care for his interests has
now been made an essential in some cases, we think in these cases now
before us he should have been provided at the outset with counsel."
It is the policy of the state of Maryland to provide counsel only
for persons charged with capital crimes.
From the above cases it may be concluded that the factors which the
court will take into consideration in determining whether or not the
refusal to appoint counsel in a particular case amounted to a denial of
due process may be outlined as follows:
1) The policy of the particular state as to the appointment of
counsel.
2) The age of the defendant.
3) The amount of education, or degree of intelligence, of the
defendant.
4) Prior conviction for crime familiarizing him with court procedure.
5) Knowledge of court procedure.
6) The nature of the crime charged.
7) The nature of the issues involved, i.e. whether simple or
complex.
8) The degree of protection given by the court to the accused
during the course of the trial.
In addition to this the court will take into consideration those circumstances which can be classified only under the broad heading of
incidents peculiar to the trial. This would include such elements as
public sentiment as to the crime or as to the defendant, fraud on the
part of law-enforcement officers, and others, varying with the case.
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The problem as to the appointment of counsel arises not so frequently in capital as in non-capital cases. In the former the policy of
the states generally is to require appointment. In the latter, the policy
varies. Twenty-five of the states require, by statute, that an indigent
defendant be provided with counsel in a non-capital as well as in a
capital case; and eight other states impose the same requirement by
judicial decision or by established practice judicially approved. Two of
the states have constitutional provisions to this effect, while nine others
have neither constitutional provision, statute, nor judicial decision
establishing the requirement. 12
Notwithstanding that it is historically sound, it does not seem
entirely satisfying to say that the Constitution of the United States does
not, even where a felony is charged, require counsel to be appointed by
the state for indigent defendants in all cases. This denies them an important right enjoyed by those more fortunately situated in an economic way. "A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right'," says Mr. Justice Black in his
dissenting opinion in the case of Betts v. Brady,13 "which subjects
innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely because of
their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a
trial in which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with a satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant's case
was adequately presented." "Any other practice," (than that which
assures that no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of
his poverty) "seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic,
society to provide equal justice under the law."
The policy of the state of Wisconsin as established by Article I,
section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution as construed in the case of
Carpenter v. Dane County 4 is a most liberal and ideal one. In all
cases of felony appointment of counsel is required, unless it is expressly
waived, and in cases of misdemeanor appointment is allowed when the
court deems it necessary to afford a fair trial to the accused. By thus
limiting the exercise of the court's discretion adequate protection would
seem to be secured to indigent defendants. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in declaring the state's policy, said in Carpenter v. Dane
County: "* * * would it not be a little like mockery to secure to a

pauper those solemn constitutional guarantees for a fair and full trial
of the matters with which he was charged, and yet say to him on trial,
that he must employ his own counsel, who could alone render these
guarantees of any real permanent value to him. *** Why this great
' 2 Betts v. Brady, supra.
13Betts v. Brady, supra.
14 Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (1859).
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solicitude to secure him a fair trial if he cannot have the benefit of
counsel ?" 5
The question of expense may be raised since the burden of paying
the fees of counsel appointed falls on the county. In Milwaukee County
Municipal Court where counsel is appointed for an average of thirtyfive to forty per cent of the felony cases tried, the cost has not been
found to be exhorbitant. Investigation has shown that the sum expended
annually for the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
amounts, approximately, to only one-eighth of that spent to maintain
the District Attorney's office and staff over the same period of time.
Surely, that the innocent be not deprived of liberty is as important
as that the guilty be punished. "It is not to be thought of, in a civilized
community, for a moment," says the Supreme Court of Indiana, "that
any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty should be debarred of
counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid. No Court could
be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The defense
of the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere, which will be
at once conceded as essential to the accused, to the Court, and to the
public."' 16
JOAN MOONAN.

15 This statement was quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Black's dissenting

opinion in Betts v. Brady, supra.
16 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.
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ABSOLUTE OR LIMITED DIVORCE JUDGMENTS
UNDER SECTION 247.09 OF THE
WISCONSIN STATUTES
A problem confronting divorce courts in this state almost daily
arises out of section 247.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes. It reads:
"A divorce from the bond of matrimony may also be adjudged
for either of the causes specified in the second and third subdivisions of section 247.08 whenever, in the opinion of the court,
the circumstances are such that it would be discreet and proper
so to do."
The subdivisions referred to are as follows:
"(2) Extreme cruelty of either party
(3) On the complaint of the wife, when the husband, being
of sufficient ability, shall refuse or neglect to provide for
her or when his conduct toward her is such as may
render it unsafe and improper for her to live with him."'
It is clear that the court with jurisdiction in matters of divorce have
the power under section 247.09 to grant an absolute divorce upon
grounds which are declared in section 247.08 to be cause for a limited
divorce. The question here raised is two fold: first, have the divorce
courts, under section 247.09, the power to grant an alsolute divorce
when only a limited divorce is prayed for in the complaint; secondly,
if the courts do have such power should such absolute discretion be
vested in them.
The first question finds its answer in the cases which appear to
stand as precedent in this state. As far as research herein has revealed
there are only three cases which involve this problem directly, the most
recent of which is Sang v. Sang.2 In that case the plaintiff husband
sued for a divorce from bed and board but the trial court granted an
absolute divorce to the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the plaintiff sought modification of the judgment so as to grant a limited divorce in accordance
with his complaint. While the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction over the
parties, it stated the law to be that "the trial court may grant an absolute divorce although the prayer be for one from bed and board." This
case cited In re Estate of Kehl,3 and Shequin v. Shequin4 as controlling
precedent.
In the case of In re Estate of Kehl,5 the language of the trial court
upon rendering the judgment indicated rather clearly that an absolute
STAT. (1941) 247.08(2) (3).
N.W. (2d) 340, April, 1942.
3215 Wis. 353, 254 N.W. 639 (1934).
4161 Wis. 183, 152 N.W. 823 (1915).
5Supra,note 3.
IWis.

23
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divorce was granted though the prayer of the complaint was for a
limited divorce only. The appellants in the supreme court insisted that
it was a divorce a vinculo, the respondent that it was a limited divorce.
Upon deciding the issue, the supreme court said: "It is true that a
court may grant a divorce a vinculo although the prayer of the complaint be for one from bed and board. But the prayer of the complaint,
with nearly all judges, we believe, controls the nature of the judgment
granted by the court especially when the defendant interposes no objection, and none was interposed herein. We consider the real intention of
the court was to render a judgment in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint." While this case is clearly in line with the position taken
in Sang v. Sang6 as to the discretionary power of the court, it lends
support to the view that the prayer of the complaint should be the basis
for the judgment.
The earliest and leading case in point is Shequin v. Shequin.7 In this
case, the complaint, as amended before trial, was for a divorce a mensa
et thoro. An absolute divorce was granted, however, at the request of
the defendant who was the guilty party. The plaintiff appealed. The
supreme court said that "the mere fact that the prayer of the complaint
asked for a limited divorce did not preclude the court from granting
a divorce from the bonds when the proof warranted such a judgment."
This language upholds the statements in Sang v. Sangs and In re Estate
of Kehl.9 But it should be noted that in Shequin v. Shequin 0 it was
shown by the defendant that the plaintiff's attorneys consented to the
judgment for an absolute divorce; and the supreme court held the
plaintiff bound thereby. In Shequin v. Shequin, the court cited Dutcher
v. Dutcher" as precedent for the discretionary power of the court to
grant an absolute divorce though only a limited divorce is prayed for.
Dutcher v. Dutcher does not seem to involve this problem directly or
indirectly, nor does it discuss the statute out of which this problem
arises. The only possible language therein, it seems, which might have
been construed as relating to the question is as follows:
"It has been seen that this case was in the minds of the revisers
in New York, and influenced them in framing the divorce statute
from which section 13 in our statute is copied, and on which our
whole statute is largely modeled. And accordingly we find the
New York statute in terms permissive both as to judgments of
nullity and judgments of divorce. In our statute, the provisions
for judgments of nullity or affirmance of marriage are in terms
6Supra, note 2.
7
Supra,note 4.
8Supra, note 2.
9Supra, note 3.

10 Supra, note 4.

1139 Wis. 651 (1874).
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obligatory, and for judgments for divorce in terms permissive
throughout; a distinction of language in kindred sections in the
same statute pregnant with meaning.
The rule that may means shall in statutes where the public
or individuals have a claim de jure to the exercise of the power
conferred, is not overlooked. But we have the great authority of
Chancellor Kent for holding permissive words in the grant of
this peculiar jurisdiction, to imply a sound judicial discretion in
its exercise; strongly fortified here by the abrupt transition of
the statute from uniformly obligatory words in one branch of
the jurisdiction conferred, to uniformly permissive words in the
other; an antithesis precluding oversight and implying design. '' 2
While this language does not seem to justify the broad statement in
Shequin v. Shequin,1 3 the fact remains that ever since that decision the
trial courts have taken the position that they have the power to grant
an absolute divorce under section 247.09 irrespective of the prayer of
the complaint so long as the proof warrants such a judgment, and the
broad language of the cases above cited justifies this view.
As to the second question, namely, whether or not the courts should
be vested with this broad discretion, it is the opinion of the writer
that the courts should not possess this power. This opinion is based,
first, upon the statute itself; secondly, upon authorities holding that
relief granted must be in conformity with the demands of the complaint; and lastly, upon justice and sound social policy.
Under section 247.09, an absolute divorce may be granted 1) for
extreme cruelty of either party, 2) on the complaint of the wife,
when the husband, being of sufficient ability, shall refuse or neglect to
provide for her or when his conduct toward her is such as may render
it unsafe and improper for her to live with him. It must be remembered, however, that these grounds are originally grounds only for a
limited divorce under section 247.08 and they are made grounds for
an absolute divorce only by virtue of section 247.09. In other words,
in the absence of section 247.09 it would be impossible to obtain an
absolute divorce upon these grounds. It seems, therefore, that the
statute was intended to grant an adequate remedy to the complaining
party where, in the absence of the statute, such remedy would not
exist. It does not seem to have been the intention of the legislature
that this statute should be, in effect, a subdivision of section 247.08 so
as to give the courts the power to grant, in its discretion, an absolute
divorce without regard for the prayer of the litigants. Further, the
discretionary power seems to be given in this statute so that the court
may decide from the circumstances of the case whether or not a party
'1

Dutcher v. Dutcher, 1847, 39 Wis. 651, pp. 666-667.

Supra, note 4.
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seeking the remedy of an absolute divorce under this statute should be
granted such remedy.
As far as actions in the courts are concerned, divorce actions are
treated the same as other cases. And in cases generally, at law or in
equity, the demands of the complaint control and limit the relief
granted by the judgment. The state of Wisconsin has so provided by
statute14 and the courts have upheld the statute in their decisions.,
It is true that this statute on the measure of relief provides that where
an answer is interposed to the complaint the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. 16 There is no apparent reason why this general
rule should not apply to divorce actions under section 247.09, at least
where the judgment is taken by default, when it does as a matter of
7
fact apply to other aspects of a divorce action. In Hoh v. Hoh'
the complaint in the divorce action demanded relief only as'to alimony
and temporary allowances. The trial court granted a default judgment
for a division of the husband's property. Upon appeal the judgment
of the trial court was held erroneous as granting a remedy outside the
prayer of the complaint.
The danger of vesting this power in divorce courts which are so
fundamentally vital to the proper and wholesome xirection of a sound
social policy of which marriage is in many ways the basis, is a real
one. If this power to grant an absolute divorce without at least the
consent of the parties when only a limited divorce is requested continues to exist in the courts the ends of social evils and injustice can
only be served: social evil, because divorce always affects society and
judgments for absolute divorce without regard for the desire of the
litigants seems to lead to no apparent good to society; injustice, because
this power may violate the rights of individuals who have moral convictions and reasons opposed to absolute divorce whether these convictions or reasons be religious or personal in character. Socially and in
justice, then, no litigant should be subjected to such complete judicial
discretion.
The cases cited herein were not decided solely upon the basis of
this discretionary power. In Shequin v. Shequin there was present the
consent of the plaintiff's attorneys; In re Estate of Kehl, the supreme
court was asked merely to interpret a trial court's judgment; in Sang
v. Sang, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction was the decisive element.
Nevertheless, from what has been said it is clear that the supreme court

-Wis.

STAT.

(1914) 270.57.

'15Hoh v. Hoh, 84 Wis. 378, 54 N.W. 731; Wis. Nat. L. & B. Ass'n. v. Pride,
136 Wis 102, 116 N.W. 637; Good v. Schlitz, 195 Wis. 481, 218 N.W. 727.
16Wis. STAT. (1941) 270.57; City of Wauwatosa v. Union Free High School

District, 214 Wis. 35, 252 N.W. 351.
17 Supra, note 15.
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has stated and reiterated its position in favor of obsolute discretion
of the trial court under section 247.09, and relief, it would seem,
can come only from the legislature.
It is suggested here that section 247.09 be amended by the legislature to include the words "with the consent or at the prayer of the
complainant." With this amendment by insertion, the statute would
read in its entirety as follows:
"A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may also be adjudged
for either of the causes specified in the second and third subdivisions of section 247.08 with the consent or at the prayer of the
complainant whenever, in the opinion of the court, it would be
discreet and proper so to do."
The inserted amendment would empower the court to grant the remedy
prayed for and no other, or deny it, depending for its decree upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. Such a legislative act would remove the uncertainty and fear that litigants going into court must now
face under section 247.09 in that they can never know when a judgment for an absolute divorce granted under judicial discretion will
give them what they do not seek or desire.
ANTHONY PALASZ.

RECENT DECISIONS
Negligence-Foreseeability of Intervening Cause.-Action by Mary G. Wray,
as administratrix of the estate of Norman E. Wray, deceased, against the
Riesbeck Drug Company, to recover damages for the death of Norman E.
Wray. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. The evidence
showed that (on May 7, 1928), Russell Wray, an eight year old son of the
decedent, at the request of the decedent, purchased of an employee of the
defendant a small bottle of carbolic acid. This acid was delivered by the
employee to the son, who returned with it to the home of his father, whi
was about four blocks from the drug store. The father was in bed when the
son gave him the carbolic acid. The father then drank it and died. Plaintiff
charged that the defendant was negligent when it sold and placed in the hands
of the infant son, eight years old, who did not understand the dangerous nature
thereof, the bottle containing carbolic acid, without making inquiry concerning
the purpose for which the acid was to be used or to whom it was to be delivered.
Plaintiffs claim this negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the
decedent. However, the Appellate Court of Indiana reversed the decision on the
ground that the death by suicide of the father could not have been reasonably
foreseen by the druggist when he sold to the infant son the bottle of carbolic
acid. The court stated the rule to be that where harmful consequences are
brought about by intervening and independent forces, the operation of which
might have been reasonably foreseen, there will be no break in the chain of
causation of such a character as to relieve the actor from liability. But if the
new independent intervening force was not reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the defendant's wrongful conduct, the consequences, ordinarily, are not caused
proximately by the original wrongful act. Where the intervening force is a
deliberate act of a human being which was in no sense foreseeable by the
defendant at the time of his misconduct, the chain of causation is broken.
Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 39 N.E. (2d) 776 (Ind. 1942).
"A common statement of the general rule is, that in order that an act or
omission may be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the
natural and probable consequence of the act or omission and such as might
have been foreseen by an ordinarily reasonable and prudent man, in the light
of the attendant circumstances, as likely to result therefrom" Throckmorton's
Cooley On Torts (1930), Sec. 32.
The rule which is generally followed in cases where intervening cause is a
factor may be stated as follows: "Where harmful consequences are brought
about by intervening and independent forces the operation of which might have
been reasonably foreseen, there will be no break in the chain of causation of
such a character as to relieve the actor from liability." HARrm, TORTS (1933) 185.
The question of proximate cause was involved in a Kentucky case where
(on August 3, 1933), a 750 ton oil and rock barge belonging to the defendant
cement company was tied to a dock on the Ohio River during a thunderstorm.
An explosion occurred, killing everyone on board, including the plaintiffs'
decedents. The plaintiffs contended that the explosion was caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to use reasonable care to provide the deceased
persons with a safe place in which to work, in that the defendant, after having
used the barge for oil, failed properly to clean out its hold so as to prevent
the generation of gases. The lower court held that the defendant had failed to
use reasonable care and that the explosion of the gases caused the death of
the decedents. It also held that the gases were set off and exploded by a lightning
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bolt which struck the barge, and the striking of the barge by the lightning,
and the explosion of the gases therein as a result thereof, was not such a
natural and probable consequence of leaving the gases in the barge as should
have reasonably been anticipated by the respondent at the time it permitted
the decedents to begin work on the barge, and that the plaintiffs could not
recover. Upon appeal the cause was reversed the appellate court holding that
when the thing done produices immediate danger of injury, and is a substantial
factor in bringing it about, it is not necessary that the author of it should
have had in mind the particular means by which the potential force he has
created might be vitalized into injury; that here it was enough that the defendant
realized the possibility of some danger resulting in allowing the gases to generate in the hold; and that it was not necessary that he foresee the particular
danger which resulted. Johnson, et al. v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.

(2d) 193 (C.C.A. 6th, 1933).
"The harm which was foreseeable, and the specific harm which actually
resulted, need not be absolutely identical. * * * If there is a substantial likelihood that certain conduct when pursued will result in some appreciable harm
to the plaintiff's person, then the defendant if he so conducts, cannot escape
liability on the ground that he could not foresee the precise manner in which
the harm would occur, nor the exact nature of the harm, nor the full extent
of the harm." 25 HARv L. REv. 238.
In a Wisconsin case, the plaintiff was riding along the highway at a reasonable speed, and the defendant was driving along behind the plaintiff. Just as
the defendant was about to pass the plaintiff's vehicle, there was a sudden
deflation of the defendant's left rear tire which caused the defendant to lose
control of his car and strike the rear of the car in which the plaintiff was
riding, causing the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks damages. Lower court
granted judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the judgment was reversed, the
appellate court holding that the accidental and unavoidable deflation of the tire
on the defendant's car constituted an unforeseeable, intervening and .efficient
cause of the resulting collision with the plaintiff's car so that the defendant was
not liable for the injuries caused to the plaintiff. The court said, "Whenever
a new cause intervenes which is not a consequence of the first wrongful cause,
which is not under the control of the wrongdoer, which could not have been
foreseen by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the wrongdoer, and except
for which the final injurious consequences would not have happened, then such
injurious consequences must be deemed too remote to constitute the basis of a
cause of action. Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936).
As a result of a grade crossing collision, a horse was killed, a wagon
destroyed, and the contents of the wagon scattered, and were stolen by various
persons at the scene of the accident. The driver, who was alone in charge for
the plaintiff, was so stunned that he was found in a fit immediately after the
accident. The plaintiffs are seeking to recover for the loss of the contents of
the wagon. The defendants contended that their negligence was not the proximate cause of the loss of this property, since the act of the thieves was an
intervening cause. The court, in affirming the decision of the lower court in
favor of the plaintiff, said that it was permissible for a jury to find that the
collision was the proximate cause of the loss of the contents of the wagon,
saying, "The negligence which caused the collision resulted immediately in such
a condition of the driver of the wagon that he was no longer able to protect
his employer's property; the natural and probable result of his enforced abandonment of it in the street of a large city was its disappearance; and the wrong-
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doer cannot escape making reparation for the loss caused by depriving the
plaintiff of the protection which the presence of the driver in his right senses
would have afforded." Brauer, et at. v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co., 103 Atl.
166 (N.J. 1918).
The question of intervening cause was involved in a Massachusetts case
where the plaintiff was riding in the rear seat of an automobile belonging to
one Barrow. Barrow stopped to buy gasoline. The gasoline tank was under
the front seat and the defendant's attendant inserted the nozzle of the hose
into the tank, and then gave the handle of the pump a quick jerk, causing the
nozzle of the hose to flop out, spilling gasoline over the clothes of the plaintiff.
Barrow had left the cover off of the coil box of the car, and when he
cranked it, a spark flew off and set the plaintiff's clothes on fire, resulting in
severe burns to the plaintiff. The defendant oil company contended that the
negligence of their station attendant was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but that the act of Barrow in leaving the cover off of the coil
box was an intervening cause. The lower court rendered a judgment for the
plaintiff which was affirmed on appeal, the court saying that the intervening
act of a third person, which contributes a condition necessary to the injurious
effect of the original negligence will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such
intervening act should have been foreseen; and, that while there was no evidence that the defendant's employee knew of the uncovered coil box, it is a
matter of common knowledge that gasoline is highly inflammable and that its
contact with a spark is liable to result in serious consequences. Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 164 N.E. 612 (Mass. 1929).
A similar result was reached in another Massachusetts case where the
defendants left a wagon loaded with iron on the street unguarded. The plaintiff, a seven year old boy, and another boy came along, and a third boy called
them over to watch him move the wagon. When the third boy lifted the tongue
of the wagon a piece of the iron rolled off and struck the plaintiff, injuring
his leg. The defendants contended that the injury was not due to their negligence in leaving the wagon unguarded, but to the intervening act of the third
boy who moved the wagon. Liability of the defendants was sustained the court
holding that the act of a 3rd person, intervening and contributing a condition
necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence, will not excuse the
first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have been foreseen, the original negligence
still remaining a culpable and direct cause of the injury. Lane v. Atlantic Works,
111 Mass. 136 (1872).
In a Missouri case, a seven year old child sued the city for negligence in
failing to maintain a proper sidewalk. Because of the muddy condition of the
sidewalk on one side of the street the plaintiff decided to cross the street in
order to use a concrete sidewalk on the opposite side. While crossing, the plaintiff was struck by an automobile. It was contended that the negligence of the city
concurred with the negligence of the driver of the car in producing the injuries, and therefore the city must respond in damages for such injuries. The
court sustained a demurrer by the city which, on appeal, was affirmed on the
grounds that the negligence by the city was not a "proximate cause" of the
injury, and that the city was not liable to the child since the acts of the motorist
were the independent, efficient and proximate cause of the accident. Smith v.
Mabrey, et al., 154 S.W. (2d) 770 (Mo. 1941).
In another suit by a minor, a similar result was reached. The plaintiff, an
eleven year old boy sues the administratrix of the estate of Dr. Wetherby for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when accidentally thrown from the decedent's
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automobile. The plaintiff accompanied the decedent on an automobile trip, and
as they rode along the plaintiff observed that the door was not securely closed.
Plaintiff opened the door with the intention of closing it more securely, and
the rush of air threw the door violently open and the plaintiff was thrown to
the ground and was injured. The contention was that the Doctor was negligent
in not examing the door to see that it was securely locked before he started the
car. Judgment for the defendant, was affirmed on appeal, the court holding that
proximate cause is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any new, independent cause produces the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred. Said the court: "It was only the independent act
of the plaintiff in attempting to open and close the door which caused the accident, and an independent act which Dr. Wetherby was under no duty to
anticipate." Newton v. Wetherby's Administratrix, 153 S.W. (2d) 947 (1941).
In another automobile case, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages on account of injuries alleged to have been caused when a third party
negligently drove an automobile into an electric light pole maintained by the
defendant corporation, thereby causing another electric light pole also maintained by the defendant corporation to fall upon the plaintiff, injuring him.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant corporation was negligent in permitting the second pole to become rotten and decayed so that when the third
party negligently struck the first pole, the second pole' fell, injuring the plaintiff. The defendant corporation demurred on the ground that its negligence was
not the proximate cause of the injuries. The order overruling the demurrer was
reversed. Held, An essential element of proximate cause is the requirement that
the result must be such as might reasonably have been anticipated in the ordinary
experience of men. Where the negligence merely creates a condition by which
an injury is made possible and a subsequent independent act of an intervening agency causes the injury, in order for the negligence to be the
"proximate cause" of the injury, not only should the type of the injury have
been reasonably anticipated, but the intervention of the independent agency
should have been anticipated. Indiana Service Corporation v. Johnston, et al, 34
N.E. (2d) 157 (Ind. 1941).
A similar result was reached in a Pennsylvania case where the plaintiff sued
the county to recover damages for the death of her son. The son was killed
when a car in which he was riding struck the wall of a bridge. The plaintiff
contended that the defendant was negligent in not providing additional warnings of the approach to the bridge. There was also an allegation of the negligent maintenance and improper construction and design of the approach to the
bridge and of the bridge. The lower court found that the proximate cause
of the accident was not the alleged negligence of the defendant, but the negligence of the driver of the car. On the plaintiff's appeal this holding was affirmed,
the appellate court saying that the intervening negligent act of the driver caused
the accident and was so clearly unforeseeable and extraordinarily negligent that
the alleged negligence of the county was not the "proximate cause" of the
decedent's death. The proximate cause was the reckless and negligent act of
the driver whose actions nobody could foresee. Bieanman v. Allegheny County,
145 Pa. Super. 330, 21 AtI. (2d) 112 (1941).
In another case involving intervening cause, some of the defendant's employees negligently left some dynamite caps lying on some lumber, and a small
boy picked one up. He later threw it into a bonfire and it exploded, injuring
him. The defendant's insurer disclaimed liability upon the theory that the boy's
act was an "intervening cause." Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, the
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court saying that where a dangerous article is negligently left by a defendant
where it is likely to be found by children, the act of children who find the
article and are injured by it is not an "intervening cause" of the injury so as
to relieve the defendant of liability, since the result must have been, or at least
should have been foreseen and the defendant is held liable under the general
rule that a negligent person is responsible for all of the consequences of his
negligence which ought reasonably to have been foreseen. American Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. v. Buckley & Co., 117 F. (2d) 845 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).
A Tennessee court rendered judgment in favor of the. defendant electric
company in a case where the company allowed tree branches to grow up around
an uninsulated transmission line at a point where the line crossed the highway,
and a third party cut the limb from the tree at the direction of the owner of
the abutting property and the limb lodged on the wire pulling it on top of the
tree, thus creating a short circuit and causing the wire to burn and separate.
A few minutes after, the electric company received notice that the wire was
down and extending across the highway. The owner of the abutting land
attempted to lead the plaintiff's horse under the wire and the horse came in
contact with the wire and was killed. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, the
appellate court saying that the electric company was not bound to anticipate
the actions of the owner and the third party which constituted an "independent
intervening cause" of the accident. An injury that is the natural and probable
consequence of an action of negligence is actionable,'and such an act is the
proximate cause of the injury. But an injury which could not have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence
is not actionable and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever,
of the injury. Moyers, et al. v. Ogle, 148 S.W. (2d) 637 (Tenn. App. 1940).
In a Texas case, the plaintiff was an employee of a street car company and
while in the course of employment, the street car was derailed because of a
defective condition of the tracks. In attempting to rerail the car by the use of a
"frog," the plaintiff motorman was injured. He had reported the defective condition of the track to the company, but they had done nothing about it. The
lower court sustained a general demurrer to the petition, from which the plaintiff appeals. The appellate court reversed saying that negligence creating a condition may become the "proximate cause" of an injury, even though the active
cause is some intervening agency, if the fact of the intervening agency could
have been reasonably anticipated, but if the intervening agency could not have
been reasonably anticipated, then the intervening agency will be deemed the
"proximate cause." Here in view of the fact that the defendant knew of the
defective condition of the tracks it could reasonably have anticipated an injury
to someone. Renegar v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 143 S.W. (2d) 443 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940).
A New Mexico court rendered judgment in favor of a defendant in a case
where the defendant had placed grasshopper poison on the land of an adjoining owner for the purpose of storing it, and the land was later leased to the
plaintiff who used it for grazing purpose for his cattle, which cattle ate the
poisoned feed and died. The defendant had personal knowledge of the leasing,
but did not tell the plaintiff of the poison which he had placed on the land.
The defendant contended that the renting of the land by the plaintiff was an
"intervening cause" which he should not be required to anticipate, and which
broke the causal connection between his negligence and the poisoning of the
cattle. On appeal the judgment was reversed, the court saying that if the occurrence of the intervening cause upon which the defendant relies might reason-
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ably have been anticipated, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury. The defendant here should
have anticipated the results. Reif v. Morrison, 100 Pac. (2d) 229, 44 N.M. 201
(1940).
In a Georgia case the plaintiff was a guest in the automobile of the defendant
when the defendant struck a car coming from the opposite direction. It was
shown that the defendant was driving very negligently and at an excessive rate
of speed under the very unfavorable weather conditions, and that at the time
of the accident he was attempting to tune in a broadcast on his auto radio instead of watching where he was driving. The defendant insistdd that the acts
of the other driver were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff saying, "While the general rule is that if, subsequently to an original wrongful or negligent act, a new
cause has intervened of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune,
the former must be considered as too remote, still if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act
and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequences
could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original
wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is
responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act." The
defendant should have foreseen that some danger might result from his negligent driving. McDaniel v. Brown, 6 S.E. (2d) 382 (Ga. App. 1939).
In an action against a telephone company for destruction of the plaintiff's
warehouse by fire allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant company's
employee who forced open a window of the warehouse in order to enter and
remove a dead telephone and then left by the door, leaving it open, as a result
of which hoboes entered the warehouse and caused the fire, an Arkansas court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed on appeal, the court
stating the rule to be that in no case is the connection between an original act
of negligence and an injury broken by an intervening act of negligence of
another, if a person of ordinary sagacity and experience, acquainted with all
of the circumstances, could have reasonably anticipated that the intervening
event might in natural and ordinary course of things follow his act of negligence, or if the misconduct is of a character which, according to the usual
experience of mankind, is calculated to invite or induce the intervention of some
subsequent cause. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Adanas, 133 S.W. (2d)
867 (Ark- 1939).
In an Illinois case two boys found a fuse on the right-of-way of the defendant railroad. They took it home with them, and later one of the boys lit it in the
presence of the plaintiff, a child of nine years of age, and a spark flew and
ignited the dress of the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff was severely
burned. The plaintiff charged that the defendant railroad was negligent with
respect to the fuse. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
However, on appeal, this verdict was reversed on the ground that the negligence of the defendant was not the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. The court said that proximate cause is that which naturally leads to or
produces, or contributes directly to producing a result such as might be expected
by any reasonable and prudent man as likely to directly and naturally follow
and flow out of the performance or nonperformance of any act. The act here
was not of that nature. Dabrowski v. Illinois Central R. Co., 24 N.E. (2d) 382,
303 Ill. App. 31 (1939).
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In an action for property damage caused by the falling of the walls of the
defendant's brick building during a fire, the plaintiff charged that the building
was negligently constructed and maintained, by reason of the fact that the
second story walls were too thin and so negligently constructed that they had
cracked, and were bulging and out of line long before the fire, and that the
defendant knew or must necessarily have known of such faulty construction
and dangerous condition. The defendant contended that the fire was no fault
of his, and that it was an independent, intervening agency. The lower court
granted judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals, the court stating the rule to be that negligence creating a condition may become the "proximate cause" of an injury, even though the active
cause is some intervening agency, if the fact of the intervening agency could
have been reasonably anticipated under all the circumstances. It held that the
defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of fire in view of
the fact that fire insurance was so common. Wachholder v. Kitchens, 126 S.W.
(2d) 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
In a Nebraska personal injury case, the plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries received by her as a result of the negligence of the defendant
in the construction and maintenance of a roof monitor on its warehouse. The
monitor was torn from the warehouse by a windstorm and carried more than
a block away to the home of the plaintiff, injuring her. The defendant contended
that the injury was the sole and proximate result of an act of God, and that the
wind was an intervening cause between the negligence of the defendant and the
injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff showed that the wind was usual for
that time and place. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff
saying that if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonable have
been anticipated, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury. Under this rule the ordinary forces of
nature and condition of the weather, such as cold, heat, wind, or a rainstorm
or snowstorm, which are usual at the time and place, are conditions which
reasonably could have been anticipated, and will not relieve from liability the
person guilty of the original negligent act or omission. Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co., 277 N.W. 830 (Neb. 1938).
A Texas court rendered judgment for the plaintiff who sued to recover for
injuries to his wife sustained while she was a customer in the defendant's store
and resulting from gunshot wounds inflicted by the accidental discharge of an
automatic shotgun in the hands of another customer. The plaintiff charged that
the defendant was negligent in permitting the other customer to inject shells
into the gun, and that such act was dangerous to the safety of other customers
in the store. The defendant contended that his negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the injury, but that the gun was caused to fire by either a defect
in the mechanism of the gun, or by some improper manipulation of the gun by
the other customer, and that either of these facts constituted an "intervening
cause" which would relieve the defendant from liability. On appeal the upper
court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff saying that it is not every "new
intervening cause" that will relieve from liability for the original negligence.
If it be such a new intervening cause as in the light of the attending circumstances ought reasonably to have been foreseen, then the causal connection
between the original wrong and the resultant injury is not broken. Berry v.
Harper, 111 S.W .(2d) 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
In a Colorado case a child, eight years old, through his next friend, sued
the defendant for injuries received on a partially constructed merry-go-round
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which the defendant and his employees had negligently left unguarded. The
plaintiff and other children were playing on the merry-go-round when two older
boys began to revolve the merry-go-round. The plaintiff's foot got caught in a
cog and it was so badly crushed that it had to be amputated. The defendant contended that the act of the boys in causing the merry-go-round to revolve was
such an intervening cause as to relieve him from liability. The lower court
granted judgment for the defendant which, on appeal, was reversed on the
ground that the act of a third person in setting in motion machinery attractive
to children and left unguarded is not considered such an intervening independent cause as will relieve the owner of such machinery from liability for injury
to a child, and a fortiori, the act of a child in the course of his play, after he
reached the dangerous and attractive premises or machinery, cannot be regarded
as an intervening efficient cause which will relieve the owner of liability. Simkins
v. Dowis, 67 Pac. (2d) 627, 100 Colo. 355 (1937).
In an Iowa case the plaintiff was a passenger in a car being driven along the
public highway in the city of Des Moines. At a certain point the street was in
a very defective condition, the bricks in the pavement having become loose and
some having fallen away into the ditch and the others becoming disarranged
and laying loose in the sand. The car in which the plaintiff was riding struck a
defective spot in the pavement, swerved to the left, and collided with a cattle
truck which was going in the opposite direction. For a long time prior to this
accident the street had been in this defective condition. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant city, on appeal, contended the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the collision of
the two cars, and that such was a sufficient intervening cause to excuse the
defendant. The judgment was affirmed on the ground that the defendant could
reasonably have anticipated that some accident might result from the defective
pavement Gray v. City of Des Moines, 265 N.W. 612 (Iowa 1936).
An Illinois court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in a case where the
plaintiff was riding with her husband in an automobile along a highway and a
third person attempted to pass them, and where at the same time the defendant
was coming from the opposite direction and driving three feet over the black
line in the middle of the road, resulting in a collision between all three cars
and causing injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the attempt
of the third person to pass the car in which plaintiff was riding was an intervening cause of the plaintiff's injury. However, the court ,in affirming the judgment for plaintiff said that the defendant as a reasonable person should have
anticipated a collision unless he pulled over to his side of the road in order to
let the third car pass. The court stated the rule to be that if the occurrence of
an intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, such intervening
cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the
injury. Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259 (II. 1933).
In a Georgia case the defendant sold to a minor some loaded cartridges and
a pistol in violation of the criminal statute of the state, and this minor, some
days afterwards, lent the pistol to another minor, and the latter accidentally shot
a third minor, the plaintiff in this action. The defendant contended that the
proximate cause of the injury was the negligent act of the minor who accidentally discharged the pistol and that such act could not reasonably be expected
by the defendant. Judgment for the defendant in the lower court, was reversed
on appeal the Court of Appeals of Georgia saying the defendant was bound to
anticipate the negligent habits of boys in handling weapons, and stating the rule
to be that if, subsequently to the original wrongful act, a new cause intervened,

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

sufficient of itself to stand as the cause of the injury, the former will be considered too remote. But if the intervening cause and its probable consequence
should reasonably have been anticipated by the original wrongdoer as a natural
and probable result of the wrongful act, the causal connection between the
wrongful act and the consequent injury is not broken, and an action for resulting damages will lie against the original tort-feasor. Spires v. Goldberg, 106 S.E.
585, 26 Ga. App. 530 (1921).
In another case involving intervening cause, in which the plaintiff sued as
administrator, the evidence showed that the train on wlich the plaintiff's decedent
was riding struck an automobile at a crossing and threw it against a switch
stand, and that thereby the track was turned to such an extent that the train
ran off the main track onto a switch track, and struck some cars standing thereon, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff's decedent. The plaintiff contended that
the defendant was negligent in the operation of the train and the maintenance
of the tracks. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant
which was affirmed on appeal, the court saying it could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the defendant that the automobile would be thrown against
the switch stand. The court held that where there is an independent responsible
agency intervening between the defendant's negligence and the injury, the question whether the original negligence is the proximate cause of the injury is to
be determined by whether the agency might have been reasonably expected
under the circumstances to intervene in such a way as to be likely to produce
an injury similar to the one actually caused; and that if the intervening agency
was one over which the original tort-feasor had no control, and which could
not have reasonably been expected to occur in the ordinary course of nature,
and according to common experience, such agency is the sole proximate cause of
the injury. Engle v. Director General of Railroads, 133 N.E. 138, 78 Ind. App.
547 (1921).
The general rule as to foreseeability which can be gathered from the foregoing cases is that, where there is a negligent act or omission, it is not necessary to render it the proximate cause that the person committing it could or
might have foreseen the particular consequence or precise form of the injury,
or the particular manner in which it occured, or that it would occur to the
particular person, if the act might have been foreseen or anticipated that some
injury might result. It is sufficient that the consequence attributable to the
negligent act or omission was the natural and probable result thereof, although
it might not have been specifically contemplated or anticipated. It should be
particularly noted that the element of anticipation does not mean that the
wrongdoer should anticipate the particular injury in question. It is sufficient if
the wrongdoer had reasonable ground to apprehend soine injury might occur
from the negligent act. If the damage follows the wrongful act in an unbroken
sequence, without any intervening, independent cause to break the continuity,
then such damage is proximate to the injury, though the wrongdoer had no
reasonable ground to apprehend it would occur from the negligent act.
A question of some difficulty arises where a person is guilty of a failure to
exercise ordinary care, which failure, in the field of reasonable anticipation and
experience of the average person, is usually followed by slight or immaterial
results and damages, whether such person must nevertheless respond in damages to the full extent thereof when to such slight and to be anticipated results
there are added unusual and extraordinary results. To make such person respond
to the full extent might seem to work an injustice upon him. However, on the
other hand, to deny to a person innocent of any wrong-doing compensation for
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injuries and results therefrom which would not have occurred except for the
negligence of a responsible person, would also, in many instances, work injustice.
In the choice thus presented between two interested persons, one breaching the
law imposed upon him of exercising due care, and the other being without fault,
the courts favor the innocent party and lay the entire responsibility upon the one
breaching his legal duty.
In the final analysis, the determination of a case involving the question of
foreseeability and intervening cause must depend upon an appraisal of the totality of facts and circumstances in the individual case, and the application of the
rules of law to the results of such appraisal.
ANTHONY FRANK.

Torts-Libel and Slander-Innuendo.--Plaintiff brought suit for libel on the
basis of articles appearing in the newspaper of the defendant publisher.
In commenting editorially on the settlement of claims of the county against
former officials for alleged fraudulent land tax deals, the defendant charged
that in the past, members of the highway committee had made money on
the sale of road machinery to the county. In a subsequent issue, the editor
qualified his statement by adding that the reference was not to present committee members but to those of many years ago. Thereafter, plaintiff, who
had been a committee man ten years previous to the statement, sent a letter
to the defendant requesting an express retraction if the charge did not refer
to him. Defendant published plaintiff's letter in connection with an editorial
stating that if the plaintiff had attended Christmas eve services in any of
the town churches he "would have gotten a lot of good out of it and felt
a whole lot better.' Plaintiff alleged that by innuendo, defendant's statement
accused him of such a general lack of Christian virtue as to require his attendance at church services. Defendant demurred, contending that the alleged
defamatory statement standing alone without the innuendo did not in any
way injure the plaintiff's character or subject him to ridicule and contempt;
and that no innuendo could alter the sense of a statement or supply a meaning
not obviously present. The trial court overruled the demurrer and defendant
appealed from the order.
On appeal, held, order reversed. No innuendo can alter the sense of the
alleged derogatory statement, or supply a meaning which is not there. The court
must determine as a matter of law whether the language complained of is
capable of the meaning ascribed to it by the complaint. Luthey v. Kronschnabl,
1 N.W. (2d) 799 (Wis. 1942).
There is a great deal of diversity of opinion in various jurisdictions as to
the role which innuendo may play in libel actions where the defamatory meaning of the words is not immediately apparent. A comparison of the various
positions adopted by courts can best be made if the well recognized distinction
between words libellous per se and those libellous per quod is kept in mind. In
the former situation, the effect of the words is so direct that damages will
be presumed by the court; while in the latter, no such presumption arises, and
if the plaintiff is to succeed, he must make proof of actual damages. The function of innuendo differs in each case, and the differences are so great as to
necessitate separate examination.
When the theory of the plaintiff's action is that the words were defamatory
in themselves, a numerical majority of the courts will not allow him to assign
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a meaning by innuendo. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distilling
Corp., 288 Ill. App. 79, 5 N.E. (2d) 610 (1937), Kassowitz v. Sentinel, 277 N.W.
177 (Wis. 1936), Ellsworth v. Martindale-HubbellLaw Dictionary, 268 N.W. 400
(N.D. 1936). In other words, in these states the question is one of the normal
unstrained meaning of the words employed. A strong minority, however, adopts
a freer interpretation of the phrase "ordinary meaning of the words" and
approaches the problem of a derogatory meaning present in a statement by
innuendo in this fashion: if the words are ambiguous and capable of several
meanings, one of which is actionable in se, the plaintiff may plead the meaning
which he claims as the basis of his cause of action. These courts look upon such
a pleading, not as an extension of the meaning of a statement or as an averment of special damages because of defamatory understanding, but as the
statement of an actionable meaning which while not apparent, was always
inherent in the statement. Furr v. Foulke, 266 N.W. 687 (S.D. 1936), Bradstreet
v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753 (1888) ; Maas v. National Casualty Co., 97 F.
(2d) 247 (C.C.A. 4th 1938); Washington Post v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 39
Sup. Ct. 448, 63 L.Ed. 987 (1919).
Some courts of the majority which refuse to allow an innuendo to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statement have carried this policy to the
extreme of throwing a plaintiff into a libel per quod action if he averred any
extraneous facts surrounding the publication on which he brought suit. Clarity
of legal thought has been sacrificed for example, when a court which denied
the ability of an innuendo to change the natural import of the words was
faced with the following situation: an actress brought suit on the basis of a
picture and article which described her as the lady love of a famous comedian.
Without showing special damages, the plaintiff contended that the words in their
most innocent sense becarme actionable in the light of the additional fact that
she was a married woman. In an opinion, two judges dissenting, the court
decided that the plaintiff was properly allowed to assert the fact of her marital
status, though neither the majority or minority questioned that such was a
pleading by innuendo. Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Publications, 242 N.Y.
208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926). Likewise, several southern courts by their strict
adherence to the letter of the majority rule have precipitated themselves unnecessarily into a discussion of innuendo in libel in se actions based on articles
describing a man as colored when in fact he was white. Upton v. TimesDemocrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) ; Flood v. News and Courier
Co., 71 S.C. 112, 50 S.E. 637 (1905).
These courts are apparently using innuendo in its widest sense: to cover
every averment which is not immediately apparent from the statement on which
the complaint is based, whether such averment resolves an ambiguity in meaning
or describes the circumstances making the statement actionable. Logic would
seem to be with the courts restricting the use of the term innuendo and the
prohibitions surrounding its use to pleadings of the former type. When the
term is used in a wider sense than this, courts involve themselves in at least
an apparent contradiction of the rule that the standard of interpretation of an
article allegedly defamatory is how those in the community would reasonably
understand the statement. Facts attending publication but extraneous to it can
give to an apparently innocent article a nuance of meaning which could not be
detected merely from an examination of the words used. Hubbard v. Associated
Press, 123 F. (2d) 864 (C.C.A. 4th, 1941).
An entirely different rule applies to the pleading of innuendo in actions on
the theory of libel per quod. In such cases innuendo is almost universally
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admitted, and the cases seem concerned with two questions-(l) the differences
between libel per se and per quod, and (2) the uses to which innuuendo can
be put to make out a case.
From the standpoint of damages, the distinguishing factor between libel in
se and per quod seems to be the obviousness and directness of the damage done
to the plaintiff by the statement. "A publication is not of itself libellous unless
the language as a whole in its ordinary meaning naturally and proximately was
so injurious to the plaintiff that the court will presume without proof that his
credit or reputation have been thereby impaired." McAuliffe v. Local Union No.
3 IBEW, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 963 (1941), following O'Connell v. Press Publishing
Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915) ; see also Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell
Law Dictionary Co., supra.
The most stringent application of the above rule is that governing libel in se
actions in Connecticut, where in an early case, a candidate for political office
brought an action against a person who accused him of violating the election
laws by having liquor bought for voters. After denying the ability of innuendo
to change the sense of words not actionable in themselves where no special
damages were shown, the court stated: "To be actionable in se, the words must
not only impute to the plaintiff a violation of a penal or criminal law, but it
must charge him with a crime involving moral turpitude or subjecting him to an
infamous punishment." Hoag v. Hatch, 23 Conn. 585 (1855).
New York, on the other hand, is rather lenient in its view of what constitutes libel in se. In a case tried in the federal court under New York law, the
defendant newspaper was accused of charging that the plaintiff Congressman had
opposed the appointment to the Federal bench of a named individual because
of the latter's religion and foreign birth. Defendant contended that such a charge
became actionable only if special damages could be shown, and innuendo pleaded,
but a divided court found the charge libellous in se and laid down the following as New York law:
1. A false statement need not charge a violation of any law to be actionable
in se.
2. False statements which might lead right thinking people to think a public
official less fit to hold office are actionable in se.
3. The falsehood need not make even a majority of the readers think less
of the person defamed in order to be libellous in se. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F. (2d) 288 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
When, however, suit is brought on the theory of libel per quod, the plaintiff
pleads that the defamation is actionable because of the meaning which was
conveyed to the readers and the actual provable losses which he suffered thereby.
Special significance which the words had because of their reference to preceding
facts and exterior circumstances may and often must be alleged; and often the
procedure followed is the pleading of innuendo. Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell
Latw Dictionary, supra, illustrates pointedly the additional burden of proof the
plaintiff must bear when the court decides that the words are not libelous in se.
In the case last mentioned, the plaintiff's attorney sued the defendant publisher because of blanks following his name in defendant's directory of attorneys.
Plaintiff alleged that the possessors of the key to the ratings were given an
untrue and defaming picture of his ability, credit, and recommendations. The
court decided that the blanks were not libellous in se, and hence were not
actionable unless the plaintiff gave to them by innuendo a meaning which they
did not of themselves possess. Moreover, even if he did so, the plaintiff assumed
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the burden of proving not the tendency of the words to cause damage, but of
proving the actual damages caused.
Furthermore, in a per quod action, the assigning of a defamatory meaning
by innuendo coupled with proof of special damages does not lead to recovery
in all cases, for damages which were voluntarily incurred have been held to be
not recoverable. In a 1941 case, Ohio courts refused to allow recovery when the
article complained of fell into the above category. Plaintiff was a minister and
the sponsor of proposed amendments to the state constitution. He was accused
by the defendants of being a paid lobbyist and he brought suit, alleging that
the statement, by innuendo, accused him of being connected with a tax movement
opposed to the best interests of the people and of being a person of ill repute
who would work for any interest if compensated according to his price. As
items of special damage he listed the expenses incurred by him in denying the
charges. On the ground that the items were voluntarily incurred, the court
denied recovery.
There is a further division of authority on the question of the province of
the court and jury in a trial where innuendo may be alleged. The principal case
holds that it is for the court to determine whether the innuendo on which the
complaint is based is properly ascribed to the statement. These are cases to the
contrary. Pollardv. Forest Lawn Memorial Park Assn., 59 P. (2d) 203, 15 Cal.
App. (2d) 77, (1936); Lily v. Belk's Department Store, 182 S.E. 889, 178 S.C.
278 (1935); Stampler v. Richmond, 125 Pa. Sup. 385, 189 A. 730 (1937).
WLLIAM MALLOY.

BOOK REVIEW
Success In Court. By Francis L. Wellman. The Macmillan Com-

pany, New York. 1941. Pp. xviii, 404.
The author has adopted an unusual pattern for this book. It is divided into
two parts, the first part is written by Wellman himself; the second part is
divided into nine chapters each of which is written by some prominent member
of the legal profession. The result is an extremely interesting and profitable
work.
This volume really has a "double barreled" worth, for it has appeal both for
the layman and the lawyer. To the layman this volume presents the lawyer in
his most glamorous light, as he engages in a contest of wits and skill with his
adversary. As far as the lawyer is concerned it really could be considered an
outline of trial procedure spiced with anecdotes illustrating the points to be made.
For the young lawyer who contemplates engaging in trial work this work
could be freely recommended. It is the next best thing to actual experience
itself, this study of the methods of trial procedure employed by specialists in
that field. A look at the list of contributors 'to this book shows, in addition to
Wellman, such legal lights as a former United States Solicitor General, a former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois, District Attorneys, a United
States Ambassador, etc.
Part one of this volume concerns itself with Wellman's ideas on the importance of various phases of trial work; the opening statement, cross-examination
of witnesses, argument to the jury, etc. As a basis for a discussion of such
topics Wellman draws examples from his own considerable trial experiences
and also from the experiences of such famous trial advocates as Rufus Choate,
Abraham Lincoln, William F. Howe, Joseph Choate and many others. These
illustrations from the lives of famous lawyers serve to emphasize the underlying theme of part one, that is, constant study of the lives, speeches and experiences of the masters of trial work for those who hope to make a success of this

phase of the profession of law.
As has been indicated, part two of this book is devoted to more specific
details of trial procedure, seen through the eyes of some advocate who has
perhaps specialized in that field. To the reviewer the chapter contributed by the
Hon. John W. Davis on the argument of an appeal was particularly instructive.
He sets down ten rules by which the argument of an appeal should be governed
which really could be considered the ten commandments of appellate argument.
There is also a chapter on international law, a phase of the law which perhaps
more than any other, has been taken over by specialists. This chapter by Frederic
R. Coudert sets forth his hope and belief that in the future every American
lawyer will be grounded in at least the rudiments of international law. These
two contributions in the second part of this book are specially cited to show
the variety of subjects which make up this half of the work. All nine of the
chapters have something of value and interest to the reader.
It is the reviewer's opinion that this book compares favorably with Wellman's
earlier efforts and is certainly one that may be read with profit and enjoyment
by either the lawyer or the layman. It is not a dry stuffy text but rather a light,
informative work which perhaps serves its purpose better than the ordinary
text because it instructs while it entertains.
ROBERT T. McGRAw.
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BROOKE TIBBS*

T

HE Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act as it now stands is a
composite of similar legislation passed in 1918 during the last
war, substantially re-enacted in 1940 more than a year before the
United States entered the present war, and of amendments adopted in
1942.1
The express purpose of the Act is to "suspend enforcement,"
temporarily, of civil liabilities of persons in the military service in order
to entitle them to devote their entire energy to the "defense needs" of
* Yale University, A.B.; Univ. of Wisconsin, LL.B.; Chairman, Legal Service

Committee, Milwaukee Bar Association; Member Board of Governors, Wisconsin Bar Association.
54 Stat. 1178; 56 Stat. 282; Public Laws No. 732, also 753, 77th Cong.; see also
50 U.S.C. § 501-585. References are to section numbers as used in Statutes and
Amending Acts of 1942.
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the nation.2 With few exceptions, the provisions of the Act do not relieve a debtor of liability.3 Although certain rights have been recognized
as being "extinguished," the Act is officially described as "freezing"
debt obligations, as "directed toward merely the withholding of remedies," and as affecting only adjective law. 4 In general it provides a
qualified moratorium on civil liabilities of men in the armed forces and
certain others incidentally affected.
The method by which the soldier 5 is protected and the rights of the
various parties are adjusted, is through judicial machinery, broad discretionary power being lodged in the courts.
Despite division of the Act under headings, provisions under various of such headings must be considered in order to really determine
how the law applies to any particular subject.
SPECIFIC APPLICATION

OF THE ACT.

The principal subject of relief is the soldier's civil liability which
existed at the time of entry into military service. However, all actions
against the soldier are subject to supervision; and relief is expressly
afforded as to certain liabilities incurred subsequent to entrance into
military service, as in relation to leases, taxes, and insurance.6
The person entitled to benefits of the Act is primarily a person in the
military service of the United States, such service period being generally considered to commence with the order to report for induction.7
Citizens serving in the armed forces of other United Nations are also
protected." Dependents of the soldier are afforded relief in relation to
lease, purchase contracts, and secured liabilities; also as to taxes other
than income.9 The lessor of the soldier is granted conditional relief as
to the leased property; and employes of a soldier apparently have certain protection in respect to real estate taxes.' 0 Persons secondarily
liable with the soldier, and his sureties, may be afforded relief correlative to that granted the soldier." The Act also seems to have limited
application to a "homestead entryman" engaged in performing farm
2
labor, without any military service whatever..
Title of Act and Section 100.
Cf. 1917 Wis. Statutes § 4232a, rendering a soldier "exempt from civil process ;"
held to contravene the 1918 Soldiers' Relief Act: Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335.
4 Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong.
10, 11, 47.
5 "Soldier" is used herein to refer to a "person in military service" under the
Act.
6 Secs. 300, 500(1), 513, 700(1), 400(a).
7 Sec. 101 (1) (2) ; 106. "Missing" persons are deemed in military service: sec.
601(3).
8 Secs. 104, 512.
9 Secs. 306; 500(1).
10 Secs. 300(2) (4), 500(1).
11 Sec. 103; see also sec. 204 as to proceeding against co-defendants.
12 Sec. 510(1).
2
3
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As to procedure, relief can be granted by "any court" of the United
States or its territories in "any action or proceeding." 13 The action may
be one against the soldier, or may have been brought by the soldier.14
Where no action is pending, the soldier or his dependent may, under
certain circumstances, make special application to the court for relief,
as in relation to extension by instalment payments and relief from
eviction or rental liability under a lease.' 5 Similar application may be
made by the creditor of the soldier for correlative relief respecting
purchase contracts, mortgages, and taxes where relief is granted to
the soldier under a lease, and to prevent reduction of interest rate to
the 6% otherwise limited by the Act.' 6 The court may disregard the
Act if property dispositions have been made "with intent to delay the
7
just enforcement" of certain rights.1
In most cases the court's power is exercised by ordering a stay of
proceedings. A general power of stay is provided for "any action or
proceeding"; and for relief from penalty.' A special power of stay is
provided in relation to persons secondarily liable, executions and attachments, rights of both tenant and owner under leases, in relation to sales
contracts, secured obligations, storage liens, and tax sales.' 9 Co-ordinate
to the general stay is a general tolling of limitations both for and against
the soldier during the period of military service except as to Revenue
Laws 20
The power of the court is largely discretionary. In some situations
the court's power depends on whether the soldier's military service hashad an adverse effect upon his ability to pay, 2' or on ability to interpose
his defense. 22 In still other situations the court's discretion is described
in varying but broad terms. 23 And in some situations this discretion is
entirely unqualified, as in requiring plaintiff to file bond before entry of
judgment, and in granting stays to persons secondarily liable.2 4
An essential part of procedure under the Act is the appointment of
an attorney for the soldier. The court is required to appoint an attorney
for a defendant before entry of judgment against him, and after period
of default, unless it affirmatively appears that such defendant is not
in military service. Showing in this regard may be made by affidavit
"sSecs. 102(1) (2), 200(1), 201.
'4 Compare secs. 200, 201.
'5 Secs. 700,300.
16 Secs. 304(2), 206.
'7Sec. 600.
18

Secs. 201, 204,202.

21

Secs. 202, 200, 300(2), 301(3), 302(2), 305, 306, 500(2).
Sec. 200 (4), 201.
See Footnote 89.

'9 Secs. 103(1), 203(2) (b), 300(2), 301(3), 302(2) (a), 305(2) (a), and 500(2),
respectively.
20 Sees. 205, 207.
22
23
24

Secs. 200(1) ; and 103(1) (2).
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or by official certificate.2 5 The court also has discretionary power to
appoint an attorney for a soldier where he, is not otherwise represented.-" The soldier's "legal representative" (as well as the soldier) is
expressly authorized to apply for relief from a judgment; and the attorney would apparently be a "person on behalf" of the soldier who would
27
be authorized to apply for a stay in the course of any court proceeding.
However, the attorney has no power to waiver.2 8 And it is apparently
contemplated that the lawyer serve without compensation, except possibly in probate proceedings.29
Waiver of rights under the Act is covered, and apparently limited,
by three provisions. The soldier may waive right in relation to secured
obligations and sales contracts by written agreement of the parties,
presumably bi-lateral, executed after the soldier has entered military
service.2 0 A co-obligor of the soldier, generally a guarantor or an
accommodation maker, may waive by a writing, separate from the main
obligation, apparently unilateral,--which is rendered ineffective if such
co-obligor subsequently enters military service. 31 And life insurance collateral may be released by written consent of the soldier.3 2 As above
stated, power of waiver is expressly denied to the attorney representing
33
the soldier.
Actions generally against the soldier are the subject of general relief
under the law. An attorney may be appointed for the soldier at any
stage of such proceedings; and such appointment is mandatory before
entry of any judgment against the soldier.3 4 On application made during
or within sixty days after military service, relief may be obtained by
requiring plaintiff to file bond, by stay of proceedings on just terms for
a period up to three months after military service, and by order "to
35
protect the rights of the soldier.
25 Sec. 200(1); 601. As to an action involving more than one 'judgment," see

20 Neb. Law Rev. 357, 361. Affidavit of non-military service made before expiration of time for answer held insufficient: National Bank v. Van Tassel,
36 N.Y.S. (2d) 478 (1942) ; and see cases under 1918 Act cited 28 Iowa Law
Rev. 19. Court finding on "adequate investigation" held to constitute sufficient
proof of non-military service: Petition of Institution for Savings (Mass. 1941)
33 N.E. (2d) 526.
2r Sec. 200(3).
27 Secs. 200(4), and 201.
28 Sec. 200(3).
29 Weyenberg v. Downey, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 600 (1941) ; In re Cool's Estate (N.J.
1941) 18 Atl. (2d) 714; see also Memorandum of Committee on National
Defense, A.B.A. 3/25/41, p. 5.
30 Sec. 107.
31 Sec. 103 (4).
32 Sec. 305(1).
33Sec. 200(3).
34 Sec. 200(3), 200(1).
35

Secs. 200(l) (3), 201, 204.

19431

SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' RELIEF ACT

Judgments against the soldier are subject to general stay of enforcement,3 8 and cognovit judgments cannot be enforced by sale or
seizure of security, without court approval, during or within three
months after military service.37 Judgments entered against soldiers during or within thirty days after military service are subject to vacation
on application within ninety days after military service.38
Garnishmentand attachment proceedings are governed by the above
provisions relating to actions generally and to judgments; and are also
39
subject to express restriction by stay and vacation.
As to the soldier's obligations generally, existing prior to military
service, maturity may be extended on an instalment basis and on other
just terms, provided application is made during or within six months
after military service.4 0 Interest on all such obligations is limited to
6% unless on application by the obligee, a court finds that the soldier's
ability to pay is not materially affected by the military service. 41
Obligations secured by real estate owned by a soldier are subject
to the above provisions relating to actions, judgments, and obligations
generally. Such debts which existed prior to military service are also
covered by express provisions: (a) that there be court approval of any
sale or foreclosure of such security during and within three months
after military service; (b) that foreclosure commenced during military
service be subject to stay or other equitable disposition; and (c) that
maturity may be extended on an instalment basis for a period equal to
the combination of the period of military service and the remaining
life of the obligation. 42 The Act also contains a provision that no part
of the period of military service after October 6, 1942 shall be included
in any period "provided by any law for the rememption of real property
sold * * to enforce any obligation * *."43 As above indicated, the Act
does permit of waiver of such relief by written agreement of the parties
executed after the commencement of the period of military service. 44
Obligationssecured by personal property are covered by the above
provisions relating to "obligations secured by real estate"--excepting
(a) maturity may be extended only for a period equal to that of the
prior military service,-not to the combined period of military service
and remaining life of the contract ;45 and (b) period of redemption is
36 Secs. 201,203(2), 204.
3 Sec. 302(3).
38 Sec. 200 (4).
39 Secs. 204,203 (b).
40 Sec. 700.
41 Sec. 206.
42 Secs. 302(3) ; 302(2) ; and 700(1) (2), respectively.
43 Sec. 205.
44Sec. 107.
45 Sec. 700(1) (b).
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not extended. However, other provisions relate specially to personal
property. Repossession of real property may be made by leave of court
after an appraisal and payment of "just" sum to the soldier or dependent, where undue hardship will not result to such persons. 4 Life insurance collateral cannot be taken over by the creditor during or within
a year after the military service except by leave of court; and the
government-guaranteed policies cannot be "forfeited" for "any indebtedness. '47 A lien for storage cannot be enforced without court
approval during or within three months after military service. 48
Sales of real and personal property are subject to the appropriate
provisions above referred to. Furthermore, where such contracts were
effective by payment prior to military service, they are enforceable only
by court action, the court having power to order repayment, repossession, stay of proceedings, or other equitable disposition. 49 With respect
to real estate sales, maturity may be extended on just terms and with
equal periodic instalments for a period equal to that of military service
combined with the remaining life of the contract. 50 With respect to personal property sales, (a) maturity may be similarly extended for the
military service period ;5 and (b) repossession may be effected by
leave of court after an appraisal and payment of a just sum to the soldier or dependent where "undue hardship" will not result. 52 The Act
permits waiver of such relief by written agreement of the parties exe53
cuted after the commencement of military service.
Liability under leases, as for accrued rent, is subject to the appropriate general provisions above referred to, also to certain special
provisions.
-As to a lease executed before the tenant's entry into military
service and covering property occupied by the soldier's dependents,
rent liability may be terminated in general on thirty days' written
notice, effective on monthly rent day, otherwise on the last day of a
calendar month ;-although this relief is subject to modification as "justice and equity may under the- circumstances require," upon application
by the lessor within the termination period. 54 A lease with a view to
purchase is also subject to the provisions relating to sales of property.55
-As to a lease on the home of dependents of the soldier, unless the
monthly rental exceeds $80, eviction rights must be exercised by court
48 Sec. 303.
47 Secs. 305(1) ;403.
48 Sec. 305 (2).
49 Secs.301(1); 301(3).
50 Sec. 700(1) (a).
52 Sec. 700(1) (b).

52 Sec. 303.

5s Sec. 107.
54 Sec. 304(1) (2).

5 Sec. 301 (1).
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action, and the court may "stay the proceedings for not longer than
three months" or "make such other order as may be just" ;-although
where such relief is granted to the tenant, the lessor is "entitled" to
relief "similar" to that provided by the Act in respect to sales of
property, secured obligations, and taxes.5 6 (For "tax" provisions see
below). Payments on such rental may be ordered out of the soldier's
allotment under government regulations. 7 Certain provisions, relating
to leases may be waived by written agreement executed after the soldier
has entered military service.58
As to all taxes except on income, including taxes on real property
occupied by dependents "or employes" of a soldier, sale cannot be had
except by leave of court; such sale will be stayed until six months after
military service if the soldier's ability to pay is materially affected by
his military service.5 9 Moreover, if real estate tax sale is had, the period
of military service is not to be included in computing the period of
redemption.60 On application made during or within six months after
military service, maturity of all taxes may be extended on an instalment
basis for the period of military service and on other just terms.6 1
Income taxes of the soldier may be deferred as to collection during
and for six months after military service if the soldier's ability to pay
is materially impaired; and he is protected against double residence for
62
state tax purposes.
Life insurance of a soldier is, on application, subject to protection.
Policies up to $10,000, in force October 6, 1942 or at least thirty days
before entrance into military service, -may be covered by government
guaranty of premium during and for two years after military service;
such policies cannot be forfeited for indebtedness. 6 3 As above stated,
a debt secured by any of a soldier's life insurance as collateral is sub64
ject to restriction in enforcement.
Rights of the soldier in public lands are the subject of protection
under the Act, to-wit: Homestead rights, desert lands, irrigation
rights, rights to mineral lands, and mining claims.6 5 To obtain certain
of such relief, the oldier is required to file notice within a limited time
after entrance into military service, or after October 6, 1942.66 The
period of relief variously extends for the period of military service and
s Secs. 300(1) ; and 300(2).
57

Sec. 300(4).

Sec. 107(b).
59 Sec. 500(1) (2).
58

60

61
62

63

Sec. 205.

Sec. 700(1) (b).
Secs. 513; 514.

Sec. 400-408.

64 See.305(1).

65 Secs. 502, 503(1) (2) ; 504(1) (2) ; 508; 501(1), 506(1); 505(1).
66

Secs. 504(3), 505 (2), 506(2), 510(1).
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six months thereafter, also for a period of hospitalization and dis87
ability.
Probateproceedings are not expressly referred to in the Act. However, the provisions as to general relief, relating to the filing of affidavit
as to non-military service, the appointment of attorney for defendant,
the vacation of judgment, and the granting of stays relate to "any
action or proceeding commenced in any court"; and the Act provides
for tolling of limitations-on the "bringing of any action or proceedings
in any court," in actions by or against "heirs, executors, administrators"
of the soldier.6 8 And a New Jersey court has expressly held probate proceedings to be within the purview of the relief statute. 9 It may be noted,
however, that the benefits of the Act have been held not extend to a
soldier acting in a representative capacity.70
Penalties for violations of the Act are provided in certain respects.
Breach or attempted breach, knowingly, of the provisions relating to
repossession on sales, secured obligations, exiction, life insurance collateral, and storage liens, constitute misdemeanors.7 1 Similarly intentional use of a false affidavit of non-military service, and improper
attempt to collect rent accruing after lease termination, are declared to
72
be misdemeanors.
QUESTIONS OF INTENT AND CONSTRUCTION

In some respects the intent of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act
is doubtful and judicial construction may well involve various legal
questions, for example:
-Was it intended that the period for relief against a judgment
expire ninety days after the termination of military service, even though
the soldier have notice or knowledge of the entry of such judgment ?1
-Is it entirely consistent and practical that varying periods of
time be fixed in limiting the soldier's right to apply for relief under
the Act? Six months after end of military service is provided in respect
to extension on maturities on an instalment basis,74 and redemption
from tax sales. 5 Ninety days after end of military service is apparently
provided in relation to vacation of a judgment76 Sixty days after end
67 See secs. 501(1), 502, 503(2), 504(1) (2), 505(1), 508.
68 Secs. 200, 201; 205.

8 In re Cool's Estate, (N.J. 1941) 18 AtI. (2d) 714; and see 28 Iowa Law Rev.
29-32.
70
Halle v. Canenaugh (N.H. 1920) 111 Atl. 76.

71 Secs. 301 (2), 302 (4), 300 (3), 305 (3).
72 Secs. 200(2) ; 304(3).
73 Cf. sec. 200(4).
74 Sec. 700.

75 Sec. 500(3).

76 Sec. 200 (4).
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of military service is apparently provided in relation to stays of proceedings generally.77 Six months after start of military service is provided in relation to public lands.78
after start of military service is provided in relation to public lands. 8
-Is it entirely consistent that the relief to the soldier extend for
varying periods of time after his military service? A period equal to
that of military service is provided in relation to extension of maturity
on instalment basis.7 9 Two years after military service is provided in
relation to protection of life insurance policies, and one year for life
insurance collateral.8 0 Six months after termination of military service
is provided for stays in relation to tax sales and income taxes.8 ' Three
months after military service is the protection period on foreclosure of
encumbrances and sales generally, on storage lien enforcement, and on
2
stays generally.
Is it entirely consistent that the period of the soldier's hospitalization
and disability be added to his direct military service in computing the
3
time within which the soldier may apply for relief in certain respects,
and not in others?
-Was it intended that the special relief relating to foreclosure
actions on secured obligations not apply to actions brought immediately
after military service ?s'
Is it consistent that the benefits of the Act extend to the soldier's
dependents only in matters involved under Article III (generally leases,
sales, mortgages) and in respect to taxes, and not in respect to other
general provisions ?85
-Who are "dependents" of the soldier ?"'
-What is the significance of the varying provisions as to the court's
extent and manner of considering facts and relief? In one instance the
requirement is "notice and hearing," in another, "such notice to the parties affected as it may require," in another "hearing" ;87 in other provisions notice and hearing are not mentioned. The term "opinion of
7 Sec. 201.
78

Secs. 504(1), 505(1) (2), 506(2), 511.

79 Sec. 700.
80 Secs. 403; 305 (1).
81
8

Secs. 500(2) (3) ; 513.

2Secs. 302 (3) ; 305 (2), 204. Comment 91 Penn. Law Rev. 192 re six month-three

month variance.

Secs. 504(1), 505 (1), 508.
See sec. 302(3) relating to proceedings "commenced during the period of military service."
85 Sec. 306; cf, sec. 300, 500, 103(4), 503. Comment 36 Ill. Law Rev. of Northwestern Univ. 337.
86 Act contains no definition, although one provision, sec. 300(1), refers to the
"wife, children, or other dependents." Comment in Hearings before Committee
on Military Affairs on H.R..7029, 77th Cong. pp. 23, 24.
83
84

87

Secs. 700; 602; 302(2).
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the court" likewise is used with relation to some,8 8 but not all fact
determinations ?
-What various meanings, if any, are intended in describing the
types of court orders authorized to be made under the Act: "As may
be equitable to conserve the interest(s) of all parties"; "as justice and
equity may in the circumstances require"; "in accordance with principles of equity and justice"; "as in its (the court's) opinion may be
necessary to protect rights"; "as may be just?"8 9
-Is any distinction intended between the "leave" of court required
in relation to disposition of life insurance collateral ;90 and the "approval" by the court, required in relation to enforcement of storage
liens, and other relief ?91
-In matters relating to sales contracts, is the court required to enter
a stay of proceedings if the defendant's ability is materially affected
by his military service; or, may the court make any disposition of the
case as may be "equitable" .1u
. -What
distinction is intended between the two terms used to
describe the effect military service must have had upon the soldier's
financial situation to entitle him to relief under the Act, to-wit: materially "impaired" and materially "affected ?"3
-What is the nature of the relief, "similar" to that granted persons
in military service, which, in event of lease termination, may be granted
to a lessor not in military service.94
-Is a distinction intended between the term "equal instalments"
and the "equal periodic instalments" in the two provisions relating to
extension of obligations?"
-Is the court's power to stay exiction proceedings limited to three
months .
-Has the court any power, discretionary or otherwise, to have rent
paid by use of allotment, which may be ordered under "regulations"
88 Sees. 304(2), 305 (1), 306, 500(2).
89Secs. 301(3), 302(2)(b), 305(2)(b);

304(2); 103(3); 200(1); 204, 300(2),

700. Note absence of any qualification in discretion relating to posting of bond
and relief to sureties [(secs. 200(1) and 103(1) (2)] ; comment on wide discretionary power in 36 I1. (N.W.) Law Review, 325; comment regarding section

304(2) in 91 Penn Law Rev. 186.

90 Sec. 305(1).
91 Secs. 305(2), 302(3).
92 Compare "shall," with use of "or" connecting the various clauses in sec. 301 (3).
93Secs. 202, 306; and 201, 206, 300(2), 301(3), 302(2), 305(1), 700(1), respectively.

DASec. 300 (2).
95 Subsec. (a) and (b) of sec. 700(1).
.6See sec. 300(2) ; compare Gilluly v. Hawkins (Wash. 1919) 182 Pac. 958; and

Riordan v. Zube (Cal. App. 1920) 195 Pac. 65; note discussion, Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong. pp. 14-17; also 91

Penn Law Rev. 84.

1943]

SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' RELIEF ACT

prescribed by the Secretaries of War and Navy?9& Was it intended that
an owner of real estate, unlike other creditors, be compelled to extend
credit for three months or other period to the soldier-tenant without
any financial protection within control of the court.98
-Is it entirely consistent that, when a soldier-lessee obtains relief,
correlative relief may be granted his lessor, yet when a soldier-mortgagor obtains relief, correlative relief is not so afforded his mortgagee?99
-Is the redemption period in a real estate mortgage foreclosure,
which, as in Wisconsin, occurs primarily before a sale, necessarily
extended by the period of military service of any defendant? 100
-Is it intended that there be no extension of redemption period in
relation to tax or mortgage sales of personal property ?1'
-Should not the soldier or dependent or employe be required to
file notice by affidavit or otherwise, in order to obtain relief relating to
tax sales ?1o2

-Is the "appointment" of attorney mandatory before entry of
judgment against a soldier even though he personally appears or is represented by an authorized attorney ?1o3
-Is there any significance in the distinction between the "legal
representative" who may act on behalf of a soldier in respect to vacation of judgments, and the "person on * * behalf of the soldier" who
may apply for a stay of proceedings ?104

-Who is a "bona fide purchaser for value under such judgment,"
in the provision protecting third party rights on vacation of a judgment
entered against the soldier ?los
-Was it intended that a soldier be permitted to waive secondary
liability rights by execution of a writing during military service? If
so, can all rights under the Act be so waived?106
97 Compare sec. 300(4). Information as to "prescribed regulations," if any, is not

available in this corps area.
98 Compare sec. 300(2) and (4) ; see Comment 91 Penn L. Rev. 184.
99Lessor relief under secs. 300, 304. Protection need of mortgagee would include taxes on real estate not occupied by soldier, dependent or employe. Cf.
sec. 500(1). See also Comment 91 Penn Law Rev. 187.
100 Compare sec. 205 relating to redemption of property "sold." Comment 28 Law
Rev. 14.
10 Compare extension of redemption on sales of real estate under sec. 205.
102 Under sec. 500(1) (2) no method is provided by which municipal authorities
can practically determine who property in the municipality is and is not owned
or occupied by a person "in military service" or his dependent or employe.

Compare filing of notices in relatioin to public lands, secs. 504(3), 505(2),
506(2).
*2 Secs. 200(4), and 201.
105 Sec. 200(4). For varying opinions as to whether a purchaser can be "bona
103
Note use of phrase "shall have appointed" in sec. 200(1).
04

fide" where requirements as filing of affidavit of non-military service, have

not
been complied with, see 28 Iowa Law Rev. 23-27, 34.
10 6Cf. sec. 103(4) under which such waiver is rendered invalid by "subsequent'

entrance into military service. See Report, War Work Sub-Committee, A.B.A.

7/18/42, p. 5; also 15 Wis. Bar Association Bulletin, p,222.
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-Does the Act apply to administrative agencies and governmental
tribunals? While the provision as to tolling of limitations, as recently
amended, includes "any action or proceeding in any court, board,
bureau, commission, department, or other agency of government," the
10
general authority under the Act applies only to "courts.

7

What if any power has the court to appoint a custodian for property
of the soldier during his military service ?107a
FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF CLARIFICATION

The immediate purpose of the Act is to strengthen the morale of the
soldier during the war, but the substantial significance and value of this
legislation depend upon its application after the war. This law is designed as both present and future protection for individual property
rights of the men in the armed forces. If those property rights are
denied, or prejudiced, as a result of military service, not only will the
men properly feel that a grave injustice has been done them, but their
part in our economic system, and indeed that system itself, may be
jeopardized. In view of the number of men in the armed forces, and
the period of time involved, this Relief Act will be of far greater significance in our nationay life than any other similar law in the history
of the country.
To make the Act really effective after the war, (a) the rights of
the soldier must be made known to him immediately upon his discharge
from military service; (b) he must be properly represented in the enforcement of his rights; and (c) such rights must be as free from
doubt as possible, so that they may be judicially declared without undue
delay.
Doubt as to the meaning of provisions of this Act will result in
extended legal controversy which, regardless of outcome, may well
deprive soldiers of the relief intended. Neither the soldier's financial
situation, nor the amount involved, will normally permit of long drawnout litigation. To avoid this danger, at least the apparent difficulties
of construction should be eliminated if possible. In respect to this particular statute, the need for later judicial clarification should be reduced to a minimum. It is submitted that Congress might consider
the possibility of clarifying phraseology of the Soldier's and Sailor's
Civil Relief Act in respects above mentioned.
107 Secs. 205; 101(4). See Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on
H.R. 7029, 77th Cong. 13; also recommendation War Work Sub-Committee,
A.B.A. 7/18/42, p. 23.
1o7aCompare Alberta Statutes 4 Geo VI c 4 (1940) providing for "Public
Administrator" to care for soldier's property; and approval comment 36 Ill.
L. Rev. of Northwestern Univ. 334.
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LAWYERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE RELIEF ACT

The lawyer is already a vital factor in the present operation of the
Civil Relief Act. The American Bar Association and local associations
had set up facilities to render legal service under the Act some time
before the United States entered the war. Since December 1941,
thousands of lawyers throughout the nation have offered their services
and, without compensation, have handled tens of thousands of legal
matters for men in the armed forces and their dependents. Requests for
such service have come from the American Red Cross, Army Emergency Relief, the U.S.O. and other public and private relief organizations as well as directly from the soldier."01
After the war, when the soldiers are leaving military service, it
will be vital that the ex-service men promptly obtain correct information as to their rights under the Act; and that they be properly represented in the enforcement of those right. Lawyers will be essential in
both respects. Although the Act provides for official notice to the soldier
"of the benefits accorded by" it, 109 it is obvious that he cannot fully
understand the scope and limitations of the relief afforded under this
complex statute without professional legal advice. Moreover the need
for such promptness and accuracy in obtaining such service is accentuated by the relatively shor 10 and varying periods after military
service within which the soldier must act to obtain relief. Relief under
the Act is afforded solely by court proceedings. The ex-soldier will
obviously require legal representation in obtaining such relief.
A serious problem is presented as to just how the ex-soldier can be
assured of obtaining legal advice and representation. In many, if not
most of the controversies, the soldier will not be in a position to pay
a reasonable attorney fee. Yet it would not seem proper that lawyers
be asked or even expected to continue rendering such service after the
war, entirely without compensation. The matter appears to be one
worthy of immediate consideration and action on the part of the organized bar, possibly in collaboration with federal and state authorities.
The economic readjustment of the soldier and his continuance as
part of the free-enterprise-life of the nation, may depend materially
upon the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, and upon whether that
Act is given its real intended effect after the war. It is not only the
duty, but the privilege of the lawyer to take a leading role in accomplishing this purpose. Such service will advance lawyers in the regard
of their community; and an enlightened public will realize the true
meaning of law in a democracy.
108 See War Department Communications 5/24/41, 6/18/41 annexed to Report

of A.B.A. Committee on National Defense 9/29/41; also A.B.A. War Bulletin
July' 1942.

109 Sec. 105.

110 Cf. two years in Alberta and Saskatchawan, unlimited in Great Britain and

Manitoba. also discussion: 36 Ill. Law Rev. of Northwestern Univ. 333-336.

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST
GOVERNMENT---TWO CONFLICTING DOCTRINES*
ROGER SHERMAN HOAR*

N a free democracy such as ours, one of the most difficult problems
will always be to maintain a nice balance between non-encroachment
on our freedoms, and the preservation of the government which protects those freedoms. Abraham Lincoln has well expressed this dilemma as follows:
"Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence."'
This fundamental dilemma is exemplified in the struggle for ascendancy, from the first World War until the second, between two doctrines
of constitutional law: (1) the "clear and present danger" doctrine,
sometimes called the "Holmes" doctrine, to the effect that civil liberties cannot be denied to subversive movements, unless and until
those movements are seen to be on the verge of success; and (2) the
"self-defense" doctrine, to the effect that the constitution, for its own
protection, withdraws the benefits of its guarantees of civil liberties
from those who seek to overthrow it.
The object of this present paper is to trace the constitutional history
of the ups and down of these two competing doctrines, in opinions, both
majority and dissenting, of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The "self-defense" doctrine is the more ancient of the two. Justice
Frankfurter 2 traces it back to Abraham Lincoln's message of July 4,
1861, to a special session of the Congress, when in reply to an accusation that he had illegally suspended the writ of habeas corpus, the
President asserted that the Federal Government must be preserved,
even if that preservation necessitates that
"some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than
of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated."'
*Member of Wisconsin Bar; Author of several law books, including "Constitutional Conventions" (Little-Brown); formerly Assistant Attorney General
of Massachusetts; member of the faculty of the Marquette Graduate School of
Engineering, and Attorney for Bucyrus-Erie Company of South Milwaukee.
'Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). Justice Frankfurter gives no
2 citation for this quotation. Cf. note 3, infra.
Dissenting opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941)

203.

8 Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents." 1908 ed., Vol. VI, p. 25.
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It is generally agreed that the "clear and present danger" doctrine
originated in the following dictum by Justice Holmes in the Schenck
case in 1918:
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring ' about
the substantive
4
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is important that we note the following facts about this obscure
sentence. It occurs in a unanimous opinion. It was wholly unnecessary
to the decision of the case, inasmuch as the conviction of Schenck for
attempting to cause insubordination and obstruct the draft was sustained by the Court. Furthermore the context leads to the conclusion
that these words were employed as a species of "thinking out loud," a
"
sort of "on the one hand... ; but on the other ....
Whether they were noticed at all by the other members of the
Court, who were unanimously agreed that Schenck should be convicted,
doctrine or no doctrine, will probably never be known.
It would not be seemly to accuse Justice Holmes of inserting those
words into that opinion as what fiction-writers call a "plant," but the
fact remains that later on they proved very handy for that purpose.
At any rate the thought contained in those words was not raised again
by Justice Holmes in his opinions sustaining the convictions of
Frohwerk5 and of Debs,6 on the authority of the Schenck case, nor
even in his dissent in the Stilson case, 7 in which dissent Justice Brandeis
joined.
But, in 1919, in Justice Holme's dissenting opinion in the Abrans
case, in which opinion Justice Brandies joined, the doctrine is casually
alluded to in the following words:
"I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reason that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended
to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.""
This is an even more moderate statement of the doctrine than
Justice Holmes's original statement of it, for note the-words: "or is
intended to produce," words later forgotten or repudiated by him.
In 1920, in the majority opinion of Justice McKenna in the Schaefer
case, we find an explicit assertion of the competing "self-defense" doc4

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1918).

5Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 63 L.Ed. 560 (1918).

6 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 63 L.Ed. 566 (1918).
7 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 589, 63 L.Ed. 1154 (1919).
8
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919).
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trine, which had been implicit in the Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, Stilson
and Abrams opinions. The Court now stated:
"A curious spectacle was presented: that great ordinance of
government and orderly liberty was invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a
strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself.
... Verdicts and judgments of conviction were the reply to the
challenge, and when they were brought here our response to
it was unhesitating and direct. We did more than reject the
contention; we forestalled all
shades of repetition of it including
'
that in the case at the bar."
So they thought. Their assertion of that doctrine made it wholly
unnecessary for the majority to dignify even by rebuttal the assertion
of the "clear and present danger" doctrine in the dissent in that case
by Justice Brandeis, Holmes concurring, in which the astonishing
statement is made that in the Schenck case "the extent to which Congress may, under the Constitution, interfere with free speech was ...
declared by a unanimous court to be" this alleged doctrine !'o Brandeis
and Holmes then proceed to base their entire dissent categorically on
a demonstration that Schaefer's subversive publications created no clear
and present danger.
Later that same year, in the Pierce case, Justice Brandeis (Holmes
concurring) again asserted the "clear and present danger" doctrine,"
and again the majority merely ignored it.
In the Gilbert case late in 1920, Justice McKenna, speaking for the
majority of the Court, including Justice Holmes, reasserted the "selfdefense" doctrine. After citing a number of prior opinions, from
Schenck down to Abrams, Justice McKenna said:
"In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, commenting on
those cases and their contentions it was said that the curious
spectacle was presented of the Constitution of the United States
being invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its
precepts it was adduced against itself. And we did more than
reject the contention, we forestalled all repetitions12 of it, and the
contention in the case at bar is a repetition of it.'

Chief Justice White dissented on merely a point of jurisdiction.
Justice Brandeis alone dissented on the merits13 ; and it is to be noted
that, now that for the first time Justice Holmes was on the other side
of the fence, there is no mention of the "clear and present danger"
9 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 477, 64 L.Ed. 360 (1919).
10 Schaefer v. United States, supra, 482.

"1Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 255, 64 L.Ed. 542 (1919).
12
'3

Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332, 65 L.Ed. 287 (1920).
Id., at 334.
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doctrine. May not this occurrence absolve Mr. Brandeis from responsibility for that doctrine?
This brings us down to 1925, up to which time the "self-defense"
doctrine had been categorically asserted in two majority opinions, and
had been implicit in at least five more, and had not up to then been
explicitly questioned even in a dissent. We find that the "clear and
present danger" doctrine had been asserted in one dictum (written by
Justice Holmes) and in three Holmes-Brandeis dissents; but even
this slight recognition had brought the alleged doctrine to the point
where it could not longer be ignored by the rest of the Court; it became
incumbent upon the majority to scotch it. Accordingly, in the Gitlow
case, the majority opinion by Justice Sanford quotes with approval the
following from the Supreme Court of Illinois:
"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government, without waiting until there is a present and imminent
danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were
compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain,
then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there
would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law."14
And, he further says:
"That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion, is clear....

And the immediate danger is none

the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen ....

A single revolutionary

spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst
into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said
that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark
without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into
the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the
adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the
revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the
threatened danger in its incipiency."'15
Justice Holmes and Brandeis, in their dissent,15a again assert the
doctrine refuted by the above quotations from the majority. Their in14 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669-670, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1924)

People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 35 (1924).
15 Id., at 669.
i5a Id., at 672.

quoting
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sistence that this doctrine had the unanimous sanction of the Court in
the Schenck case, required some reply.
This reply consisted in distinguishing the Schenck case, rather than
in dignifying the alleged "clear and present danger" doctrine by overruling it. Justice Sanford stated that the sentence which Justice Holmes
had inserted in the Schenck case,
"has no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character."'16
Subsequent developments cast doubt on the tactical wisdom of
Justice Sanford's not dismissing the Hughes interpolation as a mere
inadvertent dictum of the Schenck case, rather than to have resorted
to this somewhat labored attempt at distinguishment.
The Whitney case in 1927 afforded Justices Holmes and Brandeis
an opportunity to attack the Gitlow opinion on two fronts, with a
pincers movement. Their specially concurring opinion17: (a) relied on
the fact that the Gitlow case had merely distinguished the Schenck dictum; and (b) invented a new doctrine to combat the ground of distinguishment. This new doctrine was that a legislative determination
that certain acts are dangerous, must be disregarded unless the Court
finds that these acts actually are dangerous. The two dissenters even
tried to add a new limitation to the "clear and present danger" doctrine, namely that the danger must also be serious. Thus they sought
not only to limit the applicability of the Gitlow decision, but also to
weaken it in cases to which it was applicable. And all under the guise
of a concurrence!
Such persistence certainly deserves to be rewarded. Yet, up until
1936 there had never been a majority reliance upon the "clear and
present danger" doctrine, so often asserted by Holmes and Brandeis,
and by them alone; a doctrine once completely and logically demolished
by the majority, a doctrine utterly inconsistent with the twice-asserted
majority "self-defense" doctrine.
In the Stromberg case in 1931, although a conviction under a red
flag law was reversed, the majority opinion by Justice Hughes reiterated the "self-defense" doctrine in the following words:
"There is no question but that the State may thus provide for
the punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite
to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means. There is no constitutional
im8
munity for such conduct abhorrent to our institutions.'
16
17

Gitlow v. New York, s ,ra, 671.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1926).

IsStromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-369, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1930).
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There was no mentioff of the "clear and present danger" doctrine
in this case, nor in three others of about the same period to which it
might have been pertinent.19
In the first Herndon case, Justice Cardozo mentioned the doctrine
20
in a dissent.
Finally, in 1937, nineteen years after its first assertion, the "clear
and present danger" doctrine first received majority reliance, not however in a case involving either national defense or an attempt at overthrowing the government,-but rather one merely involving the preaching of race-equality to negroes. 21 Even this case does not overrule the
Gitlow case, but reasserts the two principles there asserted; Pnd, in at
last dignifying the Schenck dictum as a principle of law, does so by
merely distinguishing the Gitlow dictum as it in turn had distinguished
the Schenck dictum. As the writer interprets the distinguishment in
the Herndon case, it is that Herndon was not trying to overthrow the
government. The second pincer of the Holmes-Brandeis specially concurring opinion in the Whitney case, namely that the court can go
behind a legislative determination of imminent danger, still has not
been dignified by majority support. In fact, recent decisions in other
fields seem to bar out this possibility.
Since the initial majority recognition of the "clear and present
danger" doctrine in the second Herndon case, it has been reasserted
only five times, one of them a dissent, and all in fields remote from
the field of national defense in which Justice Holmes so often futilely
tried to establish it. Three of these five instances related to peaceful
picketing,22 one to the distribution of religious tracts (alleged to be
24
likely to disturb the peace) ,23 and one to contempt of court.
It was not asserted in the handbill cases, 25 nor in the Jersey City
free speech case, 2' nor in the flag-salute case, 27 nor even in Justice
it may perhaps be considered
Stone's lone disent in the latter, though
implicit in his concluding sentence. 2s
9

Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). In the Burns case, Justice
Brandeis alone dissented, and did not raise the point; thus again supplying

evidence that the "clear and present danger" doctrine was merely a Holmes
idea.
2o Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 447 (1935).
2" Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256, 81 L.Ed. 1066 (1936).
22
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) ; American Federation of Labor
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941); Justice Blacks dissent in Milk Wagon
Drivers U. v. Meadowmoor, 312 U.S. 287, 313 (1941).
23 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
24 Bridges v. California, 62 S.Ct. 190, 203 (1941).
25
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
26 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
27 Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28 Ibid.
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In the Bridges case, handed down the day after "Pearl Harbor,"
but too soon to have been influenced thereby, we can note what may be
the beginning of a new trend. Justice Frankfurter, is now the dissenter,
and against the "clear and present danger" doctrine. He says:
"Free speech is not so absolute or irrational a conception as
to imply paralysis of the means for effective protection of all
the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights. .

.

. In the cases

before us, the claims on behalf of freedom of speech and of the
press encounter claims on behalf of liberties no less precious.
California asserts her right to do what 29she has done as a means
of safeguarding her system of justice.

He is joined by the strongest members of the Court: Chief Justice
Stone, and Justices Roberts and Byrnes. Is it not likely that this
Frankfurter dissent may lay the foundation for the eventual repudiation of this doctrine?
From all the foregoing, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. The "self-defense" doctrine is well-established, and has never
been directly attacked, even in a dissent.
2. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has never been relied
on by the Court to overturn a conviction in a case involving an attempt
to subvert the government, or opposition to national defense.
3. The majority has applied it only five times: once in a case
involving propaganda of race equality, twice in picketing cases, once
in a case involving distribution of literature, and once in a case involving contempt of court.
4. The latest time that it has been applied, it prevailed in a mere
five-to-four decision, the dissenters being the strongest members of
the Court, headed by that great liberal, Justice Frankfurter.
5. The complete refutation of the doctrine by Justice Sanford
in the Gitlow case has never been answered, in fact no attempt has
ever been made to answer it.
6. The "clear and present danger" doctrine is utterly inconsistent
with the well-established "self-defense" doctrine.
7. It may be considered to have reached its height just before
Pearl Harbor, and now to be on its way out.
Shortly after the formulation of the Constitution of the United
States, and before the result had been made public, Benjamin Franklin
was asked by a Philadelphia lady whether "we had a monarchy or a
republic." He replied: "A republic, if you can keep it."' 0
Is not the answer to the proponents of the "clear and present
danger" doctrine: "What good are civil liberties, if we are unwilling
to qualify them in order to keep them ?"
Bridges v. California, supra, 596.
30 "Formation of the Union," Government Printing Office, 1927, p. 952.
29
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A WIDENING HORIZON

D

OWN through the years the study of government has engrossed
the attention of men. The problems of government have a habit
of recurring. We are surprised to find that the ancients struggled with
our problems and did not find the answer. Dictators are not new-wars
of conquest, revolution, fill the pages of history.
An ideology becomes the goal of a people, something to die for, to
sacrifice for. People grope their way upward in travail and hardship.
Russia, China, India are examples. Their destiny is unknown to them
or to us. It is idle to think that we can control the destinies of a. billion
people in flux. We may influence destinies by our example, we cannot
direct, or control, or police them.
What should a government bring to a people? A consensus would
probably be that the essential elements of an acceptable government
must include these features:
Ability and willingness to fight for country in war in spite of an
intense desire for peace.
Ability to produce munition of war.
Great productivity in times of peace.
A high standard of living for citizens.
Opportunity for advancement and improvement of conditions by
work and education.
Administration of adequate standards of justice and maintenance
of guaranteed right by independent courts.
Good municipal or local governments.
A solvent government.
Any system of government which grants or produces these elements
may be an acceptable government regardless of its nature, be it an
autocracy, a state socialism, a pure democracy or a republic of selfgoverning people.
If we apply the foregoing acid test to ourselves we find a highly
creditable record in all elements except the extremely important last
three. It is a singular thing that it is in those three the legal profession
should make its greatest contribution. We have made a good start in
the improvement of the administration of justice in recent years and
the growing consciousness of our joint responsibility in this field of
good government is producing results. But we cannot have good administration of justice in poor or corrupt systems of municipal government. We have brilliant sporadic instances of leadership and participation in local governments-Detroit, Essex County, N. J., Milwaukee,
Cincinnati, Kansas City, New Orleans, New York. We have tolerated
Long, Tammany, Hague, Kelly, Pendergast and many lesser lights.

EDITORIAL

We have not been deeply concerned with the science of good government. We have permitted our students in high schools and colleges to
complete their courses without the study of history, government or
constitution and then wondered why we did not produce more active
citizens. We have unctuously boasted that we do not participate in
politics. We have acted as though we were contaminated by politics,
forgetting that government is politics. We must participate actively in
government-good government-if we are to win in the fight for
improved judicial administration.
Our lives are now governed by war, we are disciplined and tested,
we are absorbed by actual participation in the struggle of the human
race for freedom, we fight for our lives. But we can think this tremendous problem through, we can widen our horizon of thought in preparation for a widened horizon of action. We can be better citizens, we
can influence others to be better citizens. It has been said that our profession must have an intellectual awakening. It must have an awakening in government and its responsibility for it.
Our splendid sons are the messengers of democracy through the
world, carrying to harassed and struggling people everywhere an opportunity for freedom. As a result of their work, governments will be
instituted among men. Shall it be state socialism or democracy? Shall
there be freedom of thought in the world?
American industry and labor are winning the fight for production.
Our soldiers will win in war with that production. What are we winning? Good government in all its aspects must be our goal. We must
make democracy work if we want others to adopt it. We must widen
our horizon.
CApt. B. RIx.*

*L.L.M. Georgetown University, Professor of Law Marquette University,
Member of House of Delegates, American Bar Association. -

NOTES
LEGAL RELATIONS OF OWNERS OF PRESENT AND
FUTURE INTERESTS IN PERSONALITYCONSUMABLES
In the problem of protection of future interests in personalty one
question must be whether future interests can exist in personalty. This
problem has had a peculiar and long history and its adequate recounting as an historical problem has been done elsewhere and needs no repetition.'
Today the chief vestige of the hoary past lies in the rule that there
can be no future interests in consumables, an anachronistic survival
among personalty doctrines. The rule raises two question: 1) what is
a consumable and 2) to what extent can there be no future interest
in consumables.
The first question: what is a consumable, is largely a question of
fact. Actually it seems that there are two rules here which are often
confused. The first rule concerns things which are necessarily consumed in their use and this group consists largely of foodstuffs. The
second rule concerns things whose use involves deterioration or diminution and in some cases annihilation and this group covers a wide variety
such as household goods, tools and the like. As to the first group:
foodstuffs, the rule is that there can be no future interests2 unless the
quantity is so large that no one would reasonably expect actual physical
consumption. The other rule concerning things whose use involves
deterioration is that the life tenant has free and unlimited use (short
3
of waste) and the remainderman gets whatever, if anything, is left.
But a formalistic rule based on the form of the res has given way to a
freer classification, thus if the res is part of a stock in trade or is given
'Gray, FutureInterests in Personal Property, 14 HARV. L. REv., 52 (1901).
2 Andrew v. Andrew, 1 Colby Ch. Cas. 686, 63 Eng. Rep. 598 (1845) ; Bryant v.
Easterson, 5 Jur. N.S. 166 (1859) ;-Phillips v. Beal, 32 Beav. 25, 55 Eng. Rep.
10 (1862); Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Ala. 553, 50 So. 305, 136 Am. St.
Rep. 61 (1909); Burnett v. Sister, 53 Ill. 325 (1870) ; Walker v. Pritchard,
121 Ill. 221, 12 N.E. 336 (1887); Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ili. 437, 27
N.E. 65 (1891); Gentry v. Jones, 6 J. J. Marsh 148 (Ky., 1831); Christler's
Ex. v. Meddis Adm., 6 B. Mon. 35 (Ky. 1845); Davison's Adm. v. Davison's
Admx., 149 Ky. 71, 149 S.W. 982 (1912); Healy v. Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86
Am. Dec. 157 (1864); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14 N.J. Eq. 23 (1861); Rapalye
v. Rapalye, 27 Barb. 610 (N.Y., 1857); Holman's Appeal, 24 Pa. 174 (1854);
Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill 370 (S.C., 1883); Calhoun v. Furgeson, 3 Rich.
160 (S.C., 1850) ; Wilson v. Gordon, 81 S.C. 395, 61 S.E. 85, 62 S.E. 593 (1908) ;
Henderson v. Vaulx, 10 Yerg. 30 (Tenn., 1836); Forsey v. Luton, 2 Head 183
(Tenn., 1858); Dunbar's Ex. v. Woodcoe's Ex., 10 Leigh 628 (Va., 1840).
The cases are gathered in Note, 77 A.L.R. 753 (1932).
3 Re Hall, 1 Jur. N.S. 974 (1855) ; Groves v. Wright, 2 Kay & J., 60 Eng. Rep.
815 (1856); Phillips v. Beal., supra, n. 2; Leonard v. Owen, 93 Ga. 678, 20 S.E.
65 (1893); Christler v. Meddis, supra, n. 2; Davison's Adm. v. Davison's
Adm., supra, n. 2; Field v. Hitchcock 17 Pick. 182 (Mass., 1835).

NOTES

together with another res in which future interests can exist, there
may be future interests.4 Occasionally anomalous cases arise. Such
was Sealwik v. Grimes in which the court refused to recognize a future
interest in a printing press.5
The other and important question is: to what extent is it true that
future interests cannot be created in consumables.
The Master of the Rolls, Sir William Grant, has given an historical
explanation" of the doctrine of consumables which has been frequently
quoted: "A gift for life of a chattel is now construed to be a gift of
the usufruct only. But, when the use and the property can have no
separate existence, it should seem that the old rule must still prevail,
and that a limitation over, after a life interest, must be held to be
ineffectual."
What rationale can support the rule? It is argued that a gift for
life in a consumable imports a power to consume and that such a power
is inconsistent with the existence of a future interest. This by analogy
to the case of a power of sale coupled to a life estate. But most cases
do not hold the latter a gift of the absolute interest.7
A strong argument, but one not often cited in the opinions, although
perhaps tacitly assumed, is that normally no effort is made to create
future interest in consumables and if they were permitted, undesirable
results would follow.
There are several limits to the rule that there can be no future
interests in consumables. Several cases provide that if the grantor were
clear as to his intent, he might vitiate the rule or circumstances just
pointed out, namely, gift of stock in trade or of consumables and another res clearly not a consumable with the intent that they be a unit
may take the case out of the rule.
But the most important exception is the case where there is a gift
of a residue or a general bequest. In that case there is said to be a
duty on the executor to sell the goods and the future interests attach
4Howe v. Howe, (1849) 14 Jur. 359; But cf. Howe v. Dartmouth, infra, n. 9.
5 107 Md. 410, 68 Atl. 883, 16 L.R.A. N.S. 483, 126 Am. St. Rep. 400 (1907),
It has been suggested that the run of mine cases involving the holding
that a res is consumable do not necessarily involve holding that there can be
no future interest but may merely decide that there is a future interest in
whatever is left at the cessation of the first interest.
The present case involves holding that there can be no future interest in
consumables because here the court was dealing with what was left over after
the cessation of the first interest and the quarrel was between the heirs of the
first owner and the future owner. The heirs of the first owner prevailed, the
court holding there could be no future interest in consumables.
6Randall v. Russell, 3 Merivale 190, 36 Eng. Rep. 73 (1817).
7 Cf. Simes: Future Interests (1937) sec. 598.
8 Greggs v. Dodge, 2 Day 28 (Conn., 1805); Innes v. Polter, 130 Minn. 320, 153
N.W. 604, 3 A.L.R. 896 (1915) ; Healey v. Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86 Am. Dec.
159 (1864) : Saunders v. Haughton, 8 Ired. Eq. 217 (N.C., 1832) ; Patterson v.
Devlin, McMul. Eq. 459 (S.C., 1827); Madden v. Madden's Ex., 2 Leigh 337
(Va., 1830).

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

to the proceeds. This rule was first stated in England in 1802 in Howe
v. Dartmouth.9 The rule is based on the implied intent of the testator.
Since future interests were stated and there may well be no property
to enjoy if the life tenant can consume it, the property must be converted into income-yielding property and the income paid to the life
tenant. The distinction between a general or residuary gift and a
specific devise lies in the fact that in a specific devise the testator has
made it clear that he intends the life tenant to enjoy that particular
res. The rule of Howe v. Dartmouth is followed generally 0 but not in
Maryland 1 on the ground that such an intent as the rule involves is too
fictitious.
If a contrary intent is manifest, the rule of Howe v. Dartmouth will
12
be set aside.
Included in the class of consumables to which the rule of Howe v.
Dartmouth applies are: leaseholds,'13 annuities,'1 4 and royaltiesY5 in
addition to the aforementioned foodstuffs and household goods.
9 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 56, 25 Eng. R. C. 29 (1802).

10 Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Hare 609, 67 Eng. Rep. 523 (1844) ; Re Bates (1907)

1
Ch.22, 6 B.R.C. 199; Prendergast v. Prendergast, (1850) 3 H. L. Cas. 195, 10
Eng. Rep. 75; Tickner v. Old, (1874) 18 Eq. 422; Harrison v. Foster, 9 Ala.
955 (1846); Burnett v. Lester, 53 Ill. 325 (1870); Welsch v. Belleville Sav.
Bank, 94 Ill.
191 (1876); Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill.
437, 27 N.E. 65
(1891); Balch v. Hallet, 10 Gray 402 (1858); Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass.
583 (1871) ; Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493 (1931) ; Healey v.
Toppan, 45 N.H. 243, 86 Am. Dec. 159 (1864); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14
N.J.Eq. 23 (1861); Hull v. Eddy, 14.N.J.L. 169 (1833); Rowe v. White, 16
N.J.Eq. 411, 84 Am. Dec. 169 (1863); Howard v. Howard, 16 N.J.Eq. 486
(1864); Jones v. Stites, 19 N.J.Eq. 324 (1868); Coole v. Monkhouse, 47
N.J.Eq. 73 (1890) ; Ott v. Tewksbury, 75 N.J.Eq. 4, 71 Atl. 302 (1908) ; Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige 122 (N.Y., 1830); Cairns v. Chaubert, 9 Paige 160
(N.Y., 1841); Spear v. Tinkham, 2 Barb. Ch. 211 (N.Y., 1841); Rapalye v.
Rapalye, 2-7Barb. 610 (N.Y., 1857); Re Housman, 4 Dem. 404 (N.Y., 1886);
Re Kendall, 4 Dem. 133 (N.Y., 1885); and many later N.Y. cases; Smith v.
Barham, 2 Dev. Eq. 420, 25 Am. Dec. 721 (N.C., 1833); Jones v. Simmons,
7 Ired. Eq. 178 (N.C., 1851) ; Saunders v. Haughton, 8 Ired. Eq. 217 (N.C.,
1852); Ritch v. Morris, 78 N.C. 377 (1878); Simmons v. Fleming, 157 N.C.
389, 72 S.E. 1082 (1911); Henderson v. Vaulx, 10 Yerg. 30 (Tenn., 1836);
Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344 (1872).
"2Evans v. Inglehart, 6 Gill & J. 171 (Md. 1834) ; Wooten v. Burch, 2 Md. Ch.
190 (1851).
There are dicta in several other jurisdictions against Howe v. Dartmouth.
12Alcock v. Sloper, 2 Myl & K. 699, 39 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1833) and a score of
succeeding English cases; Gay v. Focke, 291 Fed. 721 (1923); Harrison v.
Foster, 9 Ala. 955 (1846); Buckingham v. Foster, 136 Ill.
437, 27 N.E. 65
(1891) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N.E. 530 (1927) ;
Corle v. Monkhouse, 47 N.J.Eq. 73, 20 Atl. 367 (1890) ; Re Housman, 4 Dem.
404 (N.Y., 1886); Tayloe v. Bond, Busbee Eq. 5 (N.C., 1852); Deighmiller's
Estate, I Legal Gaz. 42 (1869); Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Eq. 370 (S.C.
1833); Vancil v. Evans, 4 Coldw. 340 (Tenn. 1867); Golder v. Littlejohn, 30
Wis. 344 (1872).
13 Re Game (1897) 1 Ch. 881; Frankel v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 152 App.
Div. 58, 136 N.Y. Supp. 703 (1912) affmd. 209 N.Y. 553, 103 N.E. 1124 (1913)
and in 168 App. Div. 634, 154 N.Y. Supp. 363 (1915).
'4 Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Colby Ch. Cas. 498, 63 Eng. Rep. 516 (1844).
15 Re First Trust & Deposit Co., 210 App. Div. 575, 206 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1924).
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A contrary intent (opposing Howe v. Dartmouth) may be found
from an authorization or direction to retain' or to sell at a designated
time 1 7 or at discretion Is or to pay rents.' 9
*EaRwI

EssER NEMMmS.

EDITOR's NOTE: This article is the third part of a series relating to
Problems in the Legal Relation of Owners of Present and Future Interest in Personality, the first of which will appear in the March issue
of the Wisconsin Law Review, and is entitled "The Right of the Owner
of a Future Interest in Personality to Security"; the second part will
appear in either the February or March issue of the Michigan Law Review, and is entitled "Some Problems in the Apportionment of Increase
Between Holders of Present and Future Interests in Personality."t

* Member of Wisconsin bar; Austin, Lehman and University fellow, Harvard

University.
tI The author acknowledges with thanks his debt to the late Jrofessor Joseph Warren and to Professor A. James Casner of the Harvard Law School for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.

Re Bates (1907) Ch. 22, 6 B.R.C. 199.
Daniel v. Warren, 2 Younge & C. Ch. Cas. 290, 63 Eng. Rep. 127 (1843).
Is Re Pitcairn (1896) 2 Ch. 199; Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill. 370 (S.C., 1833).
16
17
'9

Goodenough v. Tremamondo, 2 Beav. 512, 48 Eng. Rep. 1280 (1840).
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THE GRANTING OF OPTIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN LIEU OF A NEW TRIAL
Where the jury returns a verdict in a case and the trial court deems
the damages awarded to be either inadequate or excessive, it is necessary in order to preserve the constitutional right to a trial by jury that
the court award a new trial?
It is the purpose of this note to show how this problem has been
handled by the Wisconsin courts and by the Federal courts, and also
to point out the various alternatives to granting a new trial that have
been adopted and applied by the Wisconsin court.
The problem arises when the trial court is faced with a verdict
which in its opinion is either inadequate or excessive; should it grant
a new trial, which would necessarily mean additional expense to the
litigants and an additional burden on the court, or is there any other
means by which the rights of the litigants can be protected and justice
promoted?
The Wisconsin court has apparently reached its answer to this problem by using the "option" system, that is the court sets a sum which is
the lowest or the highest sum which an impartial jury properly instructed could award, and gives either the Plaintiff or the defendant
an option to accept the amount set or to submit to a new trial. The
first time the "option" plan came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
appears to have been in the case of Nudd v. Wells'; where in an action
to recover damages for the non-delivery of a box of machinery the
jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff for $1,087. The defendant
moved to set this verdict aside as excessive, the trial court held the
verdict was excessive and ordered the plaintiff to remit the excess to
the defendant or it would grant the motion for new trial. On appeal to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court the court held, "If the excess was clearly
ascertainable and the proper amount of damages might be readily fixed
by the application of a settled rule of law to the evidence, perhaps the
practice adopted by the court below of allowing the Plaintiff to remit
the excess and then refusing a new trial, would be proper.... But we
are unable to see how such a practice can be sustained in such cases
(as this) without doing the very thing which they profess not to do;
that is allow the court to substitute its own verdict for a wrong verdict
of the jury, and on the Plaintiff's accepting that refusing a new trial."
Altho the "option" plan did not receive a warm welcome by the Wisconsin court in its first appearance or in its second appearance 2 the
court soon began to recognize the practibility of such a plan and in the
1Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407 (1860).
2Potter v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 22 Wis. 615 (1868).
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4
cases of Mauson v. Robinson;3 and Corcoranv. Harran
the "option"
system was formally adopted by the court. The Mauson case was an
action in contract wherein the Plaintiff alleged the defendant was indebted to him in the sum of $350 with interest; the jury returned a
verdict for $692.12. The defendant moved to set the verdict aside
because excessive, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held, "The motion for a new trial, if denied
should have been denied only upon condition that the respondent enter
a remittitur of the excess." The Corcoran case carried the court one
step farther, that is to include tort cases within the "option" powers of
the trial court. This was a civil action for assault and battery, the jury's
verdict gave the Plaintiff $200, the defendant moved for a new trial
and the lower court allowed the Plaintiff to remit $100 of the verdict
and then denied motion for new trial. On appeal the Supreme Court
held, "In actions of tort as well as contract, where the damages are
clearly excessive, the trial judge may either grant a new trial absolutely
or give the plaintiff the option to remit the excess and in case he does
so order the verdict to stand for the residue. Clearly the practice will
tend to promote justice and lessen the expense to litigants and the
public." In commenting on the effect of such a practice on the defendant
the court said, "It is evident that the defendant has no complaint since
the reduction was a favor to him, 'certainly a party against whom a
judgment has been recovered cannot reverse it on the ground that it is
less than it should have been'." So by these two cases the foundation
was laid for the trial court to grant an option to the Plaintiff to remit
the excess of an excessive verdict or stand a new trial. However the
courts were still faced with the contention that such an option violated
the constitutional right to a trial by jury. This contention was first
answered by the court in rather broad general terms the court saying
that this practice didn't constitute an invasion of the province of the
jury but rather, "indicated that our jurisprudence is still developing
towards that ideal of perfection where the administration of the law
is truly the administration of justice." 5 It was in the case of Heimlich
v. Tabor6 that the court first stated the rule as to granting an option in
a case where the verdict is excessive as we know it today, and it was
in this case that the court gave the first logical answer to the contention that such options violated the right to a trial by jury. The court
said the rule concerning excessive verdicts allowed the court ". . . to
permit the Plaintiff to terminate the controversy without the expense
of a new trial by consenting to take judgment for an amount sufficiently

3Mauson v. Robinson, 37 Wis. 339 (1875).
4 Corcoran v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120 (1882).
5 Baxter v. Chicago & North Western R. Co., 104 Wis. 307, 80 N.W. 644 (1899).
6 123 Wis. 565 (1905).
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under that named by the jury to cure such error in the judgment of
the court; and also to permit the defendant in such situations to terminate the litigation whether plaintiff is willing or not, by consenting to
judgment for a sum sufficiently less than the verdict to, in the judgment of the court cure the error." Thus we see that the court recognized the possibility of not only giving the plaintiff an option to take
a lesser sum but also the possibility of giving the defendant an option
to take a lesser sum. The court went on to say that the requirement
concerning these options to be free from the charge of judicial invasion
of the right of jury trial is simply this, "Require the sum imposed upon
the defendant, whether he consents or not; giving the option to the
plaintiff, to be as small as an unprejudiced jury would probably name;
and the sum to be imposed upon the plaintiff whether he consents
or not, giving the option to the defendant, to be large as an unprejudiced jury on the evidence would probably name." The rule laid down
in the Heimlich case as to the sum which must be set by the court,
that is it must be the lowest amount which an unprejudiced jury would
award when the option is given the plaintiff; and the highest amount
which an unprejudiced jury would award when the option is given the
defendant, was followed by the Wisconsin court and is the law today.'
Although since the Heimlich case the power of the trial court to
grant options in case the verdict is excessive seemed firmly entrenched,
several other interesting questions have arisen concerning the use of
this power. One such question arose in the case of Urban v. Anderson8
where it was contended that the trial court was limited in its use of
options to cases where the excessiveness was due to prejudice, passion, ignorance or bias of the jury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held, "The court may deal with the matter whether the error is attributable to perversity or the amount found by the jury is not supported by
the evidence in the case."
Another question arising under the use of options by the trial
court, which was faced with an excessive verdict, is the situation
where the trial court does not regard the verdict to be excessive but the
Supreme Court does. Must the Supreme Court order a new trial or
may it impose an option? The case of Secord v. John Schroeder L. Co.9
is an example of the Supreme Court imposing an option. Here the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $5,500 the Supreme Court
held, "We are inclined to hold in case of another trial a jury properly
instructed would probably not assess the damages at less than $4,000."
7Stangarone v. Jacobs, 188 Wis. 20 (1925); West v. Johnson, 202 Wis. 416
(1930); Muska v. Apel, 203 Wis. 389 (1931); Malliet v. Super Products Co.,
218 Wis. 145 (1935) ; Urban v. Anderson, 234 Wis. 280 (1940).

8234 Wis. 280 (1940).
9

160 Wis. 1 (1915).
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The court then reversed and remanded the case with an option to the
plaintiff to take judgment for $4,000 and costs within twenty days after
filing of the remittur or have a new trial.
Thus in Wisconsin at least when the trial court has a verdict before
it which it deems excessive it may either grant a new trial; or it may
set the lowest sum which a properly instructed jury would award giving the plaintiff the option to accept that amount or have a new trial;
or it may set the highest sum which a properly instructed jury would
probably award, giving the option to the defendant.
We have seen that the Wisconsin court has recognized the principle
that the trial court may use this "option" plan in connection with excessive verdicts, but what about verdicts where the damages awarded are
inadequate, may the court use a similar option plan in such cases? The
answer, at least in the Wisconsin court is yes.
Apparently the first time the court applied the "option" plan to
inadequate verdicts was in the case of West v. The Mil., Lake Shore
and Western Ry. Co.,10 where the lower court erroneously made the
direction not to allow interest in the judgment. The Supreme Court
reversed this holding saying, "The defendant is authorized at his option
within 30 days after filing the remittitur, to serve upon the opposite
party and file with the clerk a stipulation authorizing the Plaintiff to
take judgment for the amount of the verdict with interest thereon at
7% from the time of the rendition of said award to the entry of such
judgment, in which case the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment for
the amount of such verdict with interest." The court went on to say,
"Upon principle, we see no difference in allowing a party against itself
voluntarily to add to the verdict the amount so improperly excluded,
and then authorize judgment for the amount of such verdict and additur and the remission of part of an excessive verdict." The court then
remanded the case for a new trial subject to the option to the defendant
given above. This principle was affirmed in the case of Molzahn v.
Christensen," which was an action on a building contract, the trial court
found that the defendant's claim for unfinished work on the manure
pit was undetermined, having been omitted from the verdict and on
this account that the defendant was entitled to a new trial if he desired
one, and therefore, it gave the defendant the right to elect to have a
new trial on account of this error or submit to judgment against him
on the balance due the plaintiff according to the verdict. The defendant
elected to have judgment awarded against him for such amount. This
was affirmed on appeal.
10 56

Wis. 318 (1882).
11152 Wis. 520 (1913).
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The next problem which seems to have arisen in connection with
the court's use of options in connection with inadequate verdicts was
the contention that in case the trial court gave no option to allow judgment for a sum fixed by the court or to accept a new trial that the
Supreme Court should do so. But in the case of Reuter v. Hickman,
Lauson & Diener Co.12 the Supreme Court held that these options were
a matter of discretion with the trial court, and the Supreme Court
would not interfere unless there had been an abuse of discretion. In
discussing just what sum should be fixed on by the trial court in case
it decides to use this method the court said, "In fixing such a sum the
maximum amount that in the judgment of the court any jury would
be warranted in assessing would have to be fixed on (if the option
given to defendent). If such option is given to the plaintiff the minimum amount any jury would be likely to assess would be fixed on."
The Wisconsin court has been faced with the contention that these
options granted by the trial court in cases where the verdict is inadequate constitute a violation of trial by jury, just as they were in options
used where the verdict was excessive. The first real answer to such a
contention was made by the court in Campbell v .Sutliff.13 In discussing

these options the court said, "When the court grants the option to take
judgment for the sum which the court determines to be the least amount
which a jury could assess under the proof, the plaintiff cannot complain
that he has been deprived of his right to trial by jury because he cannot
question a judgment which has been entered because he elected to accept
judgment for that amount.... The defendant's constitutional rights are
not invaded because the judgment is reduced to the least amount which
the plaintiff may recover as determined by the court that has the power
to fix the minimum amount that may be recovered-the smallest verdict
which the court will permit to stand."
"Conversely neither party can complain when the defendant elects
to consent to the entry of judgment for the sum which the court determines to be the largest amount which a jury could assess under the
proof. The defendant cannot question the judgment because he has
elected to have it entered. The plaintiff cannot question it because it is
for the largest amount which the court will permit the jury to assess
under the proof of the case .... The right to a jury trial on the ques-

tion of damages can be waived like any other right guaranteed by the
constitution. It is waived by the party that elects to have judgment
entered in accordance with the option given him by the court.

.

." To

the same effect is the court's holding in the case of Risch v. Lawhead'4
where the court said "Where in a case involving unliquidated damages,
12 160

Wis. 284 (1915).
193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
14211 Wis. 270, 248 N.W. 127 (1933).
13

1943]

NOTES

the amount found by the jury is deemed by the court wholly inadequate
it seems clear that the trial court may grant a new trial unless the plaintiff consents to take judgment for such increased amount found by the
court to represent the least amount that an unprejudiced jury would
probably fix. Since the court finds the 'least amount' plaintiff must be
given an option to consent to the amount of damages found by the
court. In such a situation the defendant may not complain because the
court has only increased the damages to the least amount which it will
permit to stand in lieu of granting a new trial."
So the trial court may grant an option to the plaintiff or to the
defendant to accept a fixed amount or submit to a new trial in a case
where the court deems the damages awarded by the jury to be inadequate as well as a case where the damages awarded are excessive, and
this remains the law of Wisconsin today.'15
Therefore the Wisconsin court makes use of the option system
both in cases involving excessive verdicts and in cases involving inadequate verdicts. The question then is as to what variations of this option
system may be used. The options which may be used by the Wisconsin
courts can be divided into six classes:
1) In a case where the damages are inadequate the court may give an
option to the defendant to have judgment entered against him for the
maximum amount which a properly instructed jury could award, or to
submit to a new trial.
2) Also in a case where the damages are deemed inadequate the court
may give an option to the plaintiff to accept judgment for the minimum
amount which a jury properly instructed could award or to submit to
a new trial.
3) Or where the damages are inadequate the court may combine the
options number one and number two above; and first give the defendant
the option and then give the plaintiff an option and if neither elects
then the court will grant a new trial.
4) In case the damages awarded are excessive the court may give an
option to the plaintiff to accept the lowest amount which any reasonable
jury properly instructed could award, or to submit to a new trial.
5) In a case where the damages are excessive tfie court may also give
an option to the defendant to pay the maximum amount which a reasonable jury, properly instructed could award, or to submit to a new
trial.
6) In a case where the damages are excessive the court can combine
the two options given in number four and five above and first give the
15 Tollander v. Bonneville, 3 N.W. (2d) 679 (Wis. 1942)
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plaintiff an option and then give the defendant an option and if neither
elects to accept the option then the court will grant a new trial.
The Federal courts do not seem to be in accord with the holdings
of the Wisconsin court in this matter of allowing the trial court to fix
options where the verdict is inadequate or excessive. Although the
United States Supreme Court started out on the same line of reasoning
as did the Wisconsin court they failed to go to the length of the
Wisconsin holdings. For example in the case of Northern Pac R. Co.
v. Herbert,1 where the jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $25,000, the defendant made a motion for new trial because the damages
were excessive. The lower court ordered that a new trial be granted
unless plaintiff remitted $15,000 of the verdict and in case he did so
that the motion for new trial would be denied. The Supreme Court
held this was proper saying, "The exaction as a condition of refusing
a new trial, that the plaintiff should remit a portion of the amount
awarded by the verdict was a matter within the discretion of the court.
It held that the amount found was excessive but that no error had
been committed on the trial. In requiring the remission of what was
deemed excessive it did nothing more than require the reliquishment
of so much damages as in its opinion the jury had improperly awarded."
This decision was apparently followed without question for some
time 17 and the Supreme Court had even declared that such an option did
not violate the right to trial by jury.' However with the case of Dimick
v. Schiedt 9 the U. S. Supreme Court adopted the rule in regard to
these options in place of granting a new trial which stands as the federal
rule today. This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries
resulting from the alleged negligent operation of the defendant's automobile. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $500;
the plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the damages
awarded were inadequate. The trial court ordered a new trial unless
the defendant would consent to an increase of the damages to the sum
of $1,500. The defendant consented to this option and the motion for
new trial was denied. However on appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals this judgment was reversed on the ground that this conditional
order violated the 7th. amendment of the United States Constitution
in respect to the right of trial by jury. The Supreme court of the
United States affirmed the holding of Circuit Court of Appeals saying,
.. no federal court so far as we can discover has ever undertaken
16 116 U.S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L.Ed. 755 (1886).
17 Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1888) ; Kennon v. Gilmen, 131 U.S.

22, 29; Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41, 52; German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 312; Gila Valley S. & N. Ry. Co. v.

Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103-5.
Is Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1888).
19 293 U.S. 474, 55 Sup. Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935).
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similarly to increase the damages although there are numerous cases
where motions for new trials have been made and granted on the
ground that the verdict was inadequate. .... When we consider the
great length of time mentioned, the federal courts were constantly
applying the rule in respect to the remission of excessive damages, the
circumstance that the practice here in question in respect of inadequate
damages was never followed, or, apparently its approval even suggested, seems highly significance as indicating a lack of judicial belief
in the existence of the power." The court went on to say that in fact
if the question of granting such an option even in cases where the damages were excessive were originally before it it would not hesitate to
deny the existence of such a power in the trial court in such cases as
well as in cases where the verdict was inadequate. In commenting more
specifically on the use of such a power by the trial court and a denial
of the right to a trial by jury, the court in the Dimick case said: "When
therefore the trial court here found that the damages awarded by the
jury were so inadequate as to entitle plaintiff to a new trial, how can
it be held, with any semblance of'reason, that that court, with the consent of the defendant only, may, by assessing in additional amount of
damages, bring the constitutional right of the plaintiff to a jury trial
to an end in respect of a matter of fact which no jury has ever passed
on either explicitly or by implication? To so hold is obviously to compel the plaintiff to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a
jury and accept an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted
improperly, and partly by a court which has no power to assess."
So the Federal rule seems to be, that the trial court can within its
discretion in lieu of unconditionally granting a new trial for excessiveness of damages, grant a new trial unless the plaintiff remits the excessive portion of his damages. But the trial court does not have the power
to increase an inadequate verdict for the plaintiff, though the defendant
consents thereto, the only course open being to grant a new trial.
One more point should be mentioned in connection with the federal
holdings on this question, and that is, that apparently the rule in the
Dimick case is restricted to common law actions.20 In the case of
United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n.,2 ' the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the lower court was empowered to give the
defendant an option to consent to a verdict which had been raised because inadequate, or to submit to a new trial in a condemnation case.
The District court in the Kennesaw case in discussing the option said,
"Verdicts have often been set aside as excessive unless written down
to an amount fixed by the judge. I know of no precedent for refusing
20

United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n., 99 Fed. (2d) 830

21

Supra, note 20.

(C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
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one to be written up as a condition of refusing a new trial. I see no
difference in principle. In both cases the judge thinks the verdict wrong
in amount and will set it aside unless the party who desires to maintain
the verdict will voluntarily correct it rather than suffer a new trial."
The Circuit Court in discussing the District Court's opinion said,
".. . We agree with the District judge that Dimick v. Schiedt is not
controlling. We agree with the reason he gives that the complained of
action in requiring an additur and refusing a new trial was not taken
in a common law action within the 7th. amendment as it was in the
Dimick case, but in a condemnation proceeding to which the guarantees
of the 7th. amendment do not apply." Another Circuit Court of Appeals
case seems to strengthen the view that the restriction set up in the
Dimick case is confined to common law actions.2 2 The court saying,
"Under the 7th. amendment the national courts are without power to
add to a verdict in a common law action ......
It seems to the writer that the position taken by the Federal Court
in adopting the option system when the verdict in question is excessive
but refusing to adopt it in reference to verdicts where the amount
awarded is deemed inadequate, is not logical. In the writer's opinion
the position taken in the Kennesaw Mountain2 3 case and of the dissent
in the Diinick 4 case, that there is no distinction between granting an
option in a case, where the damages are excessive, and granting the
option in a case where the damages are inadequate, is the correct one.
The Wisconsin court seems to have had good success with this system
and their answer to the contention that any such option violates the
right to trial by jury seems a complete and logical one. Moreover, as
to promote
the Wisconsin court says, "Clearly the practice will tend
25
justice and lessen the expense to litigants and the public.
ROBERT T. McGRAw.

22 Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Thomas, 123 Fed. (2d) 353 (C.C.A.
23 8th, 1941).
2 Supra, note 20.
4Supra, note 19.
25 Corcoran v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120 (1882).

1943]

NOTES

DOUBLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES
May a state other than the state of domicile of the creditor levy a
transfer tax upon intangible property, the interest in which is transferred by the death of the creditor?
Any attempt by a state to levy such a death tax when it has no
jurisdiction to do so is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
as such would be prohibited. A question must then immediately arise
as to when a state does have jurisdiction to impose a death tax.
Perhaps the earliest leading case on this subject was the case of
Blackstone v. Miller,' where New York levied a tax upon the transfer
by will of debts owed to an Illinois decedent by a New York firm and
bank. Illinois had already taxed this succession. One of the objections
to the New York tax was that it was contra the Fourteenth Amendment. The test laid down in this case was that if the transfer of the
debt necessarily depends upon and involves the law of New York for
its exercise, or, in other words, if the transfer is subject to the power
of the State of New York, then New York may subject the transfer to
a tax. The tax was sustained, the court stating that the transfer of the
debts necessarily depended upon and involved the law of New York
for its exercise, because it was the law of New York that gave validity
to the debt. This rule was affirmed in Bullen v. Wisconsin,2 where the
Supreme Court of the United States permitted Wisconsin to impose
a transfer tax upon certain stocks and bonds which a Wisconsin
decedent had transferred to an Illinois trust company to hold in trust,
retaining a power of revocation, and the right to direct and control the
disposition of both principal and income.
The doctrine of the Blackstone case, supra, was followed until 1930,
in which year it was overruled by the case of Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota,3 in which case a New York resident died owning
negotiable bonds issued by the State of Minnesota and the cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul. His will was probated in New York and
a tax was levied on the testamentary transfer. Minnesota also assessed
an inheritance tax on this transfer on the ground that the bonds were
debts of Minnesota and of corporations subject to her control; that her
laws gave them validity, protected them and provided means for enforcing payment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the judgment of the Minnesota court upholding the tax was reversed,
the court saying that no state may tax anything not within her jurisdiction without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. While debts have no
territorial situs a state may properly applying the rule "mobilia sequun1 188 U.S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 8, 47 L.Ed. 439 (1902).

2240 U.S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L.Ed. 830 (1915).

3280 U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 439 (1929).
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tur personam" and treat them as localized at the creditor's domicile
for taxation purposes. The court- further stated that there was no
reason for saying that intangibles are not entitled to enjoy an immunity
against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to
tangibles. The dissent by Justice Holmes was to the effect that the
debt, wherever enforced, is enforced only because it is recognized as
such by the law that created it and keep it still a debt.
The court in arriving at its decision in the Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota case affirmed and elaborated upon the decision it had
reached inthe slightly earlier case of Blodget v. Silbermann.4 In that
case a Connecticut resident died leaving the greater part of his Wealth
in New York, some of which was intangible in nature. It was held
that the transfer of the intangible property was subject to the tax
imposed by the law of the decendent's domicile, the court saying that
the situs of intangibles is the domicile of the creditor. (The decision
in this case was a further application of the principle,"mobilia sequuntur personam.")
This rule was again upheld in the case of First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine,5 which was an action to recover the amount of a transfer tax levied by the State of Maine against shares of a Maine corporation owned by a Massachusetts decedent. The Maine tax was held to
be invalid, the court saying that shares of stock, like other intangibles,
constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer tax by one state
only, and that convenience and justice alike dictates the desirability of
a uniform general rule confining the jurisdiction to impose death transfer taxes as to intangibles to the state of the domicile.
Although the tendency of the courts has been to avoid double
taxation, exceptions to the rule have arisen.
In the FarmersLoan and Trust Co. case, supra, the court alluded to
an exception to the rule that intangibles are taxable only at the domicile.
It was there stated that choses in action may acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of their owner if they have become integral parts of some local business. The case of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox,8 is an apt illustration of this exception. There, West
Virginia levied an ad valorem property tax upon accounts receivable
and bank deposits in West Virginia of a corporation organized under
the laws of Delaware. The corporation maintained its principal office in
Delaware, but the general books and accounting records were also kept.
It was held that the intangibles were taxable in West Virginia because
the corporation had established a "commercial domicile" there. There
had been such a localization of the corporation's business that there was
4277 U.S. 1,48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L.Ed. 749 (1928).
5284 U.S.312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L.Ed. 313 (1931).
8298 U.S. 193, 56 Sup.Ct. 773, 80 L.Ed. 1143 (1935).
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imparted to its entire intangible property a prima facie situs for taxation
in that place.
In Curry v. McCanless,7 the decedent, a resident of Tennessee transferred stocks to an Alabama trustee. The deceased reserved the power
to dispose of the trust estate by her last will and testament, however
this power was never exercised. It was hold that both Tennessee and
Alabama could impose the death transfer tax, the court applying the
benefit theory of taxation. When the taxpayer extends his activities
with respect to his intangibles so as to avail himself of the protection
and benefit of the laws of another state, such other state may tax these
intangibles. Protection, benefit, and power over the subject matter are
not confined to either state. The taxpayer who is domiciled in one state
but carries on business in another is subject to a tax there measured by
the value of the intangibles used in his business. The court expressly
denied that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the taxation of the
same intangible in more than one state.
Graves v. E1iott8 was decided by the same court in the same term,
and is usually cited as a companion case to Curry v. McCannless, supra.
In that case a decedent domiciled in New York created a trust in Colorado. Both New York and Colorado were permitted to impose a death
transfer tax, the court applying the same reasoning as in Curry v.
McCannless.
From the foregoing cases it appears that the rule in the Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. case to the effect that only the state of the domicile
of the creditor can tax an intangible is applicable only where the decedent has confined his activities to his domicile. However, where he
extends his activities to another state, that state also can tax the intangibles. Under such circumstances both states can tax the intangibles.
The foregoing cases represent the law as it existed until April 27,
1942. On that date the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down the decision in the case of State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich," which overruled the case of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, and permitted both the state of the domicile of the creditor
and of the debtor to tax the transfer of intangible personal property at
death. In this case a New York resident died owning stock in a Utah
railroad. The certificates, as well as the company's stock books, records and transfer agents were kept in New York. The administrators
of the estate of the deceased sought a declaratory judgment in the
Utah court to the effect that the transfer of the shares were not subject to taxation by Utah under the provisions of its inheritance tax law.
The Utah court rendered judgment for the administrators under the
7307 U.S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1938).
8307 U.S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 3156 (1938).

962 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942).
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doctrine of First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, supra.
Certiorari was granted, and the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the Utah Court saying that in cases of shares of
stock "jurisdiction to tax" is not restricted to the domiciliary state.
Another state which has extended benefits or protection or which can
demonstrate "the practical fact of its power" or sovereignty as respects
the shares may likewise constitutionally make its exaction.
In arriving at the decision in the case of State Tax Commission of
Utah v. Aldrich, the United States Supreme Court has reestablished
the rule of Blacksone v. Miller. This result has been predicted by some,
in view of the more liberal tendency of the court as indicated by such
cases as Curry v. McCannless and Graves v. Elliot, and also in view of
the changing personnel of the court.
Thus as the law stands today, double taxation of intangibles is constitutional, and a state other than the -state of domicile of a creditor
may levy a transfer tax upon intangible personal property transferred
by the death of the creditor.
ANTHONY FRANK.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STERILIZATION STATUTES
Whether the year 1927 marks the turning point away from the
preservation of the natural rights and the constitutional protection of
those rights to the citizens of the United States is perhaps still a problem for future historians to determine. In that year Mr. Justice Holmes
of the United States Supreme Court decided that a Virginia statute'
providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions supported by the State who should be found afflicted with a hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility was valid and was not open to the attack
that it denied such inmates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment since "the law does all that is needed when it
does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines
and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so
fast as its means allow" and "so far as the operations enable those who
otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus
open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly
' 2
reached.
Again in 1942 the United States Supreme Court found occasion to
determine the validity of a state law 3 which provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals, i.e., persons convicted two or more times for
crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude, save "offenses
arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses." Though the court found the statute
unconstitutional inasmuch as "sterilization of those who have thrice
committed grand larceny with immunity for those who are embezzlers
is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination" because the two crimes
are distinguishable only "with reference to the time when the fraudulent intent to convert the property to the taker's own use" arises, the
court did cite Buck v. Bell as precedent for upholding such a legislative
enactment where proper equality in application is achieved.4
Accordingly under the decision in Buck v. BelP and Skinner v. State
of Oklahoma6 we may properly conclude that any statute permitting
sterilization of mental defectives or habitual criminals will be upheld
as constitutional and not violative of the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment provided that no discriminatory classification is
effected as to those within the natural class designated as proper subjects for its application. Sterilization laws can no longer be attack as
constituting a denial of equal protection unless discrimination is present.
I Acts 1924, c. 394, p. 569.
2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 574, 71 L.Ed. 1000 (1927).
3 Okla. St. Ann. Tit. 57, 171 et seq.; L. 1935, p. 94 et seq.
4 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma,
62 Sup. Ct. 1110, - U.S. - (1942).
5 Supra.
6

Supra.
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State courts are bound in principal by the decisions of the supreme tribunal of the land when it has spoken upon that for which it is constituted to decide, and are therefore controlled by its decisions in determining whether a statute before it violates the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 7
Unfortunately most courts in determining whether such enactments
are valid have utterly neglected to inquire whether the state can proceed to deny one of his natural right to bodily integrity by means of
sterilization. In Buck v. Bell8 it was said, "The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian
tubes." But the principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is confined
to the rule that a state may limit personal freedom in any reasonable
manner for the protection or promotion of public health.e Though it is
true that sterilization may promote public health insofar as it will, in
theory at least, rid society of the birth of mental unfortunates of
eugenic origin, the solution cannot be designated reasonable, unless we
are to concede that the state has a right to mutilate innocent subjects
and consequently concede that man exists only for the good of the
State. Certainly if man exists but for that purpose there can be no
rational basis in the enactment of laws to secure to him the due process
of law when called upon to render account to the State but the presence
of an empty Constitutional provision. The entire framework of our
constitutional system must of necessity collapse as must any government which proceeds upon a materialistic conception of man.
Perhaps it was the foresight of things to come that prompted at
least one court to state its attitude upon the inherent dangers of laws
allowing sterilization of unfits when it said in extenso, "While the case
raises the very important and novel question whether it is one of the
attributes of government to essay the theoretical improvement of society by destroying the function of procreation in certain of its members
who are not malefactors against its laws, it is evident that the decision
of that question carries with it certain logical consequents having farreaching results. For the feeble-minded and epileptics are not the only
persons in the community whose elimination as undesirable citizens
would, or might in the judgment of the legislature, be a distinct benefit
to society. If the enforced sterility of this class be a legitimate exercise
of governmental power, a wide field of legislative activity and duty is
thrown open to which it would be difficult to assign a legal limit.
"If in the present case we decide that such a power exists in the case
of epileptics, the doctrine we shall have enunciated cannot stop there.
7Davis
v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
8
Supra.
OJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.
Cas. 765 (1905).
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For epilepsy is not the only disease by which the welfare of society at
large is injuriously affected, indeed, it lacks some of the gravest dangers
that attend upon such diseases as pulmonary consumption and communicable syphilis. So that it would seem to be a logical necessity that,
if the legislature may under the police power theoretically benefit the
next generation by the sterilization of the epileptics of this, it both may
and should pursue the like course with respect to the other diseases
mentioned with the additional gain to society thereby arising for the
protection of the present generation from contagion and contamination.
Even when these and many other diseases that might be named have
been included, the limits of logical necessity have by no means been
reached.
"There are other things besides physical and mental diseases that
may render persons undesirable citizens or might do so in the opinion
of a majority of a prevailing legislature. Racial differences for instance,
might afford a basis for such an opinion in communities where that
question is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue. Even
beyond all such considerations it might be logically consistent to bring
the philosophic theory of Malthus (sic) to bear upon the police power,
to the end that the tendency of population-to outgrow its means of
subsistence should be counteracted by surgical interference of the sort
we are now considering."' 0 The Skinner case likewise noted the dangers of allowing such laws to become tools for purposes of oppression
but went nb further than to state that such possible abuse gave greater
cause for careful scrutiny in determining whether actual discrimination
was present."
Without resort to judicial opinion it should be clear to reasonable
men who retain that proper respect for human dignity and personal
independence as is necessary for the preservation of a well ordered
society that eugenic sterilization of mental incompetents and criminals
is a direct attack by the state upon an absolute right of the individual,
namely, the right to his faculties. Though imbeciles and hopelessly diseased have no right to procreation, the public authority is doing wrong
in destroying their procreative faculty for the right to the faculty
itself is absolute. The right of the state to rid itself of individuals who
are a standing danger, morally or physically, to the community cannot
be extended beyond the power of segregation. Economlic considerations
cannot be tolerated unless the traditions and philosophy from which
Smith v. Bd. of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 AUt. 963 (1913).
m Supra.
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that cherthe Founding Fathers drew for inspiration in formulating
12
ished document known as our Constitution are cast aside.
Even conceding that the state had the requisite authority to sterilize
a human being for eugenic reasons the avowed purpose of sterilization
laws would still remain unaccomplished. Society would not be benefited
by turning loose degenerates after sterilization. Indeed, it would be an
inducement for certain degenerates to commit their crimes with an
added sense of security. Where one is guilty of repeated criminal acts
he has no place in a societal union. Segregation under supervision of
competent authorities is the only proper remedy, and if so confined
there is no cause for fear that more of his kind will be propagated
(if it be true that criminals procreate criminals), and removal of many
dangers to society arising from the freedom of the unfit is realized.
Segregation is the only rightful way of preventing the use of the procreative faculty of the weak-minded and criminals.
In Buck v. Bell"3 it was said, "It is better for all the world, if instead
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind." Indeed! Upon what theory of law
or morality can it be said the state possesses the power to execute an
irresponsible person for even the most heinous crime? Has the meting
of punitive measures sunk to such depths as to execute one who has
come into the world without possession of his natural reason? And if
it is sought to sterilize to, prevent offspring who will starve for their
imbecility what reason is there to make barren the imbeciles of the
rich? Definitely, the answer to such rationalization can be but oneeconomic considerations. Under such theories human law and morality
become conflicting norms of action and human individuality must surrender to the might of the State. How inconsistent with present ideals!
ROBERT SCHEFFER.

12 Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. "We hold these truths to be self-

evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness-That to secure there rights, Governments are instituted
among men...

23 Supra.
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Code Practice-Five-Sixths Jury Verdict.-Plaintiff's automobile collided
with a bus belonging to the defendant company at a blind T-shaped intersection
when plaintiff had almost completed a left turn into the street on which the
bus was approaching from the opposite direction. In reaching a verdict the jury
was unanimous in its finding that the defendant was negligent in several respects
and that such negligence was the cause of the collision. The jury was also unanimous as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence on all items except that of
"lookout." As to that item, two jurors found the plaintiff not negligent. On the
question of damages, one juror, other than the two dissenting on the item of
"lookout," dissented as to the amount. Held that the verdict was fatally defective in that the same ten jurors did not agree as to negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. 5 N.W. (2d) 750 (Wis. 1942). In reaching its decision the
court followed the rule as laid down in Biersach v. Wechselberg, 238 N.W. 905,
206 Wis. 113 (1931) that there must be an identity of ten jurors not only on the
question of the defendant's causal negligence, but also as to the amount of
damages and as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The Biersach case
was an action against an automobile driver for injuries to a guest in the verdict
of which there was an identity of ten concurring jurors as to failure to exercise ordinary care and as to such failure being the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but not as to negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing
to the injuries. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that in
order to complete a verdict in favor of the plaintiff the same ten jurors had to
agree upon all questions necessary to sustain the judgment, including that of
assumption of risk or contributory negligence. The court in this case explained
the seeming conflict between its decision and the language in Will v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 210 N.W. 717, 191 Wis. 247 (1926), that "One set of ten
jurors might find defendant negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; another set of ten might, however, find that there was
negligence by plaintiff proximately contributing to the same injury. That defendant was thus found negligent and proximately contributing to the injury would
then become immaterial, so far as plaintiff's ultimate right to recover was concerned, because ten jurors having found that plaintiff himself was negligent,
then it follows as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot recover." The court
explained in the Biersach case that this language would be inapplicable in a
situation where, as in the Biersach case, the jury found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In the Will case, also a personal injury action,
all~twelve jurors were unanimous in finding that the defendant could be charged
with failing to exercise ordinary care in learning of the danger to which the
plaintiff was subjected, although one juror, A, then dissented from the finding
that the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the danger. Two jurors,
B and C, dissented as to the time when the plaintiff was overcome by the gas
while working in the defendant's employ, and two jurors, A and D, dissented to
the finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 50% of the
negligence was found to be attributable to the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant the order for new trial because the verdict was defective in that the same
ten jurors had not agreed upon all the findings was reversed. The Court however indicated that the trial court had been justified in ordering a retrial in view
of the decisions reached in the cases of Kosak v. Boyce, 201 N.W. 757, 185 Wis.
513 (1925) ; Stevens v. Montfort State Bank, 198 N.W. 600, 183 Wis. 621 (1924) ;
Benison v. Brown, 203 N.W. 380, 186 Wis. 629, 38 A.L.IL 1417 (1925); and
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Hobbs v. Nelson, 205 N.W. 918, 188 Wis. 108 (1925), the rule being stated in the
last case to be that a special verdict is defective unless the same ten jurors
agree upon their answers to each and every question of the special verdict. The
language used in the last case was, as the court expresses it in Will v. Chicago,
supra, "unfortunate" and has' led to mistakes by trial courts. The basis for the
ruling in these cases is found in Dick v. Heisler, 198 N.W. 734, 184 Wis. 77
(1924), one of the first cases to construe the statute on five-sixths jury verdict.
"As we construe the statute ten members of the jury must agree before a question can be answered; but the same ten must agree to each question before it
can be answered." The Dick and Hobbs cases are overruled by the Will case so
far as identity of jurors on all the answers is concerned and the only problem
remaining is: Upon what answers must the same ten jurors agree?
The key to this problem is to be found in the words used in Biersach v. Wechselberg, supra, that the same ten jurors must agree upon all questions necessary
to sustain the judgment. What these questions may be will vary somewhat with
the case. As the court explains the situation in the Will case, each lawsuit presents two sets of issues, one as to the plaintiff's attack and the other as to the
defendant's defense. If the plaintiff fails to prove his attack and ten jurors find
that he has so failed, the defendant's defense is immaterial, and the same ten
jurors need not reach a decision on that point. The same is true when contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is found. No great problem is raised by
the comparative negligence statute. If the plaintiff is found to be more than 50%
negligent then as a matter of law he cannot recover and the question of the
defendant's negligence is immaterial. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is found
to be not negligent or is found to be less than 50% negligent then the verdict
must also decide whether the defendant was negligent, whether such negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the amount of the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The same set of ten jurors must concur on all
these questions in order to sustain the judgment.
The rule as stated above was apparently followed in the cases of Lefebvre v.
Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 236 N.W. 684, 205 Wis. 115 (1931) and Fraundorf v.
Schmidt, 256 N.W. 699, 216 Wis. 158 (1934). In the former case the same ten
jurors did not agree on any two of the questions of the special verdict. It was
held that the verdict was not imperfect since only the answer to the first question
was essential to support the judgment and it then became immaterial as to how
the other questions were answered. In the latter case, an instruction that at least
the same ten jurors must agree to all of the answers in the verdict was held to
be erroneous although not prejudicial since three jurors had dissented, showing
that the jurors had not followed the instruction. A verdict returned as the
result of the consensus of opinion of at least ten jurors on all questions necessary
to sustain recovery by the plaintiff was there held sufficient to warrant the entry
of judgment.
The question as to when an identity of jurors is necessary in a special verdict is interesting more from a technical than from a practical viewpoint. During
the past twenty years, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain, the question
has gone to the Supreime Court of Wisconsin only ten times. Four of these
cases followed exactly the rule as laid down in the case first construing the
statute allowing a five-sixths jury verdict in civil cases. These were followed
by the Will case narrowing the rule as originally laid down. The Biersach case
followed the same rule and explained the apparent conflict with the previous
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case. The instant case then cites the Biersach case as ruling its decision; and the
Fraundorfand Lefebvre cases fall directly in line with both the reasoning and
the rule of the Biersach case. Thus it would seem that a definite and harmonious
construction of the five-sixths jury verdict statute has been attained.
JOAN MOONAN.

Municipal Corporations-Limitations on the Power to License.-By an
ordinance of the respondent city, transient photographers were forbidden to
engage in the business of photography, or the sale of photographs, enlargements,
or coupons without first obtaining a license from the city at a cost of ten dollars per business day. The defendant was arrested, tried in municipal court, and
found guilty of violating the ordinance. On the trial, it appeared that the defendant was engaged in taking snapshots and forwarding the film to an out of state
photography house which paid the defendant a flat fee for each sales prospect
with an additional bonus if sales exceeded a given total. The defendant's average income was $11.33 per day, while the firm for which he worked derived a
profit of between six and seven per cent. The circuit court on appeal affirmed
the sentence of the municipal court, sustaining the city's contention that the
ordinance was valid as a revenue measure. Defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as discriminatory and the
fee was unreasonable and confiscatory. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as amounting to the suppression of a lawful business and as an imposition which could not be sustained
under the taxing power of the municipality. City of Rachie v. Wayhe, 5 N.W.
(2d) 747, Wis. 1942.
The power of a municipality to require a license of those engaged in a
designated trade or profession within its boundaries and to demand a fee for
such license is recognized generally to have two sources: the police power and
the power to raise revenue. Since municipal corporations are totally the creatures
of the state, neither power can be exercised unless authorized by the charter of
the municipality or by a charter ordinance having the same effect. The granting
of one power does not confer the other, and if either the power to tax or the
power to regulate a vocation is given specifically, the courts will not infer the
existence of the other. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. (2d) 72,
1935; City of Creston v. Mezvinsky, 213 Ia. 212, 240 N.W. 676 (1932); License
Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 471, 18 L.Ed. 497 (1867). Nevertheless, the state may grant to
a municipal corporation both the power to regulate and to license for revenue,
and an ordinance passed under such authorization will not be held invalid because
justified by several provisions in'a charter. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.
340, 52 N.E. 441 (1898) ; City of Monroe v. Endelnran, 150 Wis. 621, 138 N.W.
70 (1912).
Where the business sought to be regulated bears no reasonable relation to
the health, safety, or morals of the community ,ordinances imposing a license
can not be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Fetter v. City of
Richmond, 142 S.W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1940) ; City of Creston v. Meszinsky, supra.
Moreover, the same result will be reached if, though, as in the instant case,
the business might be subject to reasonable regulation, the ordinance itself shows
a contrary intention; for instance, by demanding as a condition of the license a
fee so grossly in excess of the expense of issuing the license and enforcing the
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regulation that the courts can say as a matter of law that there has been an
invalid exercise of the police power. Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 24
A. (2d) 911 (Md. 1942).
When a muncipality lays a license upon a vocation for the purposes of raising revenue, as mentioned before, it must be able to justify its exaction by reference to a specific provision in its charter authorizing such method of raising
revenue. The power is in its nature the power to impose an excise tax on the
privilege of conducting business. Beyond the need of authorization, the only
limitations upon the power of the municipality lie in the due process clause of
the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution and in kindred provisions of
state constitutions. C. B. and Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.Ed.
979, 17 S.Ct. 581, (1897).
The municipality need not restrict its taxes to those businesses which it could
prohibit entirely. Impositions have been held legal when levied upon transactions
or occupations which are matters of inherent and natural right as well as on
those made possible by virtue of statutory authority. Beals v. State, 139 Wis.
544, 121 N.W. 347 (1909).
The requirements of due process are twofold. The first and lesser constitutional hurdle which an ordinance must pass is that a valid ground must exist
for setting the business sought to be licensed apart from others not so taxed.
In this respect the legislative body of the municipality has wide discretion, and
in order that the ordinance be sustained it must only appear that the classification is not palpably arbitrary. Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Bricknell,
233 U.S. 304, 34 S.Ct. 493, 58 L.Ed. 974 (1913); followed in Campbell Baking
Co. v. City of Harrisonville,Mo., 50 F. (2d) 670 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931).
In the latter case, the Circuit Court of Appeals on a state of facts very similar to that of the principal case held that a substantial distinction did exist between transient and resident merchants, and that a license fee of two dollars a
day, imposed for revenue purposes upon all merchants with a saving clause
exempting those doing business at an established local place of business could
not be challenged as discriminatory by a non-resident bakery company making
deliveries in the city.
In addition, a revenue licensing measure must not demand a fee which is
exorbitant. Under the power to tax, municipal corporations cannot prohibit
an individual from engaging in a legitimate trade. What is reasonable as a
fee varies in individual cases and only very general principles can be laid down.
Courts have held that the city may take into consideration the population of
the city, the profitableness of the business, the nature of the business and its
effect upon the community, and the expenses incurred in supervising its enforcement. Ex Parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173, 15 So. 522 (1894). The number of
persons who have found it profitable to pay the charge and remain in business,
and the amounts previously collected is also a valid consideration. Maryland
Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, supra.
Courts have held that a flat fee license amounting to four tenth of one per
cent of gross sales is not unreasonable. Giant Tiger Corp. of Camden v. Board
of Commissioners of the City of Caiddnen, 122 N.J.L. 240, 4 A. (2d) 775 (1939).
The same court held a licensing ordinance imposing a fee of three hundred dollars on each vehicle used by ice cream peddlers was void as excessive when
such tax was shown to amount to thirty per cent of the annual gross income
from the use of such vehicle. Gurland v. Town of Kearny, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24
A. (2d) 210 (1942). In Wisconsin license fees of twenty and twenty-five dollars
a day have been disposed of as confiscatory, the former by the federal district
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court without reference in the opinion to the value of the goods sold. Ex Parte
Eaglesfield, 180 F. 558 (D.C. E.D. Wis. 1910); Monroe v. Endelnan, supra.
In determining what is reasonable and what is confiscatory, courts have
tended to recognize a distinction between businesses regarded as legitimate and
those regarded as illegal in tendency. While the city may be given the power to
single out for taxation either pursuits which are a matter of natural right or
those made possible only by virtue of statute, higher fees are generally sustainable in the latter case than in the former on the theory that there is a public
policy in favor of suppressing the business or at least restricting the numbers
which engage therein. City of Seattle v. Rogers, 106 P. (2d) 598, Wash. (1940).
WLIAM SMITH MaO.

Sales-Warranties by Express Representation.-Defendant set up a defense
of breach of warranty in an action on a note given in a sale of dairy cows.
In making the sale the plaintiff made the statement that, "these cows would
have to be as recommended, first class dairy milk cows and six gallons a day.
they would give.' He also promised to take back any cow that went wrong.
Within two to four weeks after the purchase of said cows they began falling
ill, and the entire herd became diseased. The infection caused the milk of the
cows to become ropey and stringy; and it soured before it could be sold. The
defendant counterclaimed for damages to his own herd. In affirming
the decision of the lower court allowing damages to the defendant the
appellate court quoted the clause of the Uniform Sales Act which provides that, "any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon," and held that the statement concerning the
production of the cows was an affirmation of fact by the seller relating to the
goods within the meaning of the provision of the Act above set out and was
therefore an express warranty and not a mere statement of value, or seller's
opinion, as claimed by the plaintiff, Teter v. Schultz, 93 N.E. (2d) 802 (Ind. 1942).
Although the court is guided by the provision of the Sales Act defining
an express warranty it is, nevertheless, confronted with the problem of interpretation when it is required to determine if a particular statement of a seller is
an express warranty within the meaning of the Act. In arriving at the conclusion that a statement is a warranty, the courts have applied various tests.
All courts agree that to constitute a warranty the affirmation of fact must be
of a material fact. Typical of the application of this rule is the case of Lloyd
et al. v. James, 198 Ark. 255, 128 S.W. (2d) 1019 (1939), where the court
instructed the jury that, "before expressions rise to the dignity of a warranty,
they must amount to a specific, definite, and certain representation of a fact that
is material, and, if you find from all the testimony in this case that the expression of the salesman who sold the defendant the truck in the controversy did
not definitely and certainly point to some material quality of the truck on which
the defendant might rely and did rely, your verdict should be for the plaintiff."
No special words of warranty are necessary. The word warranty or its
precise equivalent need not be used. "It is enough," said the Minnesota court
in Skoog v. Mayer Bros. Co., 122 Minn. 209, 142 N.W. 193 (1913), "if the vendor
definitely undertakes that the thing sold shall be of a certain kind or quality!'
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This same court held that the word "good," used to describe the condition of
a second hand tent, was an express warranty, Saunders v. Cowl, et al., 201 Minn.
574, 277 N.W. 12 (1938). The court based its holding on the fact that the word
"good" related to the condition of the goods-a fact-and that this induced the
buyer to purchase the tent. In Detien v. Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo. 614,
138 S.W. 696 (1911), a mule was declared to be "straight and all right," by the
seller. The mule died of a hidden disease soon after it was purchased. The
court held this to be an express warranty, saying that, "Where the defect is
not discoverable upon ordinary inspection representations of soundness made
by the vendor, with the intent and purpose of inducing the vendee to rely on
them, and their acceptance by the vendee will constitute a warranty. The seller
is not permitted to take unfair advantage of his superior knowledge."
Where an article is of a character that might do the buyer harm if the
statements that he relied on in purchasing were not true, the court will be
stricter in construing words of the seller as a warranty than where the article is
harmless. A used car lot owner in dealing with the plaintiff referring to all the
cars on his lot stated that, "they were all in good condition and that they would
be guaranteed for thirty days." The plaintiff drove the car and was injured when
the wheel fell off. In awarding him damages for the breach of warranty the
court said: "Where sellers are describing the conditions of chattels so likely,
if defective, to occasion injury to life and limb, they should anticipate close
scrutiny of their language by the courts. What might be considered mere
"puffing" of a perfectly harmless product must be held a distinct representation
in case of an automobile," Curby v. Mastenbrook, 288 Mich. 676, 286 N.W. 123
(1939).
In dealing with intention to warrant the earlier cases emphasized the exact
stipulation of the contract to show it. Thus in Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N.Y.
199 (1872), the court declared: "It is not true, as sometimes stated, that the representation, in order to constitute a warranty, must have been intended by the
vendor, as well as understood by the vendee, as a warranty. If the contract be
in writing and it contain a clear warranty, the vendor will not be permitted to
say that he did not intend what his language clearly and explicitly declares;
and so if it be by parol, and the representation as to the character or quality
of the article be positive, not mere matter of opinion or judgment, and the
vendee understands it as a warranty, and he relies on it and he is induced
by it the vendor is bound by the warranty, no matter whether he intended it
to be a warranty or not. He is responsible for the language he uses, and cannot escape liability by claiming that he did not intend to convey the impression
which his language was calculated to produce upon the mind of the vendee."
Smith v. Justice, 13 Wis. 671 (1861), is to the same effect.
However the later cases place more stress on the question-Did the seller
intend to warrant? In 55 CJ. 673, it is stated, "To constitute an express warranty there must be an express undertaking to warrant in so many words, or,
if representations are relied on to make out the warranty, they must be made
in such manner and circumstances as to authorize the buyer to understand that
the seller intended to be bound by them as a part of the contract for sale, and
he must have purchased in reliance on them." This rule was followed in Wallace
et at v. McCampbell, (Tenn.) 156 S.W. (2d) 442 (1941) ; Naylor v. McSwegan,
21 N.Y.S. 930, 50 N.Y. 339 (1893); Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617 (1873).
The warranty must be made before or at the time of the sale. In the case of
Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E. (2d) 427 (1941), the
plaintiff had been buying the same kind of mascara for ten years. In this in-
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stance she picked up the tube, paid for it, and then asked if it was safe. The
clerk answered, "It is on the tube, it says harmless." The buyer suffered serious
eye injury but was denied recovery on breach of warranty. The Illinois court
pointed out that all statements made by the clerk seemed to have been made
after the sale was completed. "Manifestly, acts or statements of a retailer made
after a sale do not support a claim that a regular customer was induced to buy
merchandise in reliance upon such statements. In order to recover for a breach
of warranty in this case it was thus incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove an
affirmation of fact concerning the mascara by the defendant, the seller, having
a natural tendency to induce her to buy, and an actual reliance upon the
affirmation made."
"Mere silence implies no warranty, neither do remarks which should be
construed as simple praise or condemnation; but any distinct assertion or
affirmation of quality made by the owner during a negotiation for the sale of a
chattel, which may be supposed was intended to cause the sale, and was operative in causing it, will be regarded as either implying or constituting a warranty," PARSONS, CoNTRACTS, Vol. 1, p. 579 (7th ed., 1883).
A wrong statement of law on the part of the seller is not an express warranty. Thus, where a buyer sued a corporation for loss and damages suffered
when he was assessed as owner of stock purchased from them, in spite of the
agent's statement that "he would not be liable to assessment as the owner of
the stock," the Michigan court declared, "the first statement was a statement
of law and as such the speaker was mistaken and could not be held. He did not
make a knowing representation of law or fact to the plaintiff," Goodspeed v.
MacNaughton, Greenwalt & Co., 288 Mich. 1, 284 N.W. 621 (1939). In describing
what was not a warranty this court quotes with approval the following from
WLMISTON, CONTRACrS (1936) Vol. IV, p. 2692, "if a statement falsely and
fraudulently made will not sustain an action of deceit or afford ground for
rescinding a contract it is still more clear that it cannot amount to a warranty."
As to the effect of a mistake of fact on the part of the seller the Michigan
court has said there would be no warranty in such a case, Goodspeed v.
McNoughton, supra. The Wisconsin court seems to stand on opposing ground.
In Hoffmand v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315, 81 N.W. 491 (1900), the plaintiff vent
into a store and asked the defendant if he had rape seed. The defendant said
yes. The plaintiff asked for 25 pounds and the defendant took out a sack and
weighed out that amount. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew what
rape seed looked like and each was wholly unaware of the ignorance of the
other. The seeds turned out to be mustard seeds. The court awarded damages
for breach of warranty and said, "An affirmation of fact as to the kind or
quality of an article offered for sale, of which the vendee is ignorant, but upon
which he relies in purchasing such article is as much a binding contract as a
formal agreement using the plainest and most unequivocal language on the
subject. * * * Knowledge on the part of the vendor is not essential either to
actionable fraud or a contract of warranty."
Where the buyer's actual information is equal or superior to the seller's,
reliance on the seller's statements is not justified. Under such circumstances the
seller's statements are properly deemed mere statements of opinion and not
warranties. The seller's statements of value, too, are readily seen to be matters
of estimate or interested personal judgment so that without more appearing,
they are regarded as not justifying reliance thereon. Similarly, general words
of commendation, such as "good, high class, valuable" are regarded, without
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more appearing, as mere seller's talk not to be relied upon. VOLD, SALES (1931)
447. The following are illustrations of statements by the seller which were held
not express warranties but merely seller's opinions, commonly termed puffing.
A clerk's statement that the "cream is pure, beneficial and harmless, and that
it would not harm the most tender skin" was held to be a recommendation of
the cold cream and not a warranty in Bel v. Adler, 63 Ga. App. Rep. 473, 11 S.E.
(2d) 495 (1940). A circular stating the merits of a particular seed corn in
Gray v. Gurney Seed and Nursery Co., 57 S.D. 280, 231 N.W. 940 (1930), said,
"We claim that it will outyield any variety that will mature in the same time
on the same ground." The court held this to be the seller's opinion. The defendant
in the case of De Zeeuw v .Fox Chemical Co., 189 Ia. 1195, 179 N.W. 605 (1920),
attempted to make a sale by telling the plaintiff, "If he would feed the defendant's worm powder it would improve the growth and physical condition of his
hogs." The hogs were poisoned by it, but the court said that the seller's statements were not warranties, but merely opinions. So, also, was the salesman's
statement that, "you would make a saving of approximately $800 per year by
automatic gas firing," declared to be an opinion in the sale of a gas boiler in
Snow Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 61 Ga. App. Rep.
366, 6 S.E. (2d) 159 (1939). It was held not a warranty to say, "I have the
best piece of cloth in the market," even though it had a hole in it in Strauss v.
Salier, 58 Misc. Rep. 573, 109 N.Y.S. 734 (1908). Nor did the court find a warranty in the words of the clerk who said of a fur coat that, "it would wear very
good," in Keenan v. Cherry and Webb, 47 R.I. 125, 131 Atd. 309 (1925). Even
though the seller was insistent in Smith v. Bolster, 70 Wash. 1, 125 Pac. 1022
(1912), the court said that his statements to the effect that the car was, "in first
class condition, as good as any new car, and that he guaranteed the car to go
eleven miles to a gallon of gasoline on the average," were opinion or seller's
talk. There was no warranty when the seller said that, "The Jenkins stacker
would stack hay from fifty cents to one dollar a ton cheaper than the "T"
stacker," which the buyer was then using, Carver-Shadbolt Co. v. Loch et ux.,
87 Wash. 453, 151 Pac. 787 (1915). The use of words like, "prime elegant merchandise," in the case of shoes, Rosenbush v. Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N.E.
341 (1922) ; "unsurpassed and unsurpassable," speaking of bicycle parts, League
Cycle Co. v. Abrahams, 27 Misc. Rep. 548, 58 N.Y.S. 306 (1899) ; "they will sell
like hot cakes," in the case of vapor stoves, Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. .. C.
Leeter Lumber Co., 61 Utah 503, 215 Pac. 995 (1923), were all termed seller's
talk by the courts. In the case of Snow's Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., supra, the court repeated in the form of a test the section
of the Sales Act mentioned in the principle case: "the decisive test, in determining whether language used is a mere expression of opinion or a warranty, is
whether it purports to state a fact upon which it may fairly be presumed the
seller expected the buyer to rely and upon which a buyer would ordinarily rely."
In Mantle Lamp Co. v. Rucker, 202 Kan. 762, 261 S.W. 263 (1924), the
test of whether a given representation is a warranty, or a mere expression of
opinion or judgment, was said to be "whether the seller assumes to assert a
fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or whether he merely states an opinion or
expresses a judgment about a thing as to which they may each be expected to
have an opinion and exercise a judgment. In the one case it will be deemed
a warranty and in the other a mere expression of opinion."
PHILIP W. CROEN.
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U. S. SUPREME COURT RULE OF
VALUATION AS APPLIED TO
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
PERRY ANDERSON*

INDING of value may be necessary for a number of purposes.
It may be desired to find value for taxation, for condemnation,
for inclusion in a balance sheet, for a basis for depreciation, for utility
rate-making, for bargaining, for determining the upet price in liquidations or for reorganization. Methods for finding value in the past
tended to vary with the purpose for which the opinion of value was to
be used. There has been a more recent tendency toward a standardization of method due to comparing the opinion of value found by one
method with opinions of value resulting from the use of other methods.
This is not a discussion of the merits of various methods of evaluation.
Only valuation for reorganization will be discussed though the method
may have other applications.
*A.B., University of Wisconsin; former executive assistant in A. C. Allyn
& Co.; financial analysist in reorganization division of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; Secretary, Downtown Asociation of Milwaukee.
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In reorganization cases it is assumed that the subject business is to
continue in operation. It thus is necessary to determine the value of the
assets as a part of a going business. The basic question in a valuation
for reorganization purposes is how much the enterprise in all probability can earn.1
The Federal district courts have not always agreed as to the method
by which value is to be found for reorganization. Certain decisions
were based on original cost less depreciation, others were based on
reproductive cost less depreciation. Some asserted that past earnings
should be considered. Sec. 77(e) of the Bankruptcy statute says in
part "the value of any property used in railroad operation shall be
determined on a basis which will give due consideration to the earning
power of the property past, present and prospective, and all other
relevant facts. In determining such value only such effect shall be
given to the present cost of reproduction new and less depreciation and
original cost of the property and the actual investment therein as may
be required by the law of the land, in the light of its earning power
and all other relevant facts."
The U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois' cleared up much of the uncertainty as to method
by stating that the "criterion of earning capacity is the essential one if
the enterprise is to be free from the heavy hand of past errors, miscalculations, or disaster." This same decision stated that value for
reorganization depends on two factors: (1) the reasonably prospective
earnings and (2) the rate of capitalization.
The U. S. Supreme Court decision in the case of ConsolidatedRock
Products Co. v. Du Bois did not state how these two factors were to be
determined. The Securities and Exchange Commission has done much
to crystalize opinion as to the method to be employed in determining
value in its releases dealing with reorganization and simplification and
by statements of staff members in hearings dealing with valuation for
reorganization.
THE METHOD EMPLOYED

Finding of value in reorganization, as has been stated earlier in
this discu~sion, is the result of two factors, namely, the reasonably
prospective earnings and the rate of capitalization. In cases where value
is being found for a business having a finite life such as a real estate
enterprise a third factor, which is really a refinement or limitation of
the reasonably prospective earnings, must be given consideration. This
is the determination of the remaining useful life of the enterprise. The
'Group of Institutional Investors v. C. M. St. P. & P. RR. Co., Commerce
Clearing House Bankruptcy Law Service at page 55294.
2312 U.S. 510, 85 L.Ed. 982, 61 S. Ct. 675 (1940).
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remaining useful life is the span of years in which it can be reasonably
demonstrated that the cash income of the enterprise will exceed the
cash required to operate the enterprise.
This discussion will deal with a real estate organization since the
elements to be dealt with are more static. Each of the two major factors, namely, reasonably prospective earnings and the rate of capitalization together with the further restrictive factor, remaining economic
life, will be separately discussed.
REMAINING ECONOMIC LIFE

The remaining economic life of a real estate enterprise cannot
exceed the remaining depreciable life of the structure. If the structure
is now fifteen years old and good engineering practice would allow a
total depreciable life of fifty years to a structure of this type, the
remaining depreciable life would now be thirty-five years. This, of
course, assumes that no new capital will be contributed to the enterprise to rebuild or materially extend the depreciable life of the structure. The approach to this problem must be as realistic as possible
and unless funds are to be made immediately available an assumption
that the owners of the enterprise may make the further contribution at
a later date is unwarranted.
It may be well to explain at this point a basic difference between a
real estate enterprise and an industrial enterprise. The value of a real
estate enterprise arises from the earnings which can be derived from
the use of the land and from the structure in place. The excess of cash
income over cash outlay is the return of capital and return on investment. Even though a portion of this excess is to be set aside to rebuild
the structure when it is worn out that amount must be regarded as a
contribution to a new enterprise since there is not now any assurance
or indication that an identical building costing identically the same as
the present building would be warranted at that time or that a satisfactory return could be earned on the investment. To attempt to prognosticate the character and type of a structure which would be acceptable
and to estimate the cost of such a structure many years hence and to
estimate what the income and expense would then be requires occult
powers which few people can claim.
In an industrial enterprise there is no limit upon the remaining life.
There are some experts who assert that an industrial enterprise does
have a finite life based upon the business longevity of the individuals
who now control its destinies. The opinion is not generally accepted
since there is much merit to the contention that management equal to
the present management is available through training of younger men
or can be obtained.
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In industrial operations it is necessary that the plant and equipment
be maintained at a certain level of efficiency. Repairs and replacements
are made as needed and new equipment must be added as improvements are made in the art of manufacture. Thus the plant is kept continually in a good state of repair and the life of the industrial company
may reasonably be regarded as unlimited.
The economic or useful life of a particular structure is not dependent upon the character and type of the improvement alone. The age of
competitive buildings in the area and their operating condition also
affects the economic life of a building which is being studied. It
must be learned if the area is stable, if it is improving or if the tendency
is away from the neighborhood. American cities are more or less
fluid in their growth. The movement oftentimes is so pronounced that
even the business district in spite of large investments in commercial
and office buildings tends to shift. Shifting and movement in the building into new sections often result in areas of blight where values have
greatly diminished. There are few of our larger American cities which
have not experienced this tendency. In Milwaukee the center of the
business district once was located between Broadway and Milwaukee
on Wisconsin Avenue with a definite trend to move north and south.
The growth of the city to the west caused the business district to move
west on Wisconsin Avenue until today the center of the business district
is at North Third Street and West Wisconsin Avenue. This westward
growth might have continued had it not been that the growth of residential districts to the north and south has created a counter influence,
the effect of which has been to anchor indefinitely the business center
at about the present location. During the five years from 1936 to 1940
nearly 557o of all new building construction took place in Milwaukee
County beyond the city limits.3
It is necessary to learn the rentals being paid for like space in other
buildings, the length of time such rentals have prevailed and the type
of tenancy. It is necessary also to study the history of the area in
which the building is located and other districts to determine the possibility of a shift in rental preference. The income possibilities of the
city must also be studied to determine the permanence of local industries. In the case of properties having store space for rent the character
of public transportation must be studied. Today when so many transportation companies are removing street car tracks and operating
trackless trolleys it is easier to shift from one street to another and
this possibility must not be overlooked. A careful consideration of all
of these factors will permit an opinion to be formed as to the relationship of the remaining income producing years or useful life which
3 Proposals

for Downtown Milwaukee of the Urban Land Institute at page 21.
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may reasonably be expected from the property to the remaining
depreciable life. This opinion may not necessarily prevail since the
effect of experience trends on the reasonably prospective earnings of the
subject property may somewhat alter it.
THE REASONABLY PROSPECTIVE EARNINGS

The determination of the reasonably prospective earnings of an
enterprise is possibly one of the most controversial subjects to be considered in a reorganization proceeding. The Securities and Exchange
Commission has contributed largely to the development of a method for
considering this subject in utility and industrial reorganization as has
also the Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad reorganizations
though the approach of these two commissions is not necessarily the
same. Mr. Hiram L. Jome in an article "The New Schoolmaster In
Finance" 4 says "Time and again the Schoolmaster (the S.E.C.) has
,had to call attention to the distinction between reasonably prospective
earnings and hoped for earnings." The desire of one group seeking to
establish an equity may well be to assert a high rate of future earning
power. A mortgage group, on the other hand, may well assert that the
rate of future earnings is low and that the resulting value of the
property for reorganization forecloses equity groups from participation in the benefits of reorganization.
The first step in the determination of the reasonably prospective
earnings should be a careful and detailed analysis of past operating
results. Such a study and analysis is necessary in order to establish the
causes for the present financial difficulties of the subject company.
The causes may be many but if the operation is carefully analyzed and
compared with successful companies in the same field these causes will
become evident. The effect of these causes upon past earnings having
been reasonably well established, the past operating results may be
adjusted to give effect to their elimination.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has said "A debtor's
record of earnings, adjusted or weighted to give account to unusual
conditions and reasonably foreseeable changes, provides a guide to a
determination of earnings reasonably to be anticipated in the future."0,
Recent earnings are likely to be the best indication of what the
future earnings may reasonably be expected to be since many of the
same factors affecting present earnings may be anticipated in the
future. The earnings should be reviewed for a sufficient period, however, to show the effect of certain trends. The period should be of
sufficient duration, also, to reflect the full cyclical effect on earnings.
4 Michigan Law Review, March 1942 Vol. 40 No. 5 at page 632.
5 S. E. C. Corporate Reorganization release No. 22 in the Matter of Flour Mills
of American, Inc., at page 8.
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Care must be taken to adjust past earnings for conditions then existent
which are no longer present or which have been nullified in part in their
effect on present earnings. The existence of current high earnings may
be noted but should be tempered in the light of past experience and
present long term trends. In discussing present high earnings the U.S.
Supreme Court in Ecker v. Western Pacific Railroad Corp. said,
"There are factors in these increased incomes which obviously affect
their weight as evidence of continued capacity to produce earnings."
A war even of the proportions of the present conflict is not a permanent state. By the same token the depression of 1929-1933 was not
found to be a permanent condition. Since value depends upon the
prospective earnings to be realized over the remaining economic life
of the property, the evaluator is justified in establishing an average
prospective earning which may recognize the presence of a high rate
of earnings at present but does not overlook the low earnings which
may have existed in the past. The effect given to the earning's fluctuations depends to a considerable extent upon the experience of the
evaluator.
Once the present earnings have been adjusted to eliminate past
conditions which are no longer present and for new conditions which
are now evident the evaluator is ready to project these earnings over
the remaining economic life of the property. The projection is not a
matter of crystal gazing but merely applies to the adjusted present
actual earnings, certain income and expense trends which have operated
with other similar properties in the experience of the evaluator.
Studies made of large numbers of commercial, office, apartment,
apartment hotel, transient and residential hotel and other income producing properties show that each group has experience trends which
are typical of that group. The length of time required for earnings to
reach their maximum after completion varies with each group. The
economic life of buildings in each group varies not only with the type
of structure but with the city and area in a city in which it may be
located. The rate of decline for a building from peak income and earnings to the point at which it can no longer be operated profitably may
vary with each group. The percentage of occupancy will vary with
groups and cities and areas depending upon the competition. Histories
of other properties serve as a guide to establishing the experience curve
of income for specific properties but must be modified by conditions
specifically affecting the subject property.
Careful and detailed analysis of the costs of operation must be
prepared. Certain operating costs will increase with the age of the
building, others will decrease with the age of the building and still
6 C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service Report No. 131 at page, 55, 286.

1943]

SUPREME COURT RULE OF VALUATION

others may be little affected by the passage of time. As the building
becomes older the cost of repairs is certain in increase. Other items
such as real estate taxes are likely to decrease unless there is sufficient
showing that the land may improve in value to the extent that depreciation of the building may be offset. It is difficult to forecast an increased
land value at the end of the economic life of the building since it is
difficult to anticipate the level of general business at that time. If an
increase in land value were to be of sufficient magnitude it might well
shorten the remaining economic life of the structure as itwould cease
to be able to produce an income consistent with the earning value of
the land when properly improved and hence the existing structure
would be removed and an adequate structure put in its place.
The cost of water and electricity varies with occupancy and would
be affected only to the extent that occupancy is affected by increasing
age of the structure. Similarly, the janitors' wages would not be expected to vary with the age of the building since it is necessary that
janitor service be supplied so long as the building is tenanted. The
cost of decorating and rehabilitation of the building and equipment are
likely to vary with income since adequate outlays cannot be maintained
in the face of declining earnings, though failure to do so will accelerate
the rate of decline of income.
The projection of earnings, as has been previously stated, cannot
contemplate the remodeling of the premises through the contribution of
new capital unless provision is made as part of the plan of reorganization. Otherwise it would be difficult to give it much consideration since
conditions in the future may be such that the possible income after
making the expenditure would not warrant the further investment.
Likewise the projection cannot delve into the realm of crystal gazing to
reflect a use for the property in the future different from its present
use.
To summarize, the projected or reasonably foreseeable earnings
are the present earnings adjusted for past conditions no longer existent
and for future conditions which are now evident and known including
the application of adjusted experience curves of income and the various
items of operating expense.
THE

RATE op CAPITALIzATION

The nomenclature which has developed in the field of evaluation has
produced certain ambiguities in terms. This has resulted from the use
of similar terms being applied without regard for the type of property
involved. The earnings of an industrial company after reasonable provision for the replacement of machinery, equipment and buildings
through reserves for such depreciation may well be anticipated in per-
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petuity. At least, there is now no reasonable method for establishing
a definite life even though it may be known that some types of manufacture have completely disappeared with the passage of time. With
industrial companies then there is no better method of finding value
than to capitalize the anticipated earnings on a straight line. The anticipated annual earnings would be divided by a rate of interest which
would represent a fair payment for the risk of investment. To turn
this around, the value would be an amount of money which a purchaser
would be willing to pay in order to receive the anticipated earnings each
year, having in mind the risk attendant upon his investment. The situation is somewhat different with real estate enterprises as will be developed later in this discussion.
If there were no risk involved with an investment, the investor
would be entitled to no return for making his investment. Should he
lock his money in a safe deposit vault he could collect from no one
for leaving it there since it would have served no useful purpose.
By the same token if he were to loan it to a business enterprise which
dared not risk the funds so loaned in the business through fear of loss
the money would likewise be unproductive.
The only place where funds may be loaned today with absolute
certainty of the return of the principal is to the Government. If the
Government fails money itself has no value. The promise of our Government to pay is unquestioned.
Interest on Government bonds and notes is not a compensation to
the investor for risk of investment but is a payment for the use of
money as a commodity. A glance at the interest return on short term
Treasury notes shows the low use value of money as a commodity.
The rate of interest paid on longer term Government bonds or bonds
of a Government agency and guaranteed as to payment by the Government is likewise not a payment for risk but is a payment or rental for
the use of money for a longer period of time but still with the absolute
assurance that the amount of the loan will be repaid when due. The
higher rate of interest is merely a compensation for allowing the Government the use of the money for a longer period of time rather than
to have it immediately available for use. The longer the period for
which it is loaned the greater will have been the opportunity of the
investor to use it for other purposes and hence the Government must
pay more for this postponement of use by the investor. The greater
the opportunities are for the investor to use his money the more the
Government must pay to obtain the use of such funds. The obligation
of the Government can be converted to the use of the investor readily
since other investors are willing to buy the Government's obligations
for their unexpired terms.
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There are other forms of investment which are regarded as virtually
without risk. These include first mortgages of the type purchased by
life insurance companies and certain of the highest grade industrial or
utility bonds. There is little question here as to the return of the
principal or the payment of interest when due. The investor requires a
higher payment for the use of his money from this type of borrower
than he does from the Government since to convert his investment to
his own use it is necessary that he find another investor who has funds
with which to acquire this obligation and who is willing to make an
investment in that particular property or company.
Other opportunities for investment are offered where, in addition
to the reduced liquidity of the investment, there is. some degree of
doubt as to the eventual return of the principal or continued payment
for the use of funds. This risk is attendant upon most investment in
industrial or real estate enterprises. The projection of earnings has
attempted to deal as realistically as possible with the risk of income
being realized and every known factor has been discounted. However,
it is known that in the past there have been unexpected and unforeseen
developments which have affected earnings of the subject company
and most other companies. Likewise it is known that some of the
unexpected and unforeseen developments have had such an adverse
effect upon the business and income of companies that they have been
unable to survive thus resulting in substantial loss of the principal
invested.
Since the investor is aware that there may be these unknown
hazards, he requires a payment for the use of his money which he
believes will return his investment before any dire eventuality will
eliminate the company or unduly affect its earnings. If no such consequences befall the company he will have had more than an ample return
for the mere use of the money. The investor should appraise the industry in which it is proposed he shall make the investment to see the
trend of earnings and to survey the extent of industrial mortality in
that field. He should then examine the particular company to determine
as best he can the further risk that may attend investment in that
particular company. In the case of real estate enterprises he should
study the risk attendant upon investment in a particular type of building located in the particular city and area in which the building is
located and the further risk to investment in the subject building. The
evaluator likewise has to make the same study since the rate used
must be presumed to be one which will be sufficient to attract new
capital to the enterprise rather than to compensate partially capital
which may already be invested.
It is unlikely that any two evaluators will agree exactly on a rate
to be used since the weight they give various risk factors will vary
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according to individual experience. On the other hand if each has used
the same degree of care in preparing the projection of future income
and expense and in determining the remaining useful life it is likely
that neither will be able to say that the rate used by the other is unfair.
The Securities and Exchange Comniission in various of its reorganization division releases has advocated varying rates or ranges of rates
depending upon the individual subject company; hence, it is not possible to select any particular range of rates as being advocated by that
commission.
Inasmuch as it is the present value of the debtor's assets which is
being ascertained, the value may vary according to current risk rates
at the time the study on value is prepared. At present when current
interest rates are low in relation to those of a few years ago the rate
applied in a finding of value would be expected to be low in comparison
with an acceptable rate for a study made in 1934.
THE OPINION OF VALUE

Once the two principal factors forming the basis for an opinion of
the going value of the subject company has been determined the opinion of value results from the application of mathematical processes.
The going value of an enterprise includes all the elements which
are required to produce the anticipated earnings. Thus the opinion of
value includes the value of the land, buildings, machinery and equipment, working capital, processes, patents and other necessary assets.
The analysis of the operation and financial condition will have disclosed
what assets are necessary to the conduct of the business. If the amount
of cash on hand, for instance, should exceed the amount normally
required in the operation of the business, the excess above the actual
requirement could be removed from the business without distorting or
affecting earning power. This excess then becomes an added element of
value which would be added to the going value of the business since it
could be removed by the owner. Should the cash on hand be less than
the amount which would reasonably be required a reduction in the
going value to the extent of the deficit would be warranted since a
reduced scale of operation might result or the going value might have
to be encumbered in order to obtain the necessary cash.
Once these elements becomp known the opinion of value for an
industrial enterprise results from a fairly simple mathematical computation. The anticipated annual earning is divided by the risk rate and
the result of that computation when added to by the value of assets
owned which are not required to produce the anticipated earnings or
reduced by the value of assets which must be contributed to produce
the anticipated earnings, may reasonably be asserted as the value of the
subject company.
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The computation in the case of a determination of the value of a
real estate enterprise is somewhat more complex although the principles
used are much the same. The real estate enterprise may anticipate earning for only a limited period of years. Also the anticipated earnings have
been adjusted for experience trends and thus they will vary from relatively high earnings in the earlier years to zero at the end of the economic life of the building. The present value would thus be obtainable
by discounting the total anticipated earnings in the amounts and at the
time they are anticipated to the present time at the rate of interest which
the evaluator believes to be adequate for the degree of risk involved.
Since the experience curves of income and expense when applied to
the present adjusted earnings will vary the anticipated return from
year to year it is logical then to discount the-adjusted earnings for each
year of remaining economic life to the present time. The total of these
adjusted earnings for each of the remaining years of economic life
would appear to be a reasonable opinion of the value of the income producing assets if there is an adequate amount of working capital presently included in the assets.
There are other items which must be valued. At present the land
has no independent value since its continued use is required to produce
the anticipated earnings. At the expiration of the economic life of the
structure, however, the land will again be available for use when the
present structure is removed. It is thus necessary to form an opinion
as to the value of the parcel of land at that time in the future when
the building has outworn its present use. To continue to be realistic,
the best indication of the future value of the land is the value today
of a parcel of unimproved land in the same location, of same size, and
adaptable to the same use as this parcel. The current market value
might be adjusted in the light of presently foreseeable trends which
might make a similar parcel of vacant land more or less valuable at
the end of the useful life of the present structure. Now, having established a reasonable future value for this parcel of land when the present
improvement is or should be removed the present value of this reversionary interest in the land would reasonably appear to be the reasonable future value discounted to the present time at a rate of discount
equal to the interest return which an owner of land would be willing
to accept as rent for the use of land. This might reasonably be asserted
at the present time to be from four and one-half per cent to five per
cent. Many existing leases of land have been made in which the annual
rental for the land has been computed at five per cent of the land value
at the time the lease was made. Some more recent leases have been
made providing for rentals computed as four and one-half per cent of
the land value at the date the leases were made.
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If the subject property is a hotel or furnished apartment building
there would also be a reversionary interest in the value of the furnishings at the time the building ceased to warrant further operation. It
may be assumed that the equipment will be maintained in at least its
present operating condition and hence the realizable value today would
be a reasonable opinion of its future value. That value when discounted
to the present at a rate of interest consistent with the risk involved in
the rental of furniture would be the value of the reversionary interest
in the furnishings.
There is a possibility that there may be some salvage which can be
obtained from the sale of the building when it is torn down. This is
not ordinarily a likely possibility since in recent years the cost of
wrecking has generally exceeded the sales price of salvaged material.
If it can be reasonably demonstrated that there will be some salvage
that amount when discounted to the present at a fair rate of interest
will add to the total value of the enterprise.
Thus the going value of the real estate enterprise may be stated to
be the total of the discounted anticipated earnings plus the reversionary
interest in the land, the furnishings and fixtures (if any) and the discounted amount of the possible salvage. This total would be added to by
an excess of assets over those required to produce the anticipated earnings or deducted from by the value or cost of assets which would be
required to be obtained.
It should be observed that determination of value by its very nature
cannot be an exact science. It is impossible to assert that a particular
enterprise is worth exactly a stated number of dollars and no more or
less. It can be appreciated that two equally informed experts could
attach varying values or importance to the different factors affecting
value. Each would be correct in the light of his own experiences.
Generally speaking, the resulting opinions would not be expected to
vary widely and a court or interested party would be warranted in
believing that the exact value would be within the range of values
arrived at by experts all of whom had used this method.
It is as nearly a scientific approach to the determination of value
as has been offered and has the advantage of a logical presentation and
consideration of the elements of value. "It entails a prediction of future
events. Hence, an estimate as distinguished from mathematical certi'7
tude, is all that can be made."
7

Report 131 Bankruptcy Law Service Commerce Clearing House at page 54,
263 re U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Group Of Institutional Investors v.
C. M. St. P. & P. R. R. Co.
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THE FUNCTION OF THE VALUATION EXPERT IN REORGANIZATION

The principle of absolute priority has recently been restated in the
U.S. Supreme Court case of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
The absolute priority rule had earlier been stated in the U. S. Supreme
Court decision in NorthernPacific R. R. v. Boyd" but so many reorganizations later followed the rule of relative priority that it became necessary to clarify and state definitely the rule to be followed in reorganizations. According to the rule of absolute priority, regardless of whether
a company is found to be solvent or insolvent, holders of prior claims
are to be paid in full for their claims including accrued and unpaid
interest either in new securities or in assets or other valuable consideration before anything can be given to security holders of an inferior
class. The securities issued under a plan of reorganization need not be
of the same grade as were previously held but regardless of the grade
they must be equal in value to the full claim of the creditor before
junior groups are entitled to any share. This holder of a senior claim
is entitled to compensation also for any "step-down" in the position of
the security he receives in a reorganization before any consideration
can be given to the claims of junior groups of creditors.
It is, therefore, important that a class of creditors be reasonably certain of their right to participate in the ultimate benefits of a plan of
reorganization before undertaking a program of action which may
involve a considerable outlay of time and expense. The evaluator should
therefore be directed to make a preliminary survey and to express a
tentative opinion to the creditor group by whom he may be employed.
Once the decision is made to enter the proceedings the evaluator
should undertake the formal and detailed study of the elements of
value in order to be prepared to testify as to his opinion of value at
hearings on value. It is necessary also that the value of the debtor's
assets be determined as a step in the preparation of a plan of reorganization. Without a formal finding of value it is difficult to determine
the extent to which various groups may be entitled to participate or
the manner of their participation. There are instances where an agreement can be obtained that the value of the debtor's assests is so much
below the claim of a first mortgage that no exact value need be found
since no assertion of a right of participation will be asserted by creditors
junior to the first mortgage, but these instances are likely to be rather
rare. Even in these cases, while no formal finding of value may be
found by the court an appraisal study is desirable as a means to
determining the feasibility of a plan unless that plan calls for distribution of common stock, to one class of creditors only.
8308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 1 (1939).
9228 U.S. 482.
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The opinion of the evaluator is necessary also in a hearing on solvency. He should be competent to state what assets are necessary to
produce the anticipated earnings of the enterprise and the amount of
the excess assets or the extent of the deficiency in assets. His opinion
as to the value to be assigned to certain of the excess assets is valuable.
When the proposed plan or plans are submitted for consideration
the evaluator should again be consulted as to the feasibility of the proposed plan or plans in the light of the anticipated earnings of the
reorganized debtor. He should be in position to show the effect of the
provisions of various plans as to the distribution of earnings and the
availability of earnings for the various classes of securities proposed.
If the plans contemplate the issuance of debt securities he should be
in position to know whether an amount of securities can be retired from
the anticipated earnings which will at least be equal to the depreciation
of the structure in order that the ratio of outstanding debt to depreciated property value shall not reasonably be less in the future than
at the date of the plan. If the apparent value of securities proposed to
be issued is greater or less than the claim of a group is entitled to
receive the question of fairness may be raised. In its application, however, the question of fairness is much more likely to be a legal problem
rather than a problem for the evaluator. He, of course, is unlikely to
be heard as to his opinion unless he is placed on the witness stand and
carefully led in the questions asked of him by counsel who understands
thoroughly the method used and the effect of the various factors which
result in the opinion of value.

RENT CONTROL AND EVICTIONS
UNDER EMERGENCY PRICE
CONTROL
E. P. MCCARRON*

IN

the language of the 77th Congress, price control was designed in
the "interest of national defense and security," and was necessary to
"the effective prosecution of our present global war."' Of all the various
ramifications and aspects of the Emergency Price Control Act, and
price schedules, orders and regulations isued thereunder, one feature
which appears to be more directly connected with the war effort than
2
others is the restrictions against the removal or eviction of tenants.
Rather than approach the subject of "evictions" abruptly, it might
be well to consider a few of the broader aspects of the Congressional
act which affects our economic structure more so than any other law
enacted heretofore.
Until a year ago, the word inflation had a vague meaning for most
of us. Some thought that it meant the issuance of more "greenbacks"
by the government, or the circulation of useless paper money. The term
did, however, assume a definite meaning immediately after the enactment of the Lease-Lend Bill. 3 Prices began to rise, particularly on
destructible commodities used as War material. And it necessarily
followed that prices on cost of living commodities started to rise also.
Between the date of the Lease-Lend Bill and America's entry into the
War the difference between normal prices and inflated prices on purchases by the government alone, amounted to more than the entire cost
of the last World War. Inflation was on its dizzy and destructive way.
It effects not only government buying, but the public as well. When the
cost of goods increases, the wage earner needs a higher wage or salary,
and his demanding higher wages causes an industrial maladjustment
which in turn results in labor disputes. It hardly seems necessary to
point out the disastrous effects of labor disputes and strikes on production. It can be assumed, therefore, that the Congress gave consideration to these facts in declaring the Emergency Price Control Act
necessary to the effective prosecution of the present War.
In addition to its beneficial present effects on the war program,
the control of prices now, is expected to avoid an economic collapse
a'tsome future date, such as was experienced after the inflationary
* Ph.B. Notre Dame University, LL.B. University of Wisconsin; Chief Rent

Attorney, Milwaukee Defense Rental Area.

1Public Laws 421, 77th Congress, Ch. 26, Sec. 1.
2 Ibid. Sec. 2 (b).
3 March 11, 1941. C. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 411-419.
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movement of World War I. It is an attempt to forestall a recurrence
of the practices which led to the state of affairs following the economic
collapse in 1929. Our highways were crowded with men on foot,
traveling from one town to another, looking for employment; breadlines were formed in the larger cities; riots and bloodshed were prevalent; sheriffs, elected by the people, were shot in the State of Iowa in
the performance of their duties in connection with foreclosure proceedings, and business failures resulted in suicide. These conditions, and
many more, can be attributed directly to the inflationary movement
which started during the first World War.
The Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, created the
Office of Price Administration, whose function it is to prevent inflation. 4 The Administrator of the Office of Price Administration was
vested with considerable authority, and was directed to issue price
schedules, orders and regulations necessary to carry out the purposes
and intents of the act.5 One of the purposes set forth in the Act is to
prevent abnormal increases in rents, and to regulate "renting or leasing
practices (including practices relating to recovery of the possession)
in connection with any defense area housing accommodations." 6 The
Price Administrator proceeded to place a ceiling on rents, after having
given due consideration to conditions in centers of defense activities,
which either resulted, or threatened to result, in increases in rents for
housing accommodations. Relevant factors7 in the Milwaukee Defense
Rental Area led to the selection of March 1, ,1942, as the "freeze" date.
To protect from puncture the ceilings so established, complimentary
provisions were inserted in the rent regulation restricting the landlord's statutory right to remove his tenant." The law had to eliminate
competitive bidding among tenants for housing accommodations which
were all too scarce. That, however, is not the only purpose behind the
provisions prohibiting the removal of tenants.
During the last world war 20% of the total manpower in the country was lost to the war effort solely because war workers were forced
to migrate from one center of war activity to another in search for
living quarters available to them at a price within their means. Our
country cannot afford to sustain such a loss during the present war,
where capacity to produce war material seems to be one of our greatest
weapons. The stability of war workers in their present locations is
entirely essential to the war effort and must be maintained. The wheels
of production would slow down likewise if the workers responsible for
their turning were disturbed and harassed with the threat of dispos4Public Laws 421, Sec. 1(a).
5Ibid.,
Sec. 2(a) (e).
6 Ibid., Sec. 1.

7Ibid., Sec. 2(b).
1 234.03, .04 Wis. Stats., 1941.
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session. Men cannot perform satisfactorily on a production line with
the shadow of eviction at the whim of the landlord hanging over their
heads, because they know that an eviction means a long search for
other shelter and removal to another town if the search is unsuccessful.
With a full understanding of the background so thoroughly justified, the legal profession cart more readily accept the fact that case law
and statutory law is asked to step aside and give way to this new
federal law, because that is just what the Emergency Price Control Act,
and the regulations issued thereunder, demands and requires. The landowner is now limited and restricted in the free use and management of
his property such as he enjoyed under the state statutes and case law.
An eviction judgment cannot be granted to a landlord plaintiff who
desires the removal of his tenant and has complied with the statutory
requirements terminating the tenancy. The Federal Rent Regulation is
superimposed upon that part of the state laws which is in conflict with
it. The language of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Konkel v. State,
"Congress having spoken full on the subject, the power of the State to
enact a law on the same subject is suspended" is for the duration of
the war applicable to the landlord tenant relationship. 9
.One of the thirteen sections of the Maximum Rent Regulation is
devoted to "Restrictions on the Removal of Tenant." Section 6 is set
out here in full:
"SECTION 6. RESTRICTIONS ON REMOVAL OF
TENANT.-(a) So long as the tenant continues to pay the rent
to which the landlord is entitled, no tenant shall be removed
from any housing accommodations, by action to evict or to recover possession, by exclusion from possession, or otherwise,
nor shall any person attempt such removal or exclusion from
possession, notwithstanding that such tenant has no lease or that
his lease or other rental agreement has expired or otherwise terminated, and regardless of any contract, lease, agreement or obligation heretofore or hereafter entered into which provides for
entry of judgment upon the tenant's confession for breach of
the covenants thereof or which otherwise provides contrary
hereto, unless:
(1) The tenant, who had a written lease or other written
rental agreement, has refused upon demand of the landlord to
execute a written extension or renewal thereof for a further
term of like duration but not in excess of one year but otherwise
on the same terms and conditions as the previous lease or agreement, except insofar as such terms and conditions are inconsistent with this Maximum Rent Regulation; or
(2) The Tenant has unreasonably refused the landlord
access to the housing accommodations for the purpose of inspection or of showing the accommodations to a prospective purchaser, mortgagee or prospective mortgagee, or other person
9168 Wis. 335.
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having a legitimate interest therein: Provided, however, That
such refusal shall not be ground for removal or eviction if such
inspection or showing of the accommodations is contrary to the
provisions of the tenant's lease or other rental agreement; or
(3) The tenant (i) has violated a substantial obligation of
his tenancy, other than an obligation to pay rent, and has continued, or failed to cure, such violation after written notice by
the landlord that the violation cease, or (ii) is committing or
permitting a nuisance or is using or permitting a use of the housing accommodations for an immoral or illegal purpose; or
(4) The tenant's lease or other rental agreement has expired
or otherwise terminated, and at the time of termination the
housing accommodations or a predominant part thereof are
occupied by one or more subtenants or other persons who occupied under a rental agreement with the tenant; or
(5) The landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession
for the immediate purposes of demolishing the housing accommodations or of substantially altering or remodeling it in a manner which cannot practicably be done with the tenant in occupancy and the plans for such alteration or remodeling have been
approved by the proper authorities, if such approval is required
by local law; or
(6) The landlord owned, or acquired an enforceable right to
buy or the right to poisession of, the housing accommodations
prior to the effective date of this maximum rent regulation,'0
and seeks in good faith to recover possession of such accommodations for immediate use and occupancy as a dwelling for himself. If a tenant has been removed or exicted under this paragraph (a) (6) from housing occommodations, the landlord shall
file a written report on a form provided therefor before renting
the accommodations or any part thereof during a period of six
months after such removal or eviction.
(b) (1) No tenant shall be removed or evicted on grounds
other than those stated above unless, on petition of the landlord, the Administrator certifies that the landlord may pursue
his remedies in accordance with the requirements of the local
law. The Administrator shall so certify if the landlord establishes that removals or evictions of the character proposed are
not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act or this Maximum
Rent Regulation and would not be likely to result in the circumvention or evasion thereof.
(2) Removal or eviction of a tenant for occupancy by a purchaser who has acquired his rights in the housing accommodations on or after the effective date of this maximum rent regulation, is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and this
Maximum Rent Regulation and would be likely to result in
the circumvention or evasion thereof, unless (i) the payment or
payments of principal made by the purchaser, excluding any
10

October 20, 1942.
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payments made from funds borrowed for the purpose of making
such principal payments, aggregate 33 1/3 per cent or more of
the purchase price, and (ii) a period of three months has elapsed
after the issuance of a certificate by the Administrator as hereinafter provided. For the purposes of this paragraph (b) (2),
the payments of principal may be made by the purchaser conditionally or in escrow to the end that they shall be returned
to the purchaser in the event the Administrator denies a petition for a certificate. If the Administrator finds that the required
payments of principal have been made, he shall, on petition of
either the vendor or purchaser, issue a certificate authorizing
the purchaser to pursue his remedies for removal or eviction
of the tenant in accordance with the requirements of the local
law at the expiration of three months after the date of issuance
of such certificate. In no other case shall the Administrator issue
a certificate for occupancy by a purchaser who has acquired his
rights in the housing accommodations on or after the effective
date of this Maximum Rent Regulation, unless he finds that the
vendor has or had a substantial necessity requiring the sale and
that a reasonable sale or disposition of the accommodations
could not be made-without removel or eviction of the tenant,
or unless he finds that other special hardship would result; under such circumstances the payment by the purchaser of 33 1/3
per cent of the purchase price shall not be a condition to the
issuance of a certificate, and the certificate shall authorize the
vendor or purchaser to pursue his remedies for removal or
eviction of- the tenant in accordance with the requirements of
the local law.
(c) (1) The provisions of this section do not apply to a
subtenant or other person who occupied under a rental agreement with the tenant, where removal or eviction of the subtenant or other such occupant is sought by the landlord of the
tenant, unless under the local law there is a tenancy relationship between the landlord and the subtenant or other such
occupant.
(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to housing
accommodations rented to either Army or Navy personnel,
including civilian employees of the War and Navy Departments,
for which the rent is fixed by the national rent schedule of the
War or Navy Department.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an
occupant of a furnished room or room not constituting an apartment, located within the residence occupied by the landlord or
his immediate family, where such landlord rents to not more
than two occupants within such residence.
(d) (1) Every notice to a tenant to vacate or surrender possession of housing accommodations shall state the ground under
this section upon which the landlord relies for removal or eviction of the tenant. A written copy of such notice shall be given
to the Area Rent Office with 24 hours after the notice is given
to the tenant.
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No tenant shall be removed or evicted from housing accommodations, by court process or otherwise, unless, at least ten days
prior to the time specified for surrender of possession and to the
commencement of any action for removal or eviction, the landlord has given written notices of the proposed removal or eviction to the tenant and to the Area Rent Office, stating the
ground under this section upon which such removal or eviction
is sought and specifying the time when the tenant .is required
to surrender possession.
Where the ground for removal or eviction of a tenant is nonpayment of rent, every notice under this paragraph (d) (1) shall
state the rent for the housing accommodations, the amount of
rent due and the rental period or period for which such rent
is due. The provisions of this paragraph (d) (1) shall not
apply where a certificate has been issued by the Administrator
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) At the time of commencing any action to remove or
evict a tenant, including an action based upon nonpayment of
rent, the landlord shall give written notice thereof to the Area
Rent Office stating the title of the case, the number of the case
where that is possible, the court in which it is filed, the name and
address of 'the tenant, and the ground under this section on
which removal or eviction is sought.
(e) No provision of this section shall be construed to
authorize the removal of a tenant unless such removal is authorized under the local law."
The foregoing section 6 is an exerpt from the Maximum Rent
Regulation applicable to housing accommodations. The same law governs tenancies in rooming houses and hotels, with the exception of
hotels or rooming houses renting rooms on a daily basis; dwellings in
the two categories are specifically exempted from the restrictions on
evictions.
Eviction actions are still brought before and tried in the local courts,
but it does not seem amiss to point out the possibility of withdrawing
all such actions from the judiciary; it could be done by eliminating
paragraphs (a) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), thus requiring an
Administrator's certificate on petition of landlord before the commencement of any eviction action. The Price Administrator has not as yet
deemed it necessary to assume such rigid control.
It can be noted that the law not only prohibits the removal of tennants from possession, but also prohibits attempts at such removal or
exclusion from possession. This provision in the Price Administrator's
rent regulation has a corollary in the Emergency Price Control Act
which can be found in section 4 under Prohibitions:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to remove or attempt to
remove from any defense area housing accommodations the
tenant or occupant thereof or to refuse to renew the lease or
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agreement for the use of such accommodations, because such
tenant or occupant has taken, or proposes to take, action authorized or required by this Act or any regulation, order, or requirement thereunder."
Such reprisals on the part of the landlord are apparently of serious
consequence because the Price Control Act prescribes heavy penalties
for any person "who willfully violates any provision of Section 4 of
this Act.""
From a practical standpoint the Area Rent Office has been represented by a member of the legal staff in the eviction courts of Mihvaukee daily since the enactment of the regulation, August 1, 1942. Upon
receipt of eviction notices, appropriate entries are made in a docket at
the rent office. Cases involving factual disputes become the subject
of field investigations conducted impartially and proper reports on the
results of the investigation are submitted to the trial court.
It is recognized that the notice requirements as well as the substantive law is more highly technical under the rent regulation than under
the Wisconsin statutes. Attorneys who handle eviction actions only
occasionally may consequently deem it advisable to solicit information
on procedure from the Area Rent Office, and thus avail themselves of
a service which the office renders to all attorneys regardless of whom
they represent-the landlord or the tenant.

- Public Laws 421, Sec. 205 (b).
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THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT*

E

VER since the transition of the United States from a rural to an
urban civilization, local government has been a stepchild. In
times of prosperity it was slighted because communal efficiency and
savings seemed unimportant in contrast with private gains. In periods
of adversity, the ailing waif received only the ill-conceived prescription
of diminished revenues and curtailment of essential services, together
with, in the last great depression, the worse nostrum of assumption of
powers and performance of functions by the federal government. In
war periods, the concentration of interest on foreign affairs and the
united attack on the alien foe make the citizen unmindful of insidious
internal assaults on the very things he is fighting to preserve and low
politics, the enemy of good government, entrenches itself and flourishes
unresistd.
Local government is the most vital element in a democracy, but it is
not generally recognized as such. The terminology, "levels of government," describing federal, state and local government is a misnomer
and should be abandoned unless municipal government, in the broad
sense, is placed at the top. National government, with us, is, in substance, government in Washington by representatives of local political
machines. These groups choose from their numbers the Representatives and Senators comprising the Congress. The local politicians (in
the bad sense), masquerading under the name "Republican" or "Democrat," control through patronage and the granting of illicit favors the
selection of candidates, the election machinery, the voting and the
acts of administrative, legislative and often even of judicial officials.
The local bosses become national committeemen and are otherwise
influential in the affairs of national parties. In practice, the nominal
appointing power yields, for judges, marshals, postmasters, collectors,
United States attorneys, etc., to the "recommendations" of the local
heads of the national parties. The local independent is an Ishmael so
*It is the purpose of this series of editorials to direct the attention of the
legal profession generally to the importance of good local government and
specifically to its portion of the task of making local government work as an
exhibit of the functioning of democracy.
The opinion of the writers, in which the editorial board of THn REVlEW concurs, is that the duty of the legal profession extends beyond the earning of a
living by it technical skill; beyond even a zealous regard for the administration
of justice uncoupled with a willingness to take an active part in the making
of law.
These editorials are directed to the elimination of the narrowness of vision
which too often by the unwillingness of good men to engage in "politics" has
thrown the field of local government into the hands of incompetents. Comment
of readers upon the subject matter of the editorials is invited.
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far as concerns the national parties, whose hoplites work actively
against attempts on a non-partisan and unselfish basis to improve local
government. The cities and counties are regarded as spoils grounds for
the fructifying of the national parties. This is made possible largely
because "best citizens," persons of means, education and position lend
themselves, without shame, for personal gain or in order to attain
office, to the machinations of the bosses.
Mr. Rix, in his trenchant leader, "A Widening Horizon," in the
February 1943 issue, has pointed out that
"we cannot have good administration of justice in poor or corrupt systems of municipal government."
Judges who are appointed or elected under this system, as a quid pro
quo for activity in behalf of the prevailing political group, have no
understanding of good local government or sympathy with aspirations
and experiments for its improvement and for the efficient workings of
the merit system. All these are dealt with repressively in political
court decisions, bottoi6ed on the judge's experience as a politician or
influenced by "suggestions."
This is a serious accusation against government in our country.
It may geem to some an inexcusable jeremiad. But, as a generality, it
is not exaggerated. There have been bright spots, but they have not
burned for long. The technique of good local government has been
developed by study, but the will to bring about good local government
has not been infused into the residents of our cities. Democracy must
be preserved. It is under attack as never before. Faults which make
it vulnerable must be recognized and overcome. There must be general
education in schools, colleges and graduate schools respecting the menace and wickedness involved in bad local government. The bench must
be removed from all suspicion of political influence. The "political"
lawyer and the fixer must be banished by his brethren and an aroused
public opinion. The courts and the bar will be restored to public
esteem when once they purge their membership of those who profane
the temples of justice.
Local government must be made a matter of honor and importance
in order that government may properly conduct sound post-war
readjustment. Instance of citizen leadership and participation in local
governments, such as were mentioned by Mr. Rix, must no longer
be "sporadic" but pervasive and constant. Only by education, unselfishness and the development of a high system of public morality will the
chinks of bad local government in the armor of democracy be soldered
and free institution made invulnerable.
MURRAY SEASONGOOD*
*Member of the Ohio bar; former mayor of Cincinnati; professor, teaching
"Municipal Corporations," University of Cincinnati Law School.

NOTES
THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in American
Medical Association v. United States once again brought to the front
the problem of the corporate practice of professions.
On February 24, 1937, Group Health Association Inc. was granted
a charter in Washington, D. C.2 By its certificate of incorporation and
its by-laws the corporation was empowered to treat its members and
their dependents, through hired agents and employees, for any and
all diseases and injuries.3 The certificate expressly provides that Group
Health Asociation, Inc., is "to provide ... for the services of physicians and other medical attention and any and all kinds of medical,
surgical and hospital treatment to members here-of and their dependents. ' '4 This corporation offered memberships in a risk sharing, prepayment health plan to certain government employees. It employed two
surgeons, one pediatrician, one urologist, and one obstetrician ;5 and
through this staff offered to render most types of medical and surgical
treatments at a stated annual cost. esides offering services to individuals, Bit went further and for a lump sum of $40,000 agreed to extend
similar medical and hospital services to such employees of the Home
Owners Loan Corporation office as paid a monthly fee.
The Medical Society of the District of Columbia opposed this plan
on the grounds that it not only contravened the best interests of both
the public and the profession, but also violated the principles and
ethics of the American Medical Association. 6 Knowing these facts,
several members of the Society nevertheless accepted employment of
Group Health. One such member 7 was expelled from membership after
charges had been brought against him in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Society.
The newspapers took up the story of this struggle and early in
1938, when comment pro and con had attained a national scope,
I January 18, 1943, 63 S.Ct. 326.
2 The corporation was organized under the title of the code for the District of
Columbia providing for the incorporation of societies for "benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, musical, scientific, religious, or missionary purposes, including societies formed for mutual improvement or the promotion
of the arts." D.C. Code (1929) tit. 5, Section 121.
3 See Certificate of Group Health Association, Inc., article 3, filed in the office
of Recorder of Deeds, District of Columbia, on February 24, 1937, and recorded in Title 53, folio 556, et. seq. Also By-laws of the Group Health Association, Inc., Art. V, section 5, as revised October 25, 1937, and filed together
with the certificate of incorporation.
4 Certificate of Group Health Association, Inc., Article 3.
5 Questions and Answers about Group Health (1937) section 9.
6 (1938) 111 J.Am. Med. Ass'n. 1194.
7Washington Post, March 27, 1938, Magazine section.
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Representative Scott8 offered a resolution in Congress calling for an
investigation of the antagonistic activities of the Medical Society of
Washington, D. C., and of the American Medical Association.
Because of the notoriety the matter had received and in fear of a
quo warranto proceeding by the district attorney for the illegal practice
of medicine and by the superintendent of insurance for selling insurance, the Group Health Asociation, Inc., sought a declaratory judgment as to its right to provide medical services according to its plan.
In July, 1938, Justice Bailey, in deciding Group Health Association,
Inc. v. Moor (D.C.D.C. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 445, held that the corporation through its licensed physicians was not illegally practicing medicine, nor was it within the scope of regulatory insurance laws because
it provided services rather than money benefits to its contributing
members.
In August, 1938,1 Asistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold
warned the American Medical Association and the Medical Society
that the expulsion or threatened expulsion of members for allying
themselves with Group Health, or for having professional relations
with doctors of that organization amounted to forcing its members to
participate in an illegal boycott of the Group Health Association's
doctors; and the exclusion by Washington hospitals of physicians who
were not members of the Medical Society ". . . may or may not
amount to coercion upon them.. ."o and that, "In the opinion of the
Department of Justice, this is a violation of the anti-trust laws because
it is an attempt on the part of one group of physicians to prevent qualified doctors from carrying on their calling."
On October 17, 1938, Arnold placed the matter in the hands of the
Federal Grand Jury. An indictment was returned in the District Court
of the United States for the District of Columbia under Section 3
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,1 ' naming as defendants the American
Medical Association, two of its subordinate bodies, the Washington
Academy of Surgery, and twenty-one individual doctors, all members
of the American Medical Association.'12 The indictment charged that
Honorable Byron Scott, 83 Cong. Rec., May 3, 1938 at p. 8101.
9Mimeograph release of the Department of Justice signed by Thurman Arnold,
Assistant Attorney General, and approved by Homer Cummings, Attorney
General, July 30, 1938, and (1938) 111 J. Am. Med. Ass'n. 537.
8

-0 Ibid.

1126 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. 3 (1927). "Every contract, combination in
form of trust or otherwise, a conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
in . . . or of the District of Columbia . . . is declared illegal. Every person

who shall make any contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $5000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
12The Medical Society of the District of Columbia and Harris County Medical
Society of Harris County, Texas.
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the defendants had combined and conspired together for the purpose
of (1) restraining the business of the Group Health Association;
(2) restraining the members of the Group Health Association from
obtaining by cooperative methods medical care from doctors engaged
in such group practice; (3) restrainiig the doctors of the staff and
certain other doctors 8 from pursuing their callings; (4) restraining
the business of the Washington hospitals. All of the defendants
demurred to the indictment and were sustained by the District Court
on grounds, amongst others, that neither the practice of medicine nor
the business of the Group Health Association is a trade within the
meaning of the term as used in the Sherman Act.
Notice of appeal was filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia on July 31, 1939. On hearing the Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the restraint of
trade prohibited by statute may be extended both to medical practice
and to the operations of the Group Health Association. United States
v. American Medical Asociation, 72 App. D.C. 12, 110 F. (2d) 703,
710, 711.
The case then went to trial in the District Court. Certain defendants
were acquitted by direction of the judge. As to the others the case
was submitted to the jury which found the American Medical Association and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia guilty.
This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals which reiterated
its ruling as the applicability of Section 3 of the Sherman Act, considered alleged errors and affirmed the judgments. American Medical
Association v. United States, App. D.C., 130 F. (2d) 233.
The matter went to the Supreme Court on certiorarilimited to these
questions: (1) Whether the practice of medicine and the rendering of
medical services as described in the indictment are "trade" under Section 3 of the Sherman Act; (2) whether the indictment charged or
the evidence proved "restraint of trade" under Section 3 of the Sherman Act; (3) whether a dispute concerning terms and conditions of
employment under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts was involved, and, if so, whether petitioners were interested therein, and
therefore immune from prosecution under the Sherman Act.
In affirming the judgments the Supreme Couit did nto consider
the first question, but did answer the second question in the affirmative
and the third question in the negative.
In answering the second question Justice Roberts said, "Group
Health is a membership corporation engaged in business or trade,"
and, "The fact that it is cooperative, and procures services and facili13 Doctors not on the staff of Group Health Association but who engaged in
consultations with the staff doctors.
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ties on behalf of its members only, does not remove its activities from
the sphere of business."
What is this so-called "trade or business" that Group Health is
engaged in?
Justice Bailey having held that it was not the practice of medicine,
justified his decision on the grounds that the corporation itself is not
prescribing for the sick, but it merely enters contracts with licensed
physicians, who in turn prescribe for the members of the corporation,
and that these physicians are independent contractors.14 He attempted
to distinguish the admittedly illegal practice of medicine by corporation from mere contracts made by a corporation with physicians for
the purpose of securing medicinal services for the members of the corporation; he reasoned that since one person may contract in advance
for the services of a physician over a period of time, an incorporated
group of persons may do likewise.35
It may be seen that both the reasoning and the conclusion of Justice Bailey are unsound; first, because it is evident that under Group
Health's plan the physicians are not independent contractors, but are
employees of the corporation; and second, because the existence of
the distinction between "practicing medicine" and "furnishing medical
services," while providing grounds for verbalistic conflict, is a nullity
in the eyes of a practical thinker, both being mere labels for the same
series of acts.
Justice Roberts having held that Group Health is engaged in business or trade said, "The fact that it is cooperative and procures services
and facilities on behalf of its members only, does not remove its activities from the sphere of business." Apparently Justice Roberts means
that in spite of the fact that Group Health confines its services to its
own members, it is nevertheless engaged in business. That that is true
is self evident, but likewise it is evident that he avoided saying just
what business Group Health is in. This turns us back to Justice Bailey's
answer-the business of "furnishing medical services," or as herein
submitted, the business of practicing medicine.
That the privilege of practicing a profession is one residing solely
in individuals has long been recognized. A learned profession can only
be practiced by a duly qualified human being. His authorization to
practice is given, not only because of the fact that upon examination
he has proved possession of the essential skill and knowledge of the
subject, but also because upon appraisal being made of his character
14 Group Health Asociation, Inc., v. Moor and Pine. U. S. District Court of the
District of Columbia, July 27, 1938.
15 Ibid.
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he has proven possession of those moral qualities which merit public
trust.' 6
While for some purposes-it is considered legally a person,' 7 a corporation being an artificial entity, existing only in the contemplation of
the law, has neither the right nor the power to practice a profession.'
A corporation being a fictitious character has no mind and cannot
think; consequently, it cannot meet educational requirements. The
practice of a profession necessarily involves the intimate and confidential relation of trust and confidence between practitioner and client or
patient. The courts hold that a corporation cannot satisfy these considerations.' 9
Whether or not a corporation may lawfully sell the technical or
professional services of its licensed employees depends, in the absence
of express statutory language, 20 on the policy which the court finds
embodied in the license statute. 2 ' In the case of trade licenses, the
sole purpose of the licensing act is to assure technical competence in
those who do the work and as early as 1756 it was held that no statutory policy was violated when an unlicensed entity sold the services
of licensed artisans. 22 Similarly, a corporation was allowed to sell the
services of licensed architects, 23 but the policy of the medical license
statutes, as conceived by the courts, has been to accord the physician
the same professional status as the common law provides to the
lawyer.24 The analogy found in the practice of law has been applied by
the courts to physicians in establishing the general rule that as a corporation lacks ethical standards and is incapable of personal relations,
16 State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).

In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).

A corporation is a citizen for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, Doctor v.
Harrington ,196 U.S. 579 (1905) ; however, it is not a citizen within the purview of Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution to the effect that the "citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1868).
18 People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 IIl. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936);
Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Col. 285, 14 F. (2nd) 67
(1931); Win. Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Div. 215, 113 N.Y.S. 772
(1908).
'9 People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922);
In re Shoe Manufacturers' Protective Association, 3 N.E. (2d) 746 (Mass.
1936) ; People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938); People v.
United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
20
In re Associated Lawyers, 134 App. Div. 350, 119 N.Y.S. 77 (1909); Winberry
v. Hallehan, 361 Ill. 121, 147 N.E. 552 (1935).
21 People by Kerner v. United Medical Service, Supra; Painless Parker v. Board
of Dental Examiners, Supra; Win. Messer Co. v. Rothstein, Supra.
22
Raynard v. Chase, 1 Burr 3, 97 Eng. Rep. 155 (1756). Cf. Win. Messer Co.
v. Rothstein, Supra.
23 People ex rel State Board of Examiners v. Rodgers Co., 277 Ill. 151, 115 N.E.
146 (1917); People v. Allied Architects' Ass'n., 201 Cal. 428, 257 Pac. 511
17

24

(1927).

In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
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it not only is unable to receive a medical license, but also it is unlawful
25
for a corporation to sell the services of a licensed physician.
If a corporation were licensed to practice law or medicine there
would be in effect a dual alliance imposed upon the licensed practitioner
it employed. Because a corporation can only act through its agents and
employees26 the practitioners it employed would owe a duty to the
corporation 27 as well as to the patient or client. 28 Such duties in many
instances would conflict. The benefits of a completely individual and
personal employment relationship 29 and the danger of an impairment
of professional ethics by a management group3" are the two considerations which justify the rule and have made the courts unwilling to
accept the analysis of the trade licenses cases and to segregate the
business functions of the corporate entity from the professional functions of its licensed employees.
Having herein made a resume of the reasoning from which the
rule that corporations are incapable of practicing professions evolved,
a consideration of the holding in American Medical Association v.
United States leaves us with the following question: By what manner
of reasoning can it be said that a person or persons who combine to
stop a corporation from doing that which under the law it has no right
to do, are guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act?
FREDliCK H. FOwLE.

People v. Pacific Health Corp., Supra; People by Kerner v. United Medical
Service, Supra; Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, Supra.
26 New York &N. H. R. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865).
27 Restatement of Agency (1938) Section 13.
28 Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence (1931) Section 96.
29 Stern v. Flyn, 154 Misc. 609; 278 N.Y.S. 598 (1935).
30 People v. Pacific Health Corp., Supra.
25
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WISCONSIN'S CHANGING RULE OF MUNICIPAL IABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE
Important questions concerning the liability of a municipal corporation for the negligence of its servants and for the creation and maintenance of a nuisance in the performance of governmental function
seem to be raised anew by the recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the case of Robb v. City of Milwaukee.' Apparently, the effects
of the decision are to re-define the phrase "relationship between governor and governed," to add broad new restrictions to the doctrine that
the sovereign can do no wrong, and to carry Wisconsin tacitly into
the ranks of the majority of jurisdictions which look with disfavor
upon governmental immunity from liability for tortious acts attributable to it.
In the case, a woman passerby was allowed to recover for injuries
sustained when she was struck by a ball while using the public way
adjoining a municipally maintained baseball field. Though the field
had been in use nine years, no proof was made of any injury or property damage other than that occasioned in the present instance. The
lower court entered judgment for the plaintiff on a jury verdict which
found the city negligent as to the manner in which the field was fenced,
and that the field constituted a nuisance. In its decision, the Supreme
court, two justices dissenting, based its affirmance solely on the latter
theory.
Upon what basis does such a decision rest? Concededly, in operating a play field the city was performing a governmental function,-2
and consequently, by standards heretofore applied, between it and the
injured party the relationship of governor and governed existed.3
Previously in such a situation, if the theory of action were negligence,
Wisconsin courts applied the doctrine which Stason calls the "strict"
or "logical"' view of governmental immunity:
"in the absence of a statute imposing liability, the municipality
was not liable for the tortious acts of its officers or servants in
connection with the gratuitous performance of strictly public
functions imposed by mandate of the legislature or undertaken
voluntarily by its permission from which it obtained no special
corporate advantage, no pecuniary profit, and no enforced
contribution from individuals particularly benefitted.115
If the theory of the action were that the playfield was a nuisance (and
the dissenting justices were of the opinion that it was not as a matter
of law)" the case would seem to fall well within the rule of Virovatz v.
216

N.W. (2d) 222 (Wis. 1942).

Hennessey v. City of Boston, 265 Mass. 559, 164 N.E. 470 (1929).
a Gianfortore v. Ne*i Orleans, 61 F. 64 (1894).
(1935) p. 564.
5 Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917).
8Robb v. City of Milwaukee, 6 N.W. (2d) 222 (Wis. 1942). Dissenting opinion.
4 STASON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORAnoNs
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City of Cudahy,7 where it was held that the city in conducting a swimming pool was engaged in a public activity, and did not become liable
for the death of a swimmer even though the pool constituted a nuisance. While not overruling the Virovatz case, the court presently
admitted that its former judgment "came close to ruling that even
though a thing maintained by a municipality constitutes a public
nuisance, the exemption from liability would apply where the nuisance
is created in the course of performing a governmental function."
Assuming that the Robb case and the Virovatz case are both law,
the decisions are reconcilable only on the premise that the concept of
the governor-governed relationship is a shifting one, dependent not on
the nature of the service which is being performed but rather on the
benefits which the "governed" is deriving from the service. Consequently, the municipality would sustain no liability to a person injured while using the ball field, while to the mere passerby, it would
become liable. If this is to become the basis of future decisions, the
haphazard manner in which the rule has developed will become apparent in its application to persons who, while they are on the premises,
are deriving no actual benefit from the function performed; as for
instance, would be true in the case of a party injured while a spectator
at a ball game at a municipal field.
Further than this, as the court points out in its latter decision,
there appears to be arising out of the tendency of the courts to
inquire more closely into the nature of the governor-governed relationship a new rule analogous to the one which in this jurisdiction
curtails the non-liability of the city for injuries done when the municipality and the injured party stand in the further relationship of adjoining property owner to ajoining property owner." Such curtailment
applies whether the injury is one to the property 9 or to the person.10
Thus though the Virovato case may still be the law, its effect is
confined by the Robb decision to a smaller class of cases than the language used would reasonably encompass. That such a restriction was
not in the minds of the justices at the time that the former decision
was rendered is apparent from the fact that in the earlier opinion,
the court posed the hypothetical case of an injury to a traveler on
the public way as an example of a situation in which the corporation
would not become liable under the doctrine of exemption for the maintenance of a public nuisance where the relationship of governor to
governed existed.
7

Virovatz v. City of Cudahy, 211 Wis. 357, 247 N.W. 341 (1931).

s Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 (1872).

9 Hasslinger v. Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W. 647 (1940).

20 Matson v. Dane County, 172 Wis. 522, 179 N.W. 774 (1920).
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It is to be noticed that the appeal in the instant case was apparently
decided solely on the jury finding of nuisance. If this be true, the
decision, while in conflict with the Virovatz case, does not represent a
radical departure from the law as it was conceived to be prior to
1931. As early as 1914, Wisconsin, in Bernstein v. City of Milwaukee,"
held that a city was liable for an injury done to a citizen when caused
by the creation or maintenance of a public nuisance, regardless of the
fact that the nuisance was created in the performance of a public function; and similar rules have been laid down by the courts of other
jurisdictions.1 2 But the implications of the present case seem wider
than a mere return to its former position, for there seems to be no case
which has defined "nuisance" as broadly as is here construed. 13 As the
dissenting opinion points out, it is extremely doubtful that in its widened scope, "nuisance" does not include most negligence as well. Measured by traditional standards, it would seem that an isolated injury
occurring in the extended period in which the field was maintained
would be insufficient proof of the element of continuing, damage and
annoyance which are or were previously accepted as the characteristics of the tort of nuisance.1 4 Either this doctrine is to be applied to
purely negligent acts akin to the misfeasance which unquestionably
was present in the Robb case, or it will be restricted to nuisances as the
court presently uses the term; in either event the court seems to have
created a distinction more academic than real, and by a fiction analogous to that of adjoining property owners, singularly extended municipal tort liability.
The original doctrine of municipal non-liability arose as an extension to its subdivisions of the immunity with which the sovereign
states were invested.' 5 The rule has been defended at varying times and
in various jurisdictions on the ground that to allow recovery would be
to sanction a diversion of public funds to a purpose which the state
never intended the municipality to bear;16 that the inconvenience occasioned the public would outweigh the redressing of the wrong ;17 and
that the rule encouraged the city to engage in the gratuitous rendition
of allowable public services.' 8
Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to give wholehearted support to the rule. While paying homage to it in general terms, they have
engrafted onto the rule exceptions based on theories of pecuniary
" Bernstein v. City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 382 (1914).
'2 Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931).
13 Compare fact situation in Hennessey v. Boston, supra.
14 3 COOLEY, TORTS, § 450.

15 38 AM.
36 Devers

JUPISPRUDENCE,

§ 573, note 20.

v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 A. 540 (1932).
17 Chafor v. Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 P. 670 (1932).
18 Baltimore v. State, 168 Md. 619, 179 A. 169 (1935).

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

profit, special advantage, public nuisance, and adjacent property ownership for the purpose of reaching an equitable result in individual
instances. In speaking of the exception in favor of situations arising
where the corporation anticipated the return of a profit from its activity, Justice Butler said it was court made law "adopted to escape
difficulties, in order that injustice may not result from technical
defenses based on the governmental character of such corporations."' 9
At the present time, the doctrine of non-liability on whatever theory
it rests ,and the tendency to restrict such immunity by insensible degrees seem hopelessly in conflict. It would seem that the time is ripe
for a judicial reexamination of the subject which will in the light of
public policy, unequivocally affirm exemption in all cases or impose
liability wherever, as Justice Fairchild says, the "governed can be said
not to have assumed the risk of injury."
WILLIAM

29

SMITH

MALLOY.

Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 67 L.Ed. 937, 43 S.Ct. 534, 29 A.L.R.

1471 (1922).
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PEACEFUL PICKETING AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Are sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act,' which seek to restrict the parties to and the objectives of
peaceful picketing, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution? The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks'
Union, Local No. 1403, A. F. of L., et al v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board et a12 sustained the constitutionality of these sections.
In this case the Union made unsuccessful attempts to unionize the
employees of the Sears Roebuck store in Racine. None of the store
employees attended the meeting, called, with the consent and approval
of the employer, for the purpose of organizing them into the local
union. Neither the Union nor the employees had any dispute with
Sears Roebuck and Company. Peaceful picketing of the store began
December 4 or 5, 1940, and continued until February 28, 1941, when
it was forbidden by an order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board as being in violation of sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e). The
circuit court of Racine County upheld the order of the board. Upon
appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the
lower court, and, in the opinion of the writer, if this case comes before
the United States Supreme Court, it will, in all probability, declare that
sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The trend apparent from recent Supreme Court decisions in
picketing cases should logically result in such a holding.
When the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama
held picketing to be an exercise of the right of free speech protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,4 new labor legislation became imperative. If picketing as a mode of expression were not to be made the
cover for an attack on and a violation of the property rights of others,
restrictions would have to be imposed upon it. However, the state in
"draw' .ng the line beyond which picketing may be prohibited or en111.06(2) (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice: To coerce, intimidate or
induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees in the enjoyment
of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to
engage in any practice with regard to his employees which would constitute
an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative.
111,06(2) (e). It shall be an unfair labor practice: To cooperate in, engaging in,
promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting, or any other overt concomitant
of a strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees
of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by
secret ballot to call a strike.
26 N.W. (2d) 699 (Wis. 1941).
8310 U.S. 88; 84 L.Ed. 1093; 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
4"The dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
1

must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed

by the Constitution. We concur with Mr. Justice Brandeis: 'Members of a

union might without special statutory authorization by a state make known
the facts of a labor dispute for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution."' Thornhill v. Alabama, Supra.
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joine6 ' has the tortuous task of staying within the Fourteenth Amendment. In protecting the right of others the state must not destroy the
picket.;' right to freedom of speech. The necessary equilibrium is difficult of achievement.
Picketing has three elements: (1) means; (2) parties; (3) aims
or objectives. Picketing characterized by violence (show of force,
blocking of entrances, etc.) is, of course and necessarily so, prohibited.
In Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies,Inc.,5 the United States Supreme Court held that a state court
may enjoin picketing in itself peaceful when it is enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct. Furthermore, picketing though p--aceful may be prohibited, if it is characterized by fraud and misrepresentation. Curbing violent picketing has presented no difficulties because it
naturally comes under the police powers of the state. Peaceful picketing, however, presents a more difficult problem and the attempts of
the various states to curb it have so far met with little success.
By section 103.535, commonly referred to as the "Stranger Picketing Act," Wisconsin attempted to restrict picketing to those who were
parties to the labor dispute in question. "It shall be unlawful for anyone to picket, or induce others to picket, the establishment, employer,
supply or delivery vehicles, or customers of anyone engaged in business, or to interfere with his business or interfere with any person or
persons desiring to transact or transacting business with him, when no
labor dispute ... exists between such employer and his employees or
their representatives."
In American Federation of Labor v. Swing6 the United States
Supreme Court passed on the principle involved in 103.535 and indirectly voided that statute as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of the Swing case were: That unsuccessful attempts
were made to unionize Swing's beauty parlor. That peaceful picketing
of the shop followed. That the picketing was enjoined by an Illinois
court on the grounds that since there was no dispute between the
employer and his employees, the picketing was illegal. In reversing the
Illinois courts the Supreme Court declared: "A state cannot exclude
workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers
and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
employed by him. The right of free communication cannot be mutilated
by denying it to workers in a dispute with an employer even though
'
they are not in his employ."
5 312 U.S. 287; 85 L.Ed. 836; 61 S.Ct. 552 (1940).
6312 U.S. 321; 85 L.Ed. 854; 61 S.Ct. 568 (1940).
7 Ibid. at 326.
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Wisconsin through section 111.06(2) (e), the constitutional of which
is still in question, also seeks to limit peaceful picketing to the parties
involved in the controversy. This section provides that picketing is
illegal unless the pickets represent a majority of the employees against
whose employer a strike has been called. Therefore, if only fifty or
fewer (or none) of the hundred employees of X Company vote to call
a strike, picketing by this minority or by others £s under any circumstances illegal and enjoinable. Section 111.06(2) (e) reads: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice to cooperate in, engaging in, promoting or
inducing picketing, boycotting, or any other overt concomitant of a
strikm unless a majority of the employees of an employer against whom
such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call
a strike."
The constitutionality of 111.06(2) (e) could have been passed upon
by both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and by the United States
Supreme Court in the Plankinton House case." In this case less than a
majority of the Plankinton employees went on strike and began to
picket the Plankinton House. The Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board issued an order restraining the picketing because it was carried
on in absence of a majority strike vote.9 However, neither the Wisconsin nor the United States Supreme Court decided the case in light of
the order. Both courts sustained the injunction on the grounds that the
picketing was characterized by violence. The United States Supreme
Court relied upon the construction placed upon the Board's order by
the Wisconsin court. The fallacy of this lies in the very evident fact
that "the Board's order, not the Wisconsin decision, was served upon
the pickets, and if the free speech character of picketing is to be given
-full recognition, the order on its face should have been subjected to
appropriate judicial'scrutiny."'10
In Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of 111.06
(2) (e). In this case the constitutionality of the statute was specifically
attacked and the court sustained the cease and desist order which
among other findings was based upon the fact that: The defendant
union had done or caused to be done acts prohibited by section 111.06
(2) (e), namely, "cooperating in, engaging in, promoting and inducing
8236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 (1941); 315 U.S. 437: 86 L.Ed. 946; 62 S.Ct. 65

(1941).

9 "That the respondent unions are guilty of unfair labor practices by co-operating and engaging in promoting and inducing picketing and boycotting, all

being overt concomitants of a strike, without first obtaining the approval of
the majority of the employees of the Plankinton House by a secret ballot."
236 Wis. at 335.
10 Ludwig Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," Harvard Law Review (October,
1942), p. 191.

116 N.W. (2d) 699 (Wis. 1942).
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strike, without first obtaining by secret ballot the approval of a majority of the employees of the Sears Roebuck store (the employer) to
picketing, bannering, boycotting, all being overt concomitants of a
12
call a strike."
Will the United States Supreme Court sustain 111.06(2) (e),
especially in view of the Swing case? In that case the Court declared:
"We are asked to sustain a decree which asserts that there can be no
peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion in relation to any dispute
between an employer and a trade union unless the employer's own
employees are in controversy with him. Such a bar of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech."' S The
principle of law laid down in the Swing case is that regardless of one's
relation to a labor dispute or lack thereof, he has the right peacefully
to express his opinion and viewpoint on the labor dispute. If we compare the fact situation of the Retail Clerks' Union case with that of the
Swing case, we find the two cases to be almost identical. It would seem
reasonable then to conclude that the Supreme Court on appeal will
decide the Retail Clerks' Union case in light of the same legal principles
and will declare 111.06(2) (e) unconstitutional. Such a decision is
inescapable if the Supreme Court adheres to the principle, which was
laid down in the Thornhill case and reiterated in the Swing case, that
picketing is the exercise of free speech.
15
But Carpenters & Joiners"Union, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe
and Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board16 would indicate that the Supreme Court is tending to
emasculate or, perhaps, to end the identification of picketing with free
speech. In the Ritter's case the Supreme Court sustained a Texas
injunction forbidding picketing before an establishment which industrially had no connection with the labor dispute in question. The Carpenters' Union picketed Ritter's cafe because the contractor building
his house, one and a half miles from the cafe, employed non-union
labor. In the Allen-Bradley case the Supreme Court upheld an order
issued by the Wisconsin Court enjoining the picketing of private
homes. The Union maintained a picket line before the home of a nonstriking employee of the employer with whom the Union was in dispute. The principle of law laid down in these two cases is that peaceful picketing may be illegal if the pickets and the occupant of the place
picketed lack a common business interest. The Supreme Court distinguished the Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases from the Swing case
Ibid., at 702.
"American Federation of Labor v. Swing, Supra, p. 325.
14237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791 (1941); 315 U.S. 740; 86 L.Ed. 1154; 62 S.Ct. 820
12

1942).

Is315 U.S. 769; 86 L.Ed. 1178; 62 S.Ct. 118 (1942).
16315 U.S. 722; 86 L.Ed. 1143; 62 S.Ct. 111 (1942).
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on the specious grounds that unlike the former the latter involved
parties who were interrelated through a community (nexus) of business interest.
It is difficult to follow the court's line of reasoning. For if picketing
is, as the United States Supreme Court maintains, the exercise of free
speech, then have not pickets the right to speak freely in one locality as
well as in another (if there is neither trespass nor breach of peace)?
If union beauty operators may speak freely in front of Swing's beauty
parlor, even though they have no nexus of employment with him, why
may not union carpenters speak freely in front of Ritter's cafe, even
though they have no nexus- of business interest with him. The lack of
an industrial nexus with Ritter's cafe is no more a valid reason for
depriving the carpenters of their right to freedom of speech before the
cafe, than the lack of a racial nexus with whites would be a justification
for depriving negroes of their right to freedom of speech before a
public forum. The Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases cannot be brought
into accord with the Swing case.
Under the Swing case section 111.06(2) (e) is quite evidently unconstitutional, but the Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases mark a
decided departure from the Swing case toward a willingness to permit
the states to restrict the parties involved in picketing. Therefore, the
ruling of these two cases should logically result in a sustainal of section 111.06(2) (e). The clear and irreconcilable divergence of the
Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases from the Swing case implies a repudiation of the latter by the United States Supreme Court. It would be
sound legal reasoning for the United States Supreme Court to uphold
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks' Union v. the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board.
In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks' Union
v. the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board upheld the constitutionality of 111.06(2) (b). This section provides that picketing is
illegal if the objective in view is to force an employer to interfere with
the legal rights of his employees. Therefore, if the employees of X
Company refuse to join the union, picketing to coerce X Company to
force them to do so by threat of dischargal or otherwise is illegal and
enjoinable. Section 111.06(2) (b) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice to coerce, intimidate, or induce any employer to interfere with
any of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in section [employees shall have the right of
self-organization and the right to form, join or assist labor organizations ...and such employees shall have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities-111.04] or to engage in any practice with
regard to his employees which would constitute an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative." This statute was the
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necessary consequence of the American Furniture case and the Senn
case where the courts refused to sustain an injunction against picketing
which admittedly sought to compel the employer to coerce his employees
to join the union.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision is legally correct and
basically sound for it is realistic and appreciative of the true nature of
the picketing enjoined. But will the Wisconsin Court be upheld on
appeal especially in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions and that Court's interpretation of picketing,? This will, in turn,
depend upon the Supreme Court's view of these questions: (1) May
state courts enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for an unlawful objective? (2) May the state without violating the Due Process Clause
forbid peaceful picketing which has for its objective the compelling of
an employer to force his employees to join a union?
A primary principle of the common law is that an individual or a
group of individuals may not seek an illegal object through a legal
means. Therefore, the common law forbids peaceful picketing which
involves a secondary boycott. One may not picket another if his object
in so doing is to drive the other out of business or to do him great harm.
Wisconsin has made use of this principle to forbid picketing, though
peaceful, which seeks an unfair labor practice. While acknowledging
and upholding the legality and the right of peaceful picketing, Wisconsin claims jurisdiction "to subject to injunctive relief any labor
activity, including peaceful picketing, which conflicts with desirable
social and economic policies."
While there is no United States Supreme Court decision determinative of the issue, it would seem that the United States Supreme Court
recognizes the states' right to enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for
an unlawful objective. There is not to be found "in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a constitutional command that
peaceful picketing must be wholly immune from regulation by the
community." Since the Supreme Court in the Ritter and the AllenBradley cases allow the states' right to restrict the locale of peaceful
picketing, by analogy one might conclude that the same Court recognizes the states' right to prohibit certain objectives of peaceful picketing. The dictum in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v.
Wohl17 seems to imply that state courts may enjoin picketing carried
on for an unlawful objective. That case involved a dispute between the
union and "vendors"-independent business men who owned their own
trucks, purchased goods from manufacturers, and sold them to retailers. The union by picketing the manufacturers sought to compel the
17 Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, Supra.
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vendors to employ union members. An injunction was granted and
sustained by the New York courts because no labor dispute was involved under state law. The United States Supreme Court reversed this
judgment on the grounds that the lack of a labor dispute under state
law did not impair the union's constitutional right to free expression
with regard to the facts of an industrial controversy. Wohl contended
that the term "labor dispute" was to be interpreted in light of Opera
on Tour, Inc. v. Weber' 8 where the New York Court of Appeals,
speaking of the Wohl case, stated: "We held that it was an unlawful
objective to attempt to coerce a peddler employing no employees in his
business and making approximately thirty-two dollars a week, to hire
an employee at nine dollars a day for one day a week."' 9 The Supreme
Court refused to rely upon this interpretation because "this lacks the
deliberateness and formality of a certification"20 and because the
quoted words were "uttered in a case where the question of the existence of a right to free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment was
neither raised nor considered."'n Apparently, then, the Supreme Court
would have ruled otherwise had the New York Court in the Wohl case
made a finding that the picketing was for an unlawful labor objective.
Finally, freedom of speech is not license as to its objectives. To advocate the violent overthrow of our government or to encourage resistance to the United States in time of war may certainly be prohibited.
Now, if peaceful picketing is freedom of speech, it likewise may seek
only lawful objectives.
The question as to whether or not the state may without violating
the due process clause forbid peaceful picketing which has for its
objective the compelling of an employer to force his employees to join
a union is still to be determined by the United States Supreme Court.
The picketing in the Swing case sought the compulsory unionization of
employees who had refused to join the union. The United States
Supreme Court impliedly ruled favorably on the objective in that it
permitted the picketing to continue. But the Ritter and the AllenBradley cases have substantially altered the judicial interpretation of
picketing apparent in the Swing case. Texas and Wisconsin were permitted to restrict picketing to the locale involved in the dispute on the
grounds that the right to picket may be qualified by considerations of
public policy. Moreover, the Thornhill case, which placed picketing
under the Fourteenth Amendment, emphatically stated: "The rights
of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to
compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject
N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
Ibid., at 363.
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, Supra, at p. 774.
21 Ibid., at 775.
1s 285
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to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which
they exist."2 2 Wisconsin enacted 111.06(2) (b) to obviate the injustice
and detriment to the general welfare occasioned by the Senn and the
American Furniture cases. Beyond cavil, Wisconsin has the right and
the duty to protect the rights not only of union employees but also of
non-union employees. Section 111.04, giving employees the right to
refrain from joining the union, would be nugatory if their unionization
could be compelled by coercing the employer through picketing. In
addition, the employer is obligated by section 111.06(2) to respect the
rights of his non-union employees given them by section 111.04. If the
employer is not free to carry out his obligation, then an impasse must
result which will be harmful to the common good. Therefore, the general welfare of Wisconsin is best served by forbidding peaceful picketing which has for its objective the compelling of an employer to force
his employees to join a union. For these reasons it is the opinion of the
writer that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling in Retail Clerks'
Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board will be sustained.
The unreserved declaration in the Thornhill case that peaceful
picketing is freedom of speech and its practical effectuation in the
Swing case placed the United States Supreme Court in an untenable
position. The identification of picketing with free speech would prevent any effective restriction of picketing by the states. In effect the
pickets could picket for what, against whom, and where they pleased.
Knowing that this would work incalculable harm and injustice, the
United States Supreme Court tacitly admitted in the Ritter and the
Allen-Bradley cases that picketing is, at most, akin to free speech. In
the Wohl case, Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion stated:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speeh, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of
the picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence,
those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regula23
tion.1
Indeed picketing is more than free speech, it is a form of economic
pressure. The purpose of the picket line is not to interchange ideas and
opinions, but to prevent the delivery and purchase of goods and thereby
to force the employer to comply with the union's wishes. Union members will not pass the picket line regardless of their relation to the
employer. Customers naturally are reluctant to deal with an embattled
business. "The only intellectual conviction to which picketing leads is
22Thornhill v. Alabama, Supra, at p. 103.

23 Bakery and Pastry Workers v. Wohl, Supra, at p. 776.
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the understanding that if the picketed enterprise does not give in, it
will eventually wish it had." 24
The realization that picketing is basically coercive in nature and,
for that reason, that it must be regulated in terms of such principles
of the law of torts as lawful purpose, just cause, and proper parties
caused the Wisconsin Supreme Court to sustain sections 111.06(2)
(b) and (e) as constitutional. The Ritter, Allen-Bradley, and Wohl
cases indicate that the United States Supreme Court is now appreciative of the true character of picketing. If Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board comes before the United States
Supreme Court, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be
affirmed and sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) will be declared
constitutional.
THOMAS McDERmoT.

24

Gregory, "Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech," 26 A.B.A.J. (1940),
at 710.
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Criminal Law-Criminal Responsibility of Proprietor of Tavern
for Illegal Sales of Operator in Proprietor's Absence.-Defendant,
a tavern keeper holding a Retail Class B liquor license, had in his
employ a bartender, who was licensed as an operator pursuant to
Sec. 66.05 Wisconsin Statutes. He was convicted of violation of Sec.
176.05(3) Wisconsin Statutes requiring taverns to be closed for business between 1 A.M. and 8 A.M. of each day, and was fined $1.00 and
costs. On June 13, 1942, at 2:08 A.M., the bartender had sold liquor
while the defendant was absent from his establishment. Defendant,
on appeal, contended that he was not criminally responsible for the
act of his bartender when he was not present at the time of the act,
because Sec. 176.05(11) Wisconsin Statutes imposes upon the operator licensee the responsibility for acts of all persons serving as waiters
or in any other manner any fermented malt beverages or intoxicating
liquor to customers; that in the absence of the proprietor licensee the
operator licensee on the premises assumes the responsibility and control. It was held that a sale of liquor by a licensed operator during the
proprietor licensee's absence does not relieve the proprietor, since
intent is not the controlling element and the licensing of an operator
in the proprietor licensee's employ is a method of further regulation
and not a means of relieving the proprietor licensee from liability.
State v. Grams, 6 N.W. (2d) 191 (Wis. 1942).
Since the middle of the 19th century courts in England and America have repeatedly held that criminal intent, or "mens rea" is not
required to convict a person of offenses which imperil or jeopordize
the public welfare,-crimes that are police offenses of a regulatory
nature with punishment less severe than prison sentences. Crimes that
do not require "mens rea" include such offenses as illegal sales of
intoxicating liquor; sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; sales
of misbranded articles; violations of anti-narcotic acts; criminal nuisances; violations of traffic regulations; violations of motor-vehicle
laws; and violations of general police regulations, passed for the
safety, health, or well-being of the community. Cases on this subject
are legion. The following decisions illustrate the point: A butcher was
found guilty of a crime who sold adulterated food without knowledge
of the fact that the food was diseased. Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation, 2 K.B. 471. In 1861 a defendant was convicted for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor although he neither knew nor supposed the beverage to be intoxicating. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2
Allen 160 (Mass.). Defendant company was held responsible for permitting its cars to be run without rear lights, as required by statute,
with no proof of guilty knowledge. Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dun-
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ning, 2 K.B. 599. A seller was convicted for the sale of oleomargarine
though he had no knowledge that he was selling oleomargarine. State v.
Ro'iers, 95 Maine 94, 49 Atl. 564 (1901). And, when in violation of a
statute the defendant unknowingly employed a child under the age of
fourteen, it was held knowledge was not an essential ingredient of the
crime and defendant might be punished for the act alone. Kendall v.
State, 148 N.E. 367.
The promiscuous and unregulated sale of intoxicating liquor is so
obviously contrary to public safety and morals that the legislatures of
the states have acted on their police power in restricting traffic in liquor.
Weinberg v. Kluxnesky, 236 Wis. 99, 294 N.W. 530 (1940). The public
safety and welfare so far outweigh the right of an individual to absolvence from punishment for a crime committed without intent that decisions are accepted as correct and necessary which hold against the
defendant proprietor for sales of intoxicating liquor, even when he is
not present at the time of the sale. In State v. Holm, 201 Minn. 53, 275
N.W. 401 (1937), the court said that proof that the sale with the liquor
dealer's knowledge or consent is unnecessary to sustain conviction of
a dealer for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, it being sufficient if
the sale is shown to have been made by the dealer's employees or
servants. The same principle underlying such decisions was expressed
by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Schull, 279 N.W.
241 in the following language: "In the prohibition or punishment of
particular acts, the state may in the maintenance of a public policy
provide that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will
not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance. Many
instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise
of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute
is evidently upon the achievement of some social betterment rather
than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se." Regulations prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to minors (the violation for which defendants were punished in the cases cited above) and
regulations requiring retail establishments of the Class B type to be
closed during certain hours as in State v. Grams, supra, appear to come
within the same category.
Certainly the desire and necessity of protecting the public furnishes sufficient ground for the court's decision holding the proprietor
of a tavern responsible for the conduct of his business, whether he is
present or not, and the Wisconsin court obviously was motivated by
this consideration, as was the court in State v. Sobeiman, 199 Minn.
232, when it said statutes are to be so construed as to suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy, to promote rather than defeat the
purpose of the legislation.
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However, when consideration is given to the agency aspect of
State v. Grams, supra, some doubt might arise as to the soundness of
the decision. Reference is made in the decision to several Wisconsin
cases, holding the proprietor for acts of his agent, during the absence
of the owner. Conlin v. Wausau, 137 Wis. 311, 118 N.W. 810, was
decided in 1908; Reismier v. State, 148 Wis. 593, 135 N.W. 153, in
1912; and Olson v. State, 143 Wis. 413, 127 N.W. 975, in 1910. At the
time these cases were decided employees of the proprietor were not
required to be. licensed, so obviously the only way to control the sale
of intoxicating liquor was to hold the owner of the establishment as
principal for the wrongful acts of his agent.
In 1933 Wisconsin passed the law requiring an operator's license
for "any person who shall draw or remove any fermented malt beverage for sale or consumption from any barrel, keg, cask, bottle or
other container in which fermented malt beverages shall be stored or
kept on premises requiring a Class B license, for sale or service to a
consumer for consumption in or upon the premises where sold."
Sec. 66.05 (10) (a) (6) Wis. Stat., 1941. The requirements for
an operator are the same as for a proprietor licensee as to
character, citizenship and residency. Sec. 66.05 (10)
(i)
(1)
and Sec. 66;05 (10) (g) (1) Wis. Stat., 1941. And, under Sec.
66.05(10) (i)(2) it is arguable that both the operator and proprietor
are on a par as to responsibility since it says "there shall be upon
premises operated under a Class B license, at all times, the licensee or
some person who shall have an operator's license and who shall be
responsible for the acts of all persons serving as waiters, or in any other
manner, any fermented malt beverages to customers. No person other
than the licensee shall serve fermented malt beverages in any place
operated under the Class B license unless he shall possess an operator's
license, or unless he shall be under the immediate supervision of the
licensee or a person holding an operator's license, who shall be at the
time of such service upon said premises." Sec. 176.05(11), entitled
"Restrictions on Premises Under Retail "Class A" or "Class B" license,
contains almost word for word the same language as Sec. 66.05(10)
(i) (2). It is conceivable that the legislature meant that in the absence
of the proprietor licensee the operator licensee is no longer his agent
and that the operator assumes responsibility for his own acts and those
of others working under him and that the proprietor licensee would
not be responsible for violations committed in his absence.
However, when various other sections of the Wisconsin Statutes
are examined, they compel the conclusion that the intent of the jegislature was to place primary emphasis and responsibility on the proprietor
licensee and not on the operator licensee. For instance: A retailer (who
is the proprietor licensee) shall mean any person who shall sell, barter,
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exchange, offer for sale or have in posession with intent to sell any
fermented malt beverages [Sec. 66.05(10) (a) (4)], while an operator shall be one who merely draws or removes any fermented malt beverage for sale or consumption [Sec. 66.05(10)(a)]. The license fee
for a Class B retail license shall be determined by the city, village or
town in which said licensed premises are located but shall not exceed
$100 per year [Sec. 66.05(10) (g) (2)], while the fee for an operator
is not to exceed $5.00 per year [Sec. 66.05(10) (i) (3)], thereby implying that an operator's position and a proprietor's as to accountability
for offenses on the premises are not comparable. The proprietor
licensee is required by Sec. 66.05(10)(g)(4) to display a sign disclosing the brand of beer served, and shall not substitute any other
brand for that so designated. No similar duty is placed on the operator.
Certainly, then, the proprietor licensee is the one on whom falls the
responsibility for keeping the premises closed during the hours designated in Sec. 176.06(3), and is the one who is to be in active control
and supervision of his premises, to such a degree that he cannot
escape punishment because the operator was also licensed. As said in
Hershorn v. People, 113 P. 2nd 680 (1941), "Hershorn cannot escape
guilt by attempting to shift the crime to his employee and must stand
or fall with those who acted for him. So long as he has the management, direction and supervision of the busintess and place in which
liquor was being sold, he assumes the risk of criminal liability when his
agents, working under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence,
sold liquor" contrary to statute. Even'in Sec. 176.05(11) the language
implies that the requirement is primarily directed toward the proprietor
licensee by the very wording of the statute.
Not only the language of the statute, but the safeguard of public
morals and public policy suggest that any attempt to relieve the proprietor of responsibility for acts done in his establishment and to
weaken the long line of decisions which hold him for acts done in
his absence and against his instructions be frowned upon. Were the
operator licensee alone responsible for a sale of liquor after hours, an
unscrupulous proprietor might hire equally unscrupulous operators to
serve liquor after 1 A.M. in a Class B retail establishment, take a
chance on not being apprehended at once, reap a nice profit for afterhour sales, and in turn promise to pay the operator's fine if and when
he be arrested. After the removal of the first operator, he might be
followed by a second and a third,---thus allowing a scheme for putting
money into the pocket of the proprietor unlawfully, while he went
"Scott free," except for the possible payment of an occasional fine, in
fulfillment of his part of an illegal bargain. Needless to say, such procedure would defeat the purpose of the legislation and would be cer-
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tainly contrary to proper conceptions of correct control and regulation
of the liquor business.
With a decision such as State v. Grams, supra, as law, proprietor
licensees will find it behooves them to hire only honest, reliable operators who will obey all provisions of the law, in order to protect themselves from prosecution.
JANE O'MELIA.

Federal Procedure-Applicability of Discovery Procedure under
Federal Rules to the United States.--In an action by the United
States, the General Motors Corporation and others were charged with
engaging in conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce. The defendants answered and filed forty-five interrogatories under Rule 33 of the
Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following Sec. 723c, which
they asked the government to answer. It was contended by the Government that Rule 33 "substitutes interrogatories for a bill of discovery"; that the United States has never consented to be a defendant
in such a bill, or to answer interrogatories; and that the rule substantially changes legal rights. The court held that while an action does
not lie against a sovereign except by consent and while the United
States could not be compelled to make discovery in an action brought
for that purpose, still the government in bringing a civil action against
an individual may be subjected to the ordinary rules governing procedure in the court in which the suit is brought and that, accordingly,
the Government could be required to answer the interrogatories.
United States v. General Motor Corporation,2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill.
E.D. 1942).
In the instant case, the court pointed out that although Rule 33
does not specifically include the United States as subject to it, the fact
that Rule 37(f) which provides that the payment of attorney's fees
imposed for failure to answer interrogatories are not to be imposed on
the United States, shows that Rule 33 was meant to apply to the
United States. It might further be pointed out that a reading of the
Federal Rules as a whole indicates that they were meant generally to
apply to the Government as well as any other party to a civil action.
Rule 12 specifically extends the time within which the United States
may plead to sixty days. Rule 4 makes an exception of the United
States in the procedure of service of process on the United States.
And most imperative is Rule 81 wherein all the exceptions to the
Rules are cited: and nowhere in Rule 81 is the United States exempt
from the general application of the Rules. And furthermore, the cases
have consistently held that in a civil action the United States takes
the same position as any other private suitor. United States v. National
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City Bank of New York (C.C.A., N.Y., 1936) 83 F. (2d) 236; Pollen
v. Ford Instrument Co. (United States, Intervener) (D.C. N.Y. E.D.,
1939) 26 F. Supp. 583; In re Construction Material Corp., (D.C., D.
Del. 1936) 18 F. Supp. 509; United States v. Standard Oil Co., (D.C.
S.D. Cal. N.D. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 645.
Some consideration should perhaps be given to the contention of
the Government in the instant case to the effect that Rule 33 "substitutes interrogatories for a bill of discovery" and that the United States
has never consented to be a defendant in such a bill. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, Equity Rule 58 governed the procedure for
obtaining discovery before trial both in suits in equity in which some
relief other than discovery was sought, and in suits in equity brought
solely for discovery in aid of an action at law. And the practice of the
states permitting discovery were not applicable in actions at law in
the Federal Courts since it was held that this field was preempted by
federal statutes. Ex parte Fisk (1855) 113 U.S. 713, 5 S.Ct. 724, 28
L.Ed. 1117; Carpenter v. Winn, (1911) 221 U.S. 533, 31 S.Ct. 683,
55 L.Ed. 842. Discovery before trial in an action at law could be obtained by filing a bill in equity for discovery in aid of an action at
law. And the party seeking to obtain the discovery had to make the
opposing party a defendant to the bill in equity. Here seems to be the
basis for the Government's objection to Rule 33 in the instant case.
The suit in equity to obtain a discovery was an action separate and
distinct from the action at law which such suit was supposed to aid.
Rule 33 embodied for the most part the substance of Equity Rule
58. But under the Federal Rules there are no suits in equity or actions
at las as such, but only civil actions. Thus, in a civil action formerly
denominated legal or equitable, it is not necessary to institute a separate action for discovery, but either party may obtain discovery before
trial either by taking depositions upon oral examination or upon written interrogatories or by serving written interrogatories upon each
adverse party. Federal Rules 26 to 33. However, while the new rules
render the ancient bill of discovery obsolete for most purposes, still
it seems that a bill for discovery would in substance be a proper proceeding under the Federal Rules where the plaintiff cannot without it
find out whom he should sue since the Rules do not provide for discovery before the filing of the complaint. Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Union Pac. R. Co., (S.D. N.Y., 1917) 240 Fed. 135 and 241 Fed. 964;
Arms & Drury, Inc. v. Burg, (C.A.D.C., 1937) 90 F. 2d 400.
While the court in the instant case makes Rule 33 applicable to the
United States, there is no implication that there are no limits to discovery by a party adverse to the United States. In United States v. Hartmann, (D.C. E.D. Pa., 1942) 2 F.R.D. 477, the Government brought
proceedings for the cancelation of the defendant's naturalization. The
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United States claimed that in his oath of allegiance the defendant made
representations which were false and fraudulent in that, at the time
he took the oath, he did not renounce allegiance to Germany but fraudulently reserved it. The defendant moved for a bill of particulars. The
court held that although the office of the bill of particulars is fast
becoming obsolete because of the easily available and effective discovery
procedure, the motion for the bill of particulars would be granted and
the defendant would not be required to resort to the discovery procedure. On this point the court said: "There is of course always the
choice between a more definite statement in the complaint and disclosure in discovery proceedings. I can see serious objections to allowing the usual sweeping discovery in a case like the present. I think
it much the wiser course to proceed with an amplified statement of the
charge, sufficient to give the defendant a fair opportunity to prepare
for trial, and with as little searching into government evidence later
on as many be possible without doing injustice to the defendant."
ANTHONY J. PALASZ.

Statutes - Filling Vacancy in Office of Governor. - Orland S.
Loomis, having been elected governor of Wisconsin by defeating the
incumbent Julius P. Heil at the November election in 1942, died after
certificate of election had been issued to him but before he had taken
the oath of office. Walter S. Goodland was elected lieutenant governor
in the same election. An original action for a declaratory judgment
was brought in the Supreme Court to determine who was entitled to
exercise the powers of the governor during the term for which the
deceased had been elected. It was held that under the provisions of
the Wisconsin Constitution the powers, duties and functions of the
office of governor devolved upon the lieutenant governor, and not on
the incumbent. State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, et al., 7 N.W. (2d) 375
(Wis. 1942).
In reaching this vital conclusion the Court took into consideration
four main question:
(1) Did the incumbent hold over beyond his two year term of
office ?
(2) If the incumbent did hold over was it only until a special
election for governor was held?
(3)
If the incumbent did not hold over could he appoint a successor as governor?
(4) Did the lieutenant governor-elect succeed to the powers and
duties of the governor?
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Due to the dearth of controlling authority the Court based its
decision primarily on a reasonable interpretation of the Wisconsin
Constitution and on the debates and proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention. For this reason, the arguments of the incumbent, the
lieutenant governor-elect, and the amici cureae, as to what the constitutional interpretation should be, will be reviewed rather than the few
decisions which are persuasive but none of which are directly in point.

(1) DID

THE INCUMBENT

HoLD OvER

BEYOND

His Two YEA

TERM OF OFFICE?

The applicable provision of the Wisconsin Constitution is Article V,
Section I. "The executive power shall be vested in a governor who
shall hold his office for two years; a lieutenant governor shall be elected
at the same time and for the same term."
It was argued on behalf of the lieutenant governor that the above
clause provides clearly and unambiguously that Governor Heil's term
was to last no longer than two years; that in the absence of the clause
"and until his successor is elected and qualified" there was no constitutional authority for extending the two-year term of the incumbent.
For the latter it was contended that it would be his legal duty to
refuse to give up the office of governor to any one except a lawfully
chosen successor; that is, one chosen as governor and not for some
other office. This argument was based on the premise that where the
written law contains no provision, either express or implied, to the
contrary, an officer holds his office until his successor is elected and
qualified. The incumbent relied also on the case of State ex rel. Pluntz
v. Johnson, 176 Wis. 107, 184 N.W. 683 (1922) where the court construed a constitutional provision that a sheriff should be "chosen by the
electors of the respective counties once in every two years" (Article VI,
Section 4) to mean that one elected sheriff could hold over until a sucessor was elected and qualified. As regards this case, however, the lieutenant governor claimed a distinction in that there is no constitutional
provision for a "lieutenant sheriff" who is authorized to discharge the
duties of the sheriff in case of a vacancy in that office. Thus, if the
sheriff were not permitted to hold over there would be a suspension
of official functions, which situation could not arise as to the governorship since the Constitution has provided for the devolution of the
powers upon a lieutenant governor.

(2) IF THE INCUMBENT DID HOLD OVER WAS IT ONLY UNTIL
A SPECIAL ELECTION WAS HELD?

For the lieutenant governor-elect it was proposed that the constitutional provision as to the election of a lieutenant governor leaves
no room for contemplating a special election. Sec. 7.01(4) Wis. Stats. in
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providing for special elections to fill vacancies in certain elective offices
expressly excepts the offices of governor and lieutenant governor.
Attorneys for incumbent argued that although Section 7.01(4) excepts
the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, Section 7.02, providing
for special elections in particular cases, does not so except these offices
and provides that an election shall be held "when the governor, in his
discretion, directs such an election to fill any vacancy not provided for
by this section and section 7.01." Thus the incumbent would be authorized to call a special election. On behalf of the lieutenant governor it
was contended that no special election could be directed until there was
a vacancy, that there was no vacancy as long as the present governor
continued to be governor, and that after he ceased to be governor he
would no longer have power to direct an election.
(3)

IF THE INCUMBENT DID NOT HOLD OVER COULD HE
APPOINT A SUCCESSOR AS GOVERNOR?

Here the proponents for the lieutenant governor relied to some

extent on the same argument as that presented in opposition to the
calling of a special election by the incumbent-that there could be no
vacancy in the office of governor until after the present incumbent
ceased to be governor, that the present incumbent's authority would
have ceased before a vacancy occurred and as a result he would
have no power to appoint a successor. State v. Roden, 219 Wis. 132,
262 N.W. 629 (1935) was cited as authority for the rule that an
appointment may not be made to fill an anticipated vacancy which will
not occur until after the one making the appointment has relinquished
his authority.
For the incumbent it was argued that under Article XIII, Section
10 of the Wisconsin Constitution ("The legislature may declare the
cases in which any office shall be deemed vacant, and the manner of
filling the vacancy, where no provision is made for that purpose in the
Constitution.") the legislature has been given extensive power to
provide for the filling of vacancies; that it has made a provision allowing appointment by the governor of a lieutenant governor to fill a
vacancy in that office (Section 17.27(4) Wis. Stats. as construed in
State ex rel Martin v. Ekern, 228 Wis. 645, 280 N.W. 393 (1938);
and that this same provision, since it would authorize the appointment
of an officer upon whom the governor's duties might devolve, would
also authorize the appointment of a man to fill the office of governor
itself.
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(4) Dm THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR-ELECT SUCCEED TO THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE GOVERNOR?

This is probably the most important of all the questions presented
to the court. The applicable provision of the Constitution is Article
V, Section 7. "In case of the impeachment of the governor, or his
removal from office, death, inability from mental or physical disease,
resignation, or absence from the state, the powers and duties of the
office shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for the residue of the
term or until the governor, absent or impeached, shall have returned,
or the disability shall cease."
Among the many problems presented by this provision are the following: What is meant by the "residue" of the term? Does the word
"governor" as used in the clause include a governor-elect? Does the
fact that some of the contingencies listed in the clause cannot apply
to a governor-elect mean that the provision was not intended to apply
to a governor-elect?
The term "residue," it was argued on behalf of the lieutenant
governor, may refer to the whole or any part of the term. It is intended
merely to limit the time in which the lieutenant governor may act to
the governor's two year term; and is not intended to mean that a portion of the term must have elapsed. Also it was contended that "goernor-elect" may well be included in the term "governor" as used in
the constitutional provision* since "governor-elect" is a statutory and
not a constitutional word. Section 7 might reasonably be taken to include one who was elected governor and who had not qualified. One
of the amicus cureae briefs stated the proposition that Mr. Loomis,
the deceased governor-elect, "was not elected to become governor, he
was elected governor." As to the contingencies on the happening of
which the duties of the governor devolve upon the lieutenant governor
it was argued that the fact that some would apply only to a governor
who has qualified (as impeachment or removal from office) does not
mean that the other contingencies are so limited.
Another argument on behalf of the lieutenant governor was this:
that the people have elected the lieutenant governor with the knowledge
that he might become governor; that they intended him as a substitute
in the event that the man who was elected governor could not act; and
that the lieutenant governor had to become acting governor if the
will of the people was to be given expression.
The incumbent contended, on the other hand, that the term "residue" as used in Article V, Section 7 should be taken strictly, to mean
that a term had been commenced and interrupted. They also contended
that a governor-elect is not included in the term "governor"; and that
the contingencies as provided in the Constitution are only such as may
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occur after the term of governor has been commenced. The decision
in State v. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38 upholds this viewpoint.
The Supreme Court's decision was not based entirely on the exact
wording of the constitution and of the statutes. "It is extremely important in the interpretation of constitutional provisions," the court
says, "that we avoid determinations based purely on technical or verbal
argument and that we seek to discover the true spirit and intent of the
provisions examined." Thus, where a constitutional clause presents
reasonable ground for difference it must be interpreted in a sense which
will bring out the meaning intended by those who adopted the clause.
This case is especially interesting not only because its decision is
vital to so many people but also because, being without precedent, its
decision is based chiefly upon interpretation rather than citation and
upon argumentation rather than quotation-a situation rarely encountered at the present time.
JOAN

MOONAN.

Tort Liability - Charitable Corporations. -Plaintiff brought an
action against the Young Mens' Christian Association of Chicago for
injuries sustained while the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's
hotel, alleging the negligent operation of an elevator in which he was
a passenger. In the trial court the defendant moved to strike the complaint, which motion was granted. The decision of both the Superior
Court of Cook County and of the Illinois Supreme Court was based
upon the fact that the defendant was a charitable corporation and as
such was not liable for personal injuries caused by the negligence of its
servants or agents, although the injured party paid for its service.
Saffron v. Y.M.C.A. of Chicago, 45 N.E. (2d) 555 (Ill. App. 1942).
Generally a charitable corporation has been defined by the courts
as one operated primarily for the benefit of the public rather than for
private gain, but which is not a direct agent of the government. The
fact that the institution receives payment for its services from its beneficiaries does not affect its charitable character so long as the fees are
for the purpose of enabling it to carry out its charitable purposes and
are not for private profit.
A number of the states seem to hold charitable corporations liable
almost as though they were operating for private profit, and the question of tort-liability is no different than in the case of any other corporation. However the great weight of authority cannot be said to favor
such a rule and in many of the states a charitable corporation enjoys
an immunity as to wrongs as to certain classes of persons that a corporation generally does not possess. The conflict among the various
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states is due largely to the variety of theories upon which the decisions
are based.
Many of the courts have based their opinions upon the so-called
doctrine of public policy, giving as their reason that such institutions
are inspired and supported by benevolence, and devote their assets and
energies to the relief for which the corporation was created; and that
common welfare demands that they be encouraged and held exempt
from liability for tort; that to do otherwise would result in discouraging those inclined to contribute to charities and a~ply the funds
especially contributed for a public charitable purpose to objects not
contemplated by the donors, namely, to damage suits. In Vermillion v.
Womens' College of Due West, 10 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916), it
was said that the state is most deeply interested in the preservation of
public charities, and the questions of public policy must be determined
upon the consideration of what on the whole will best promote the
general welfare. Substantially similar was the ruling in Fordyce v.
Womens' Christian Library Asociation, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155
(1906).
This public policy theory has been disapproved in a number of cases.
In Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110
N.W. 951 (1907), the defendant church was held liable for injuries
to an employee of a contractor under a contract for decorating its
church building, the injury having been caused by the negligence of
the agents of the defendants in furnishing a defective scaffolding.
Closely connected with the public policy theory is the doctrine of a
trust fund upon which many of the earlier cases based their decisions.
Under the doctrine it was determined that a charity fund could not be
used to compensate injured persons because such compensation would
tend to divert the fund to purposes not intended by the donors, and
because it would frustrate the purposes of the creators of the fund.
Generally this doctrine has been repiudiated in the United States; it is
said in 13 Ruling Case Law, p. 945, Sec. 9:
"In answer to this argument, however, it has been said that
while the public has an interest in the maintenance of a great
public charity, it also has an interest in obliging every person and
corporation which undertakes the performance of a duty to
perform it carefully, and to that extent, therefore, it has an
interest against exempting any person and any such corporation
from liability for its negligence, and that moreover, it is solely
for the legislature, and not for the courts, to say that the former
interest is so supreme that the latter must be sacrificed to it."
In the case of Downes v. Harper Hospital,110 Mich. 555, 60 N.W.
42 (1894), it was held that a corporation organized and maintained
for no private gain, but for the purpose of care and medical treatment
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of the sick and to that end to manage a trust fund created for that purpose, cannot be made liable for injuries sustained by a patient by reason of the negligent acts of its managers and employees. Here the
decision was based upon an implied contract with the person injured
that he would assume the risk of such torts as may be committed by
the charitable institution whose benefits he was receiving. Both in the
Bruce case supra, and in Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 Atl.
120 (1912), the plaintiff was not a beneficiary of the trust administered
by the defendant, but was an employee of the defendant's contractor or
of the defendant itself.
Also charitable corporations have been held liable for injuries to
their employees, since they are not the recipients of the benefits of the
charity. Hughes v. President and Directors of Georgetown College,
33 F. Supp. 867 (D.C. D.C., 1940).
The administrator of the estate of a beneficiary of a charitable
institution, organized solely for public benefit, recovered damages for
the negligence of a nurse when a patient, in a delirium, jumped from
a second story window and was killed. The court based its decision on
the theory that immunity to the charitable institution for the tort of its
servant would compel the person injured to contribute the amount of
his loss to the charity against his will, and that this could not be
regarded as socially desirable nor consistent with sound policy, especially in view of the hardship which would result to the widow and
children in such a case. Mulliner v. EvangelischerKiakenneissenverein
of Minn. Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of North America, 144
Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920).
In Daniels v. Rahway Hospital, 10 N.J. Misc. 585, 160 Atl. 644
(1932), the plaintiff, in driving his automobile upon a public highway,
was a complete stranger to the charity. He was involved in a collision
with the driver of the defendant's ambulance and the defendant's agent
was found to have been negligent. The court, in awarding damages,
felt that no one, no matter how elevated his motive or how humane his
purpose should be permitted to set up and operate the machinery of his
charitable organization with impunity to injure by negligence those
unconcerned in and unrelated to that which the donor brought into
being.
The doctrine perhaps most generally recognized by the courts is the
implied-waiver doctrine, that is, waiver by acceptance of benefits; this
doctrine applies only to the beneficiaries of charitable institutions. In
the case of Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917),
the Wisconsin court based its decision upon the doctrine that a hospital
performs a quasi-governmental function, and for that reason the doctrine or respondeat superior does not apply. The court in deciding the
case of Bachman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922),
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followed the Morrison case, supra, and was of the opinion that because
of the purposes, nature, and functions of the Y.W.C.A., master and
employer of the negligent employee, the liability for the accident must
rest on the negligent individual where it primarily belongs. In effect,
the Wisconsin cases hold that the doctrine of immunity of a public
charitable institution from liability to a beneficiary within its walls
from the negligent acts of its servants, under the principle of respondeat superior, is applicable as well to one who is a stranger not
receiving the services or benefits from the institution. In its firm holding to immunity, the Wisconsin court goes so far as to exempt the
charitable institution from liability even in the negligent selection of
its employees. In the case of Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Society of Wisconsin, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935), the court
reasoned that since a charitable hospital is exempt from liability for the
negligent acts of its employees committed upon its patients, it should
also be exempt from liability for negligence of its managing officers in
selecting such incompetent employees. Some courts have held that
although the liability of the charity for all torts of its agents cannot
be upheld, it is liable if there is negligence in the selection of such
agents and employees. This is directly in conflict with the Schumacher
case supra. In that case the court said,
"Precisely the same reason lies for the exemption in both
cases, and it lies precisely to the same extent."
It would appear therefore that in Wisconsin there is immunity of
charitable institutions under all circumstances. However, there is an
exception where the charitable institution has failed to comply with
the statute requiring the maintenance of a safe public building for
employees and frequenters. Sec. 101.01, 101.06, Wis. Stat. (1941). The
above statutes were held to be applicable to religious corporations
regulating liability to one attending a church luncheon who was injured
on an unlighted stairway. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Reformation of Milwaukee, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930).
The state of Minnesota having a similar statute, sustained the liability
of the charitable association for injury caused by contact with machinery not guarded as required by statute.. Mclverny v. St. Luke's Hospital
Association, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).

RAzy G. KLErEcKA.

BOOK REVIEWS
Municipalitiesand the Law in Action. Charles S. Rhyne ,Editor.
Published by the National Institute of Municipal Law Offices, Washington, D.C. Price $7.50.
This 600 page book is not a case-book, not a digest. It is rather
a compilation of legal opinions, treatises and discussions on the law
applicable to munipalities which are obliged to depart from ordinary
municipal problems and perform a variety of undertakings in aid of
the national war effort. It contains articles on numerous special
problems and questions of policy confronting local municipalities.
The editor has included papers by many able and experienced city
counsel for large, medium and small cities of the 48 states.
There are many valuable and practical suggestions on the course
to be pursued by municipalities in matters affecting civilian defense; state and local defense councils; air raids, black-outs and
dim-outs, not only for the coastal cities but also for interior localities; leaves of absence, reinstatement, seniority and annuity rights
of city employes entering the armed forces; new revenue and financial problems of cities incident to war activities; defense public
housing and the taxation problems incident thereto, and payments
by the federal government of sums in lieu of taxes; war damage
insurance; the attempted federal control of municipal salaries and
wages; the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board over disputes between municipalities and their organized employes; compensation
for injuries to private persons participating in civilian defense activities; the legal problems of tax exemption for federally owned
and leased establishments for the manufacture of war munitions
and supplies; absentee voting by members of the various branches
of the armed services; priorities on critical construction and operating materials and equipment needed by municipalities; the unusual demands on local public health service for the prevention of
absenteeism by war workers and the control of venereal diseases
in cities adjacent to military camps; the varied demands for modification of the city zoning and building restrictions; the mixed federal and local control of municipal airports; public and privately
owned utilities, including local transportation facilities; rental control; federal legislation bearing on the competitive bidding statutes
applicable to cities and their boards and commissions and city planning for post war emergencies and the accumulation of state,
county and city surplus funds for post war public improvement construction to aid in relieving the anticipated unemployment and depression conditions most likely to be prevalent in the period of adjustment
from war economy to peace.
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This material is based on one year's war experience of cities
since Pearl Harbor. It contains reliable information on existing federal wartime statutes and a summary of pending legislation that
will affect municipalities.
Old and recent court decisions are cited on many issues of law,
especially relating to the powers and limitations of power of federal
and state and local governments, particularly in reference to the
dual sovereignty of the United States and the several states. The
book is well-planned and indexed and should be a handy ready reference for every city and county attorney in the land. It should be
of great assistance to the federal officials, military and civil, whose
positions require contact with city authorities; it should have a
wide appeal to the bar, public officials and the public generally.
It is beyond the province of this review to enumerate or discuss
the many subjects and questions covered in the book, but we can
state unreservedly that any lawyer, either serving the public or in
private practice, faced with a legal problem involving wartime activities of municipalities will find this book to be of invaluable aid.
OmAR T. McMaHom*

A Permanent United Nations-Amos Peaslee. G. P. Putnams and
Son, N. Y., 1942. Pp. 146. $2.50.
One of the most discussed questions today, that of a permanent
united nations, is the topic of Mr. Amos Peaslee's'new book. The author
is neither pessimistic nor optimistic but he does present one of the best
arguments in favor of a permanent world government that has been
seen recently.
Mr. Peaslee, who is a recognized authority on international law and
who has been an American representative at many international conferences including the one at Versailles, first makes an historical review
of the various methods employed by nations to formulate international
policy, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia up to the latest Pan
American conferences and, most recently, the Atlantic Charter. He
points out rather emphatically that the failure in the past, and the
possible collapse in the future, lies in the absence of a real world government-self-sustaining and powerful enough to enforce its laws.
Mere treaties, mere contracts are not enough; it must be government.
The author outlines a suggested form of government. It should be
democratic in form, he says, and should consist of a legislature, a
judiciary and an executive office. Although Mr. Peaslee speaks against
*Assistant City Attorney, Milwaukee.
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representation based on blocs or groups of nations such as the Balkan
states, the slavic states or the English speaking countries, he does not
make himself quite clear, it seems, as to the basis of representation he
would himself favor. This is perhaps the weakest point in his argument
for the practicability of his plan. Further, the author suggests a World
Court with jurisdiction confirmed to international disputes and an
executive office with police power to enforce court judgments and
legislative acts. The punishment for a gross violation of international
law by any nation should be the loss of nationality: just as a criminal
is deprived of citizenship so should a criminal nation be deprived of
nationality. The argument, however analogically correct, remains nevertheless doubtful since the duration of the penalty and the definition of
gross violation of international law remain far too obscure. Finally,
the basis for the entire government should be a written constitution
with a specific bill of rights for the individual nations.
No author could attempt to write this kind of book without exposing
himself to much adverse, if not severe, criticism. But Mr. Peaslee, it
is reiterated, is no optimist. He is no "quack" doctor treating international diseases with a "cure-all" patent medicine. He expects nations
to be slow and even reluctant to accept a superstructural world government. But he insists, and quite reasonably so, that now if ever, after
the errors of the past, with the myth of isolationism destroyed and
with the interdependence of nations admitted almost as axiomatic, the
nations of the world are ready to make this last step.
ANTHONY PALASZ.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES
NORMAN BAKER*

A

POLICY of life insurance is a contract to pay money upon the

happening of an event. It is a chose in action and the general
principles of law relating to assignments of choses in action are
applicable. It is everywhere assignable except as restricted by law,
by the provisions of the policy, or by collateral agreement.
The contract of life insurance has its own characteristics. A
distinguishing characteristic is that it must involve an actual "insurance risk." I Its purpose is to relieve one or more from loss that
may result from the untimely death of the insured. It, therefore,
has its beneficiaries who are the persons to be protected, and in its
most frequent form is a contract between the insurer and insured
for the benefit of persons not parties to it.
*LL.B., University of Wisconsin 1895; former Assistant District Attorney, representing Milwaukee County in civil matters; Assistant Counsel, Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Company.
'Helvering, Commissioner, v. Edith LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 85 L.Ed. 996, 61 S.Ct.
646 (1941).
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If it were not for this feature of protection from loss resulting
from insured's death, the contract would be a wager based upon
the length of another's life, with no other incentive on the part of
the beneficiary than to win the wager, and everywhere contrary to
public policy. Therefore, every policy of life insurance must be
based upon an insurable interest in the life of the insured.
Naturally the power to appoint beneficiaries is vested in the insured by the form of the policy, either subject to revocation and
change or not as may be provided. The policy vests various other
powers in the insured, such as to borrow the reserve upon or surrender the policy for its cash surrender value, to determine how
dividends upon the policy shall be paid or applied, to determine
whether the proceeds shall be paid in cash at maturity or in installments under specified methods of settlement offered to insured and
to the beneficiary if the power has not been exercised by insured.
Any or all of these powers may be waived or may be vested in the
beneficiary who takes out the policy or the beneficiary appointed
by, or the transferee of, the insured.
These and other characteristic features or provisions of the
policy must be considered in applying general principles of law in
respect to the assignment of choses in action. The problems presented to the insurer by assignments of policies generally involve
some of these characteristics or special provisions of the contract
and this paper is directed particularly to such problems.
RESTRICTIONS

In a few of the states no assignment of a policy to one having no
insurable interest in the life of the insured is permitted or valid. In some
of these states the insured may not designate as beneficiary or assign
the policy to one not having an insurable interest in his life even though
he continues to control the policy and to pay premiums upon it.2 In
other states a transfer of a policy to those having no insurable interest
in insured's life is not invalid where the insured continues to pay the
premiums upon it.3
But in most of the states it is considered that as the insured has
an insurable interest in his own life, he may transfer a policy taken
out by him in good faith upon his life, to anyone he chooses either
with or without an insurable interest; and that continuity of insur2 Griffin

v. McCoach et al., 123 F. (2d) 550 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) ; National Life and
Accident Insurance Co. v. French, 144 S.W. (2d) 653, (Texas 1940) ; Newton
v. Hick's Adm'r. 282 Ky. 226, 138 S.W. (2d) 329 (1940).
3 Weresozinski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 83, 14 A. (2d) 279 (1940) ; Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Slade et al., 47 Fed. Supp. 219 (D.C. Ky., 1942);
Allen v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 228 Mo. App. 18, 62 S.W. (2d) 916 (1933).
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able interest is not necessary, and, therefore, in all cases where the
policy when issued is based upon an insurable interest in the life of
the insured, it may thereafter be transferred to anyone even though
the assignee has no insurable interest in the life of the insured. 4
However, if the policy is taken out by the insured pursuant to an
agreement or understanding that it is to be assigned to one having
no insurable interest, it will be considered not taken out by him in
good faith and not supported by the insurable interest insured has
in his own life, and as a mere attempt to evade the requirement of
insurable interest and a wager upon the life of the insured and,
therefore, invalid. 5
There are few attempts of those having no insurable interest to
acquire such invalid insurance. Frequently, however, policies are
applied for which cannot be issued because of lack of insurable interest. For instance, a corporation may desire to acquire policies
on the lives of stockholders to aid in the purchase of their stock in
case of their death and proposes that each stockholder shall take
out insurance upon his own life and assign it to the corporation. As
to the stockholders who are not actually engaged in the business
of the corporation and deemed essential to its success, the corporation has no insurable interest in their lives and cannot in that manner secure and hold such policies.
There are instances of regulatory laws which in some of the
states restrict the transfer of life insurance policies. The purpose
of some of them is to make more secure to married women or wives
of parties insured the right to enjoy the benefits of life insurance
policies. It is not within the scope of this paper to consider such
regulatory laws. Such laws of the various states must ever be borne
in mind, but they present no serious difficulties to the insurer in
determining the rights of the insured and of the beneficiaries.
Arizona, California, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington have community property laws under which property
acquired during coverture with earnings of either spouse or other
community property funds, including policies of life insurance, is
community property; the same is true optionally in Oklahoma. The
community resembles a partnership of which the husband is the
manager. Each spouse has a vested interest in the community property. The husband as manager of the community proper may transfer or assign it for a valuable consideration, but is precluded from
giving it away. Therefore, his designation of beneficiaries under or
4 Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 56 L.Ed. 133. 32 S.Ct. 58 (1911).

5 Wagner v. National Engraving Co., 307 Ill. App. 509, 30 N.E. (2d) 750 (1940);
Banker's Reserve Life Co. v. Matthews, 39 F. (2d) 528, (E.D.S.C. 1941) ; Home

Life Insurance Co. v. Masterson, 180 Ark. 170, 21 S.W. (2d) 414, (1929).
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assignment of community property policies as a gift and not as a
sale for full value is subject to the community property interest of
the wife unless she expressly waives or joins in the transfer of her
interest. Upon dissolution of the community by death of either
spouse, the community property interest of the wife descends to
her children in some of the states and is subject to testamentary
disposition, I believe, in all of them at the present time. If the community is dissolved by divorce, it is made the duty of the court to
divide the community property between the spouses, and in the
absence of such division by the decree, the divorced husband and
wife become owners in common of all property that was community property, including life insurance policies, and the interest
of either is assignable. The result is that the insured may not assign or otherwise dispose of the policy on his life without the concurrence of others interested in the policy-perhaps his children or
his divorced wife or those who have succeeded them in interest. He
may assign his half interest in such a policy.
This law presents difficult questions, for the insurer must make
inquiry concerning various questions, such as whether the policy
was in fact community property or whether by waiver or assignment it has become the separate property of either husband or wife.
And where the policy has become owned in common upon dissolution of the community, serious questions arise under the circumstances, as to the rights of the parties where one of the owners has
voluntarily or pursuant to some understanding paid the premiums
upon the policy.
Perhaps I may refer to the restriction upon the power of the
insured to make a gift inter vivos of a life insurance policy, by the
1942 amendment of Sec. 811(g) of the Internal Revenue Code respecting liability of the proceeds of life insurance, to the estate tax.
This law if valid prescribes that if the insured pays premiums upon
the policy, he can never escape liability of his estate to the estate
tax even though he makes an absolute assignment of the policy. It
is the effect of this law that in proportion to the premiums paid by
him his estate will be liable to an estate tax, even though he had
no incidents of ownership at the time of his death. It is considered
also that even if the wife or someone else takes out the policy and
there has been no transfer of it by the insured, still the insured's
estate will be subject to the estate tax in proportion to the premiums paid by him. This law must be based upon the assumption
that a life insurance policy because its benefits are payable upon
insured's death, is comparable to a testamentary disposition or that
the gift takes effect only upon and by reason of the death of the
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insured. This assumption is inconsistent with the fact. An assignment of a life insurance policy by the insured is immediately effective. The beneficiaries are appointees of the assignee and not of the
insured. There is no transfer that becomes effective upon death.
There is no gift that is not effective immediately upon the assignment. The fact that payment becomes due on the event of death is
not characteristic solely of life insurance policies and that fact has
nothing whatever to do with the question of title tcr the contracts.
The benefits of a policy are not received by the beneficiary because
of the death of the insured, but because the beneficiary has owned
all such benefits from the time of the gift of the policy. It is inconsistent with the law which has always recognized gifts inter vivos
of life insurance policies as perhaps the most common of such gifts.
The decisions of the highest courts unanimously hold that such a
gift is effective at the time it is made and that from such time the
donee is the owner of the policy entitled to all of its benefits and
vested with all its powers, and consequently there is no possible
basis for considering that there is a transfer of benefits from the
insured at or in consequence of his death. This law, it is believed,
is unconstitutional as a violation of rights protected by the 5th
Amendment, because it is an absurd, arbitrary and whimsical discrimination against a single form of property and the owner
thereof.
Restrictions upon the power to assign are frequently found in
policy contracts. 6 A very common one, though generally introduced
into the contract by an endorsement when the policy is transferred
by the insured, is that there shall be no assignment of the policy to
one who does not have an insurable interest in the life of the insured. Sometimes there is in the policy an absolute prohibition of
any assignment of it. It is interesting to note that such a provision
has been held inoperative where the regulatory law declares that
life insurance policies shall be assignable. 7 Frequently policies require that assignments shall be made in a prescribed form or manner or only with the consent of the insured or upon notice to it, or
that the insurer shall not be bound by any assignment unless it is
in writing and filed with the insurer. Such provisions, however, are
generally considered solely for the protection of the insurer and
not to restrict the legal rights of the policyholders to assign in any
manner that the law permits. It is held, therefore, that such provisions may be and frequently are waived by the insurer or that the
informal assignment is valid as between the parties and binds the
6 Immel v. Traveller's Insurance Co.,
7 Cook v. Cook, 111 P. (2d) 322 (Cal.

373 IIl. 256, 26 N.E. (2d) 114 (1940).
1941).
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insurer if it has actual or constructive notice of it. Where the policy
expressly prohibits assignment of it, an assignment may be considered valid as an equitable assignment.8
Such restrictions upon the right to assign the policy do not apply to the matter of assignment of the proceeds after the maturity
of the policy, but the policy may include restrictions upon the
rights of beneficiaries to assign their interests in the proceeds.
Where the insured selects a settlement under which the insurer
holds the proceeds and pays them in installments according to the
settlement, it is a common practice in accordance 'vith a very common desire of the insured to include a provision which precludes
the beneficiaries from either voluntarily or involuntarily alienating
the installments to which they are entitled. The right of an insured
to deprive the beneficiary of any power to assign the benefits is
recognized everywhere and the restriction against voluntary alienation is everywhere valid. But it has been considered in some states
that to prevent involuntary alienation or to preclude creditors of
the beneficiary from reaching installments to which the beneficiary
is entitled, is contrary to public policy. In many of the states there
are enactments which expressly permit provisions to be inserted
that prevent assignments by the beneficiary and his creditors from
reaching the installments to which he is entitled. These statutes, of
course, express the public policy of the state. It is considered that
one should have the right to dispose of his property under such conditions as he chooses. In the states where there is no express authorization for such provision, the insurer is frequently asked to
include it. If the spendthrift trust is in any such state not contrary
to public policy, it may be considered perhaps that the inclusion of
such a provision is valid. It has been so held at least in one case.'
Therefore, it is a practice of insurers to include such a provision
conditioned upon its not being contrary to law. But such a restriction was not enforced where the spendthrift trust had not been
held valid.10
FORMS OF ASSIGNMENT

Conventional forms of written assignments are generally not
necessary. Policies may be assigned absolutely or as security by
parol. n The written assignment may be so informal that it is un8

Klebba v. Struempf, 224 Mo. App. 193, 23 S.W. (2d) 208 (1930).

9 Michaelson

v. Sokolove et al., 169 Md. 529, 182 A. 458 (1936).
10 Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin et al., 131 N.J. Eq., 76, 24 A. (2d) 403
(1942).
31 Sundstrom v. Sundstrom, 129 P. (2d) 783 (Wash. 1942) ; Union Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Broderick et al., 196 Cal. 497, 238 P. 1034 (1925); Opitz v.
Karl 118 Wis. 527, 95 N.W. 948, 62 L.R.A. 982 (1903) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 226
S.W. 447 (Tex. Civil App. 1920) ; Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Sailor, 47
F. (2d) 911 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1930).
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certain whether an assignment or a change of beneficiary is intended. Sometimes it is held that the instrument is operative as a
request for the change of beneficiary, although it is not valid as an
assignment, and on the contrary it has been held that an informal
instrument intended to effect a change of beneficiary, but not valid
in view of the prescribed method for changing the beneficiary, is
effective as an assignment. It may not be effective as either. This,
however, is purely a matter of construction of the instrument. To
be valid the assignment must be made in accordance with the requirements of the law. To be valid as a change of beneficiary, it
must comply with the method prescribed in the policy for changing
the beneficiary. It must be borne in mind that the right to designate
or change the beneficiary is the right to exercise a contract power
to appoint, reserved to the policyholder by the provisions of the
policy, and it, therefore, must be exercised in accordance with the
method prescribed by the policy for effecting the change.' The
right to exercise such power is unilateral. An assignment, however,
is a right secured by law and governed by the principles of law in
respect to assignments. It involves two parties-the assignor and
the assignee. It requires delivery and a meeting of the minds, but
in the case of written assignments, the delivery of the policy is not
necessary provided the instrument of assignment is actually or
constructively delivered. The delivery may be made to a third
party, as, for instance, filed with the insurer for the benefit of the
assignee, and in such case it may constitute a valid delivery even
though unknown to the assignee, for it may be presumed that as it
is beneficial to him he has accepted the act of delivery. 13 However,
in the case of parol assignments either intended to transfer the
policy or to create a pledge of it, there must be a delivery of the
policy itself.14 But more than delivery is necessary to establish a
parol or equitable assignment.' 5
There may be assignments by contract. The appointment of a
beneficiary even though no power to change is reserved is not an
assignment. The insured under most forms of policies still has interests in them. The forms generally terminate the vested rights
of the beneficiary in case of death in the lifetime of the insured. But
where insured vests in the beneficiary the right to exercise all pow12Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Clark, 81 Cal. App. 546, 254 P. 306 (1927).
13 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wright, 153 Wis. 252, 140 N.W. 1078 (1913).
141n re Bickford's Estate, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 785, 265 App. Div. 266 (1942); Ratsch
v. Rengel, 23 A. (2d) 680 (Md. 1942).
15 Blount v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 192 Ga. 325, 15 S.E. (2d) 413
(1941) ; Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.; v. Clark, supra; Loewenstine v.
Loewenstine, 42 N.E. (2d) 1007 (Ohio 1942); Joseph v. New York Life Insurance Co., 308 Pa. 460, 162 A. 441 (1932).
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ers and privileges under it and the right to control the disposition
of the proceeds in case the beneficiary dies in the lifetime of the insured, or, in other words, where all incidents of ownership are
vested in the beneficiary, it is considered equivalent to an assignment of the policy and it is commonly referred to, sometimes in
the decisions of courts, as an assignment.
Equitable assignments of life insurance policies seem to be liberally recognized by the courts. The illustrative case and that
which most commonly presents problems to the insurer is that of
an equitable assignment resulting from the property settlement
agreement in anticipation of divorce and the divorce decree. If
either or both require the insured to transfer policies upon his life
to or for the benefit of the divorced wife or their children by endorsement of the policies, making them irrevocable beneficiaries,
or by an instrument of assignment, and neither of these things is
done, the courts hold that the agreement and the decree or either
of them create an equitable assignment of the policy which not
only binds the insured and his beneficiary, but also the insurer if
it has actual or constructive notice of the equitable assignment. 6
Difficult problems often confront the insurer not only when it
appears that there has been an equitable assignment and it has permitted endorsements on request of the insured inconsistent with it,
but where endorsements intended to conform -with the requirements of the agreement or decree are not in harmony with it. Often
the endorsements may agree with the requirements of the decree,
but still fail to conform with its intent and purpose. For instance,
the decree may specifically require him to name his wife or children as
irrevocable beneficiaries when it was the intended requirement of
the agreement merely to make them irrevocable beneficiaries during the minority of the children. This results from carelessness in
preparing either the agreement or the decree. Insured has the right
to designate his children as irrevocable beneficiaries of the policies
on his life even though he is not required to do so by the decree. In
such case they will have vested interests not only during minority,
but interests which the insured will have no power to revoke at any
time. Therefore, care must be taken by the insurer and by the attorneys representing the parties that the assignment or endorsement exactly complies with the requirements of the decree and the
16 Chilwell v. Chilwell et a]., 40 Cal. App. (2d) 550, 105 P. (2d) 122 (1940);

Chrysler Corp. v. Disich, 295 Mich. 261, 294 N.W. 673 (1940); Kalschinski v.
Ill. Bankers' Life Association Co. et al., 311 Ill. App. 181, 35 N.E. (2d) 705
1941) ; Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Franck et al., 9 Cal. App. (2d) 528, 50 P.

(2) 480 (1935) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Wilkins, 44 F. Supp. 594

(D.C.N.Y. 1940) ; Travellers' Insurance Co. v. Gibs et al., 106 Vt. 155, 170 A,-

917 (1934).
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attorneys for the parties must be careful that both the endorsement
and the property settlement agreement or decree are in accord
with the intention of the parties and of the court.
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

A policy designating insured's executors, administrators or assigns
or his heirs as beneficiaries is always assignable by insured unless
assignment is restricted by law or contract 16a Likewise a policy taken
out by the beneficiary who is vested with powers to control the policy is
assignable by the beneficiary alone. Where the insured reserves no power
to change the beneficiary or waives such power, he cannot by assignment
or in any other way affect the vested rights and interests of the irrevocable beneficiary. A few decisions seemingly to the contrary are
based upon a construction of the contract to expressly give the insured the right to assign, to which the rights of the irrevocable
beneficiary are subject. The only real exception to the rule is that
recognized in Wisconsin based upon an ancient error to the effect
that if the insured takes out a policy designating an irrevocable
beneficiary, he may destroy the vested interests of the beneficiary
by assignment or otherwise where he has continued to hold the
policy and pay the premiums upon it.7 This, of course, is inconsistent with the well-established rule that the parties to a contract
entered into for the benefit.of a third party cannot destroy or revoke the interests of the third party without his consent. This erroneous rule, though repeatedly and consistently followed in the
Wisconsin decisions, has presented serious questions arising in
other states to which the insured while holding the policy has removed. Thus an insured after removing to Iowa attempted to revoke the designation and assign the policy to others than members
of his family who were designated irrevocable beneficiaries. They,
as well as the assignee, claimed the proceeds. Insurer was uncertain
whether the Iowa court would apply the rule of that state which
was in accord with the decisions of this state in respect to contracts
entered into for the benefit of third parties, and hold that insured
had no power to divest the interests of the beneficiaries, or whether
it would follow the erroneous and inconsistent Wisconsin rule. The
interested parties compromised before an action of interpleader
was begun.
Even if the beneficiary is irrevocably designated, the insured
usually has rights and interests such as the reversionary right to
16a Anderson v. Groesbeck, 55 P. 1086, 26 Colo. 3 (1899).
17 Slocum v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 135 Wis. 288, 115 N.W.

796 (1908).
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the benefits of the policy and to control the payment of its proceeds
in case the beneficiary dies in his lifetime, or perhaps the right to
designate contingent beneficiaries and select an optional method
of settlement, which rights and interests are assignable by him.
The absolute assignment will vest in the assignee the right to
exercise all powers and privileges vested in the assignor unless by
the terms of the policy they are expressly personal or their exercise is expressly limited.18
The interests of the irrevocable beneficiary are vested and assignable unless assignment is restricted. For instance, the irrevocable beneficiary may be precluded from assigning her vested interest during the lifetime of the insured separately from the insured
or without his consent. When she joins the insured in an absolute
assignment of a policy on his life, every interest in the policy will
be vested in the assignee. The assignee, of course, would have the
right to substitute any other beneficiary and as a matter of practice should do so. Even though the beneficiary may be stopped by
the as.signment from claiming the proceeds, the assignment in itself
would not effect a change of beneficiary. 9 Sometimes absolute assignments are given for the purpose merely of vesting all powers
in the assignee, but with no intention or purpose of substituting
beneficiaries or contingent beneficiaries for those named in the
policy. The circumstances may present a problem and, therefore, in
such case it is advisable that the assignment express its purpose to
transfer the policy subject to the beneficiary designations and expressly confer the power to revoke and change them upon the assignee. Perhaps this is more important in the case of the revocable
beneficiary who has no vested or assignable interest. It has been
held that though the revocable beneficiary joined insured in such
an assignment and the assignee failed to revoke the designation,
the beneficiary and not the assignee was entitled to the insurance
proceeds.2 More of the decisions are to the contrary.
In case of the collateral assignment of a policy in which a revocable beneficiary is designated, for purposes of security, the
beneficiary should be changed and redesignated subject to the assignment. A few years ago the weight of authority seemed to be
that insured alone could not pledge a policy and that the lien of the
assignee would be subject to the rights of the beneficiary upon
I89 Thompson's Ex'rx v. Thompson, 190 Ky. 3, 226 S.W. 350 (1920).
1 Allen v Home National Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498 (1935); In re Hayes'
Will, 252 N.Y. 148, 169 N.E. 120 (1929); Davis v. Acacih Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
177 S.C. 321, 181 S.E. 12 (1935) ; Resneck v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 305
190 N.W. 603 (1934).
20 Mahoney v. Eaton, 205 N.Y.S. 707, affirmed 208 N.Y.S. 898, 212 App. Div. 867

(1925).
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maturity of the policy 2' On the other hand, a constantly increasing number of cases hold that the insured may assign a policy without the consent or toncurrence of the revocable beneficiary and
that the effect of his assignment is to subordinate the rights of the
revocable beneficiary to the lien of the assignee.F2 These decisions
are based upon the theory that as the beneficiary has no vested interests or rights, the insured should not be required to revoke the
designation and then reinstate it subject to the assignment. Some
cases are based upon the erroneous assumption that the policy
gives the insured the right to subordinate the interests of the beneficiary by his pledge of the policy? 3 Where the policy is construed

to give the insured that right, the assignee of an absolute assignment may have interests superior to those of the revocable beneficiary. 4 Of course, in those states where the law has not been definitely settled one way or the other, the insured should be required
to revoke the beneficiary before assigning the policy. Where the
revocable beneficiary joins the insured in an assignment of the
policy, particularly where it is for the purpose of security, it may
well be considered that she intended to subordinate her rights as
revocable beneficiary to those of the assignee.
The purpose and effect of an assignment is always subject to
proof.- An assignment even though absolute in form or which is
absolute by reason of its vesting powers of ownership in the assignee, when given merely for the purpose of security, creates a
pledge of the policy or a mere lien upon it, and no matter what the
form or conditions of the assignment may be, the relationship between the assignor and the assignee is that merely of pledgor and
pledgee. 5 The rights and duties of the parties as such conferred
upon them by the common law or public policy or by statute, must
be recognized by the insurer. Of course, if the insurer has neither
actual nor constructive notice and in good faith is led to believe
that the assignment is absolute in fact as well as in form, it will
not be liable for conversion of the policy where it accepts the acts
of. the assignee as owner. 6 But if insurer is chargeable with notice
21 Anderson v. Broad St. National Bank, 90 N.J. Eq. 78, 105 A. 599, affirmed 109

A. 205 (1920); Barran v. Liberty National Bank, 131 S.C. 441, 128 S.E. 414
(1925); Schoenholz v. New York Life Insurance Co., 234 N.Y. 24, 136 N.E.
2 2 227 (1922).
Farracy v. Perry, 12 S.W. (2d) 651 (Texas 1929) ; Bank of Belzoni v. Hodges
et al., 132 Miss. 238, 96 So. 97 (1923) ; First National Bank v. Security Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 283 Mo. 336, 222 S.W. 832 (1920).
23
Potter v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 276 Ia. 799, 247 N.W.
669 (1933).
24 St. Louis Trust Co. v. Dudley, 162 S.W. (2d) 290 (Mo. 1942).
25 Olson et ux. v. National Grocery Co. et al., 130 P. (2d) 78 (Wash. 1942) ; Allen
2 6 v. Home National Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498 (1935).
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C.C.A. 8th 1926);
Wheeler v. Pereles et al., 40 Wis. 424 (1876).
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of the character of the assignment, it as well as the assignee, may
be liable for conversion of the policy. The insurer is surrounded
with danger, for it may have in its files information which should
prompt inquiry concerning the effect of the assignment. The purpose may be suggested by the assignment itself, by correspondence
between the parties interested, or by the fact that insured continues
to pay premiums upon the policy. It was held in one case that an
assignment to a national bank should be presumed given for collateral security while in another case that fact alone was held
insufficient.
The use of an absolute assignment by banks to evidence a mere
pledge of policies is common. It is thought that the absolute assignment increases the rights and powers of the assignees, but legally
it does not change the powers of the assignee from those of a mere
pledgee. On the other hand, it often proves less desirable, for it does
not identify the indebtedness secured or provide for indebtedness
subsequently created. It fails to provide any remedy for default and
in some states this may require foreclosure by action rather than
in accordance with the rules of the common law.
It is sometimes considered that these dangers in the use of the
absolute assignment form are avoided by an assignment which
though stated to be given for purposes of security purports to vest
in the assignee powers of ownership such as the right at any time
without notice to surrender the policy for its cash surrender value.
Insurer will not permit the exercise of such a power, for the exercise of it would clearly be a conversion of the policy. It is inconsistent with the legal rights and interests respectively of a pledgor
and a pledgee. Such a provision is invalid under the common law
and the statutes of no state permit it. Any provision in a collateral
assignment that purports to give the assignee the right to appropriate the property pledged, without notice and irrespective of
default is invalid. As a remedy for default the right to surrender
the policy may be given the pledgee in lieu of the common law right
to sell it where that right has not been changed by statute. But if
the power to surrender is given, it should be exercised only upon
notice to the pledgor affording a reasonable opportunity to redeem
and comparable to the notice of sale required by the common law.
The right to surrender a policy for the reserve or its cash surrender
value is not the same as the sale of it and, therefore, the power to
surrender as a remedy for default must be expressly provided in the
assignment. It has been held that the power to surrender as a
remedy for default must be exercised strictly in accordance with
the power given. For instance, where power to surrender upon de-
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fault is given, it may be considered waived and lost unless exercised
promptly upon default27
Problems arise in determining the rights of pledgees in respect
to the payment of policies. Pledgees often claim the right, and
sometimes their forms of assignment include the right, to receive
the entire proceeds even though the secured indebtedness is less.
They often claim that where several policies are assigned, they
have the right to select the policy the proceeds of which shall be
applied to the indebtedness. This claim is made sometimes for the
very purpose of favoring the beneficiaries of one assigned policy to
the prejudice of those of another. For instance, the pledgee cooperating with the beneficiary entitled to receive the proceeds in a single sum will insist upon the payment of its entire indebtedness from
other policies payable to other beneficiaries, perhaps infants, under
a settlement requiring the insurer to hold the proceeds for their
benefit. Of course, if the indebtedness exceeds the proceeds of all
policies pledged to secure the indebtedness, the pledgee is entitled
to receive the entire proceeds. Even where there is other collateral
not available for immediate application to the indebtedness, the
pledgee is entitled to satisfy its indebtedness from the funds available and is not required to await an opportunity of applying the
proceeds of other collateral. Therefore, the insurer is entitled to
proofs of the interest of the pledgee.
It must be recognized that in respect to some forms of collateral
in the nature of choses in action, the pledgee is entitled to receive
and does receive the full amounts paid upon such collateral. This
right is based upon convenience and not upon any absolute right of
the assignee to receive payments in excess of its indebtedness. Its
absolute right is merely to recover the secured indebtedness. A life
insurance policy generally designates beneficiaries. It sometimes
provides, at the election of insured, that the proceeds shall be held
by insurer and paid to the benefiiciaries in installments. The power
to elect such a settlement, if not exercised by the insured, may be
exercised by the beneficiary. Surely, the pledgee should not be permitted uselessly to prevent the exercise of such rights. The insurer
should not surrender its duty to make payment in accordance with
the policy upon the assumption that the pledgee will distribute the
proceeds in excess of the indebtedness in accordance with the
policy. Of course, it cannot do so where such a settlement has been
selected.
27

Toplitz et al., v. Bauer et al., 161 N.Y. 325, 55 N.E. 1059 (1899) ; Stevens et al.
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 183 App. Div. 629, 171 N.Y.S. 296 (1918).

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Where insured has assigned different policies, perhaps in different companies, and providing for payment to different beneficiaries or in different shares, the pledgee has no power to select the
proceeds of particular policies for application to the indebtedness.
Immediately upon death the various beneficiaries in such case have
vested rights to the proceeds of the respective policies, subject only
to the required payment to the assignee. If there are various funds
owned by different beneficiaries immediately available for payment
of the indebtedness, the pledgee may be required to accept in accordance with the rule in equity for marshalling of assets, or a
beneficiary may be subrogated to remedies of the pledgee against
others.28 It is the duty of the insurer to protect beneficiaries of its
policies and their rights under the several policy contracts and to
insist that the proceeds be applied in accordance with equitable
principles, performing as far as possible its contract with the insured.
Similar problems arise in the case of parol and equitable assignments. Regardless of insurer's efforts to relieve itself from liability
unless written assignments are filed with it, it will be held responsible to those entitled to the benefits of the policies under such assignments if it has actual or constructive notice of them. 9 The insurer may have notice that there has been a divorce between the
insured and beneficiary and a change of beneficiary is asked which
apparently is made pursuant to some property settlement agreement or decree of divorce. The insurer who does not examine such
an agreement and decree and endorse its policies accordingly, may
find itself liable, after payment of its policies to the beneficiaries, to
others who are held equitable assignees. It must exercise care not
only to determine the rights of such equitable assignees, but to require its policy provisions in respect to payment to accord with the
requirements of such agreements and decree. It is confronted with
the same difficulties in respect to other contracts that amount to
equitable assignments or at least restrictions upon the power of
insured to assign policies on his life.30 To illustrate, the insured
may designate trustees of an express trust as beneficiaries of his
policies expressly reserving the right to revoke their designation.
A valid trust may expressly provide that the insured may recall the
policies he has thus placed in trust and the power can be exercised.31
28
Ex parte Boddie, 21 S.E. (2d) 4 (S.C. 1942); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Illinois National Bank et al., 34 Fed. Supp. 206 (Mich. 1940).
29Bennett v. Union Central Life Insurance Co. et al., 220 Ia. 927, 263 N.W. 25
(1935) ; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (Okla. 1927).
30 Mass. Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 43 N.E. (2d) 521 (Mass. 1942).
s1 Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934) ; In re
Soper's Estate, 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935) ; Sussman v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 32 Fed. Supp. 88 (D.C. Pa. 1940).
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Insured may exercise such power even though the trust agreement
has no such provision and is irrevocable. On the other hand, the
trust agreement may amount to an actual or equitable assignment
of the policies. 3 2 In some cases the trust agreement employs conventional terms of assignment. In other cases it may effectively
provide that the rights of the trustee under the policies may not be
revoked, or it may otherwise prevent insured from exercising the
power to revoke the designation. In such cases, it may be considered that the power is held by insured only in trust.3 3 The trust
agreement must be examined before insured is permitted to revoke
the designation of trustees as beneficiaries, for the insurer may be
considered to have constructive notice of such equitable assignment or limitation upon the powers of the insured.

32

33

St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Dudley, 162 S.W. (2d) 290 (Mo. 1942).
Williamson v. Williamson Paint Mfg. Co., 169 S.E. 408, 113 W. Va. 744 (1933).

HANDLING THE MEDICAL
WITNESS
DR. W.

WEBBER KELLY*

T is not my intention to attempt to discuss in detail the exhaustive subject of expert medical testimony. Such a detailed discussion lies within the province of one trained in the law. My purpose
is merely to set forth some of the personal experiences and impressions gained from 35 years of continued and frequent attendance
in court as a medical witness. My opportunity to observe the workings of the wheels of justice has not been confined to the American
form of jurisprudence-it has also extended to the English system
from whence it derives. These long and tedious vigils in the halls
of justice have given me ample opportunity to observe and evaluate
court procedures in general, attorneys in particular and, incidentally, witnesses and jurors. It has been a most interesting psychological study. Any references to the legal problems concerned with
the appearance of a medical witness in court are culled from a
somewhat thorough investigation of the literature on the subject.
The reason for this investigation was that I might be more intelligently informed in the matter, and thus acquire a better understanding of my duties and responsibilities, as well as the limits
within which my testimony would be competent. It is my personal
belief that medical schools fail to devote sufficient attention to medical jurisprudence insofar, at least, as it applies to the physician's
appearance in court. As a result, doctors called upon to testify as
experts are unaware of the bounds within which their testimony
may be given, as well as the latitude which permits them to give
full effect to their opinions.
Having lived under two flags, I have naturally compared the
American system of jurisprudence with that pertaining in British
courts of law. While deeply impressed with the pompous dignity,
the wigs and gowns, the medieval ceremonials and the more rapid
administration of justice which characterize the courts of England,
the conviction remains that notwithstanding its contrasting informality and comparative slowness of action, the American procedures are more fitted to our democracy, and maintain a closer relation to the original idea of trial by one's peers. In the exercise of
broader powers and discretionary attitude of its presiding judges,
as well as the authority assumed in the conduct of the trial, comments on the weight of evidence and instructions to the jury, the
*

M.D., C.M., Fellow American College-of Surgeons, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
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federal court follows more closely the English pattern. Throughout
the British Empire, all courts of justice are held in very high regard.
Respect for the law and fear of the swift consequences of its violation dominate the mind of the average British citizen. Criticism of
the honesty of English jurists, in 6r outside the court room, is considered lese majeste, and is punished severely. The unfortunate incidents which occasionally mar court trials in America tend to
shock the foreign observer. True, these incidents are isolated cases,
but, if the prestige of the courts and of the law is to be upheld and
preserved, all attorneys must at all times unite in maintaining the
high standards of their calling and continue to foster the dignity of
trials. To the lay observer, state court procedure appears to require
some modification. One cannot escape the conviction that judges
are handicapped in the performance of certain duties which appear
clearly to lie within their province. Legal limitation and fear of
judicial error are no doubt at fault. In marked contrast to the practice of our federal courts, state judges are deterred from commenting upon the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. It
follows that juries, admittedly ill equipped, receive little or no guidance in these matters. This rule is not as rigidly adhered to in all of
the states. In California the trial court may comment upon the evidence as a whole or upon the testimony or credibility of the witness
providing the courts comment is temperate and fairly made. Thus,
the comment of the court is not confined to a colorless recital by
way of summing up the facts. My information reveals that in federal trials, while the court may not direct a verdict of guilty in
criminal cases, it may at all times either directly or indirectly analyze and comment upon the weight of evidence, and express its
views with regard to the testimony of witnesses leaving the ultimate determination of the issues of fact fairly to the jury. The reaction of the layman to these divergencies is that some middle
ground could be found which would expedite trial and promote
justice to a greater degree.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The original purpose of expert testimony is obvious. It is permitted in order to aid in the elucidation of certain issues in the case,
which elucidation is only possible by the testimony of witnesses
possessing special knowledge not to be obtained from the average
individual. The general rule is that opinion evidence is not admissible ;' in other words, the witness must testify to facts within his
knowledge or those derived from his own perception. While it is
I Mundo, -The Expert Wite.ss, p. 1; JoNFs,

EViDENCE,

§ 1242, p. 2283.
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true that from necessity the conclusions of certain witnesses are
admissible in matters of identity, quantity, value, time, distance,
velocity, heat, cold and others; as well as questions concerning various mental and moral aspects of humanity; namely, temper,
anger, fear, excitement, intoxication, veracity and general character:
such testimony is conclusion evidence and based upon evidentiary
facts. The general rule of opinion evidence is flagrantly broken in
the case of expert medical testimony. Such testimony permits the
consideration and credence by the jury of opinions and conclusions
based upon facts not necessarily within the knowledge or observations of the expert, but introduced in evidence by other witnesses
and presumed to be true. Its limitations appear to be very broad.
Once having qualified and while his competency remaining unchallenged, it permits the witness by hypothesis and assumption of
facts either testified to at the time of his direct examination, or
upon promise of later proof, an expression of opinion not only as
to the injury or episode being the proximate cause of the present
disability and a belief as to the permanency of the litigant's present
condition; it also allows statement of belief as to the probable or
even possible future onset of remote effects.2 At this point, therefore, medical expert testimony enters the field of prophecy. It has
appeared to me that this matter of prophecy is at times permitted
to go too far. Belief as to probable exacerbati6ns or remote results
in the individual's mental and physical state without evidence that
such a development is already apparent, appears unreasonable and
is obviously double speculation.3 Thus, to say that any nervous disorder resulting from an injury or shock may at some distant future
time probably or possibly result in insanity, is to assume the role
of prophet. Medicine is a changing and progressive science, and the
last word in therapeutics today may not be the last word tomorrow; however such speculation appears to be permissible.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION

Webster defines hypothesis as "A tentative theory or supposition provisionally adopted to explain certain facts, and to guide in
the investigation of others." This definition defines the mechanics,
at least, of hypothetical inquiry. As I understand it, the theory and
supposition must be in the case, and the facts supporting them must
2

Block v. Milwaukee Street R. Co., 89 Wis. 371, 61 N.W. 1101 (1895) ; Hanton
v. Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051 (1904); Faber v. Reiss Coal Co., 124
Wis. 554, 102 N.W. 1049 (1905); Sundquist v. Mad. R. R., 197 Wis. 83, 221
N.W. 392 (1928).
SCiWEITZER, NEGLIGE-NCE AcTioNs, p. 376, n. 1; Griswold v. N. Y. etc. R. C.,
115 N.Y. 61. 21 N.E. 226 (1889).
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have been testified to, before a basis may be established for the
propounding of the hypothetical question. The ground work for
such question is, of course, a simple matter for the attorney whose
purpose it is to offer it later in the trial. In framing such an interrogation a great deal of care and effort must be spent. To attempt to
recite extemporaneously the facts desired is often a confusing and
unsatisfactory method of handling it. While in court I usually hear
two constant objections by opposing counsel to the hypothetical
questions submitted to me. First, that the question recites facts not
shown in the evidence, and second, that the question -does not
contain all of the facts in the case. A promise to introduce the missing facts later in the case appears to be sufficient to invalidate the
first objection. As to the second, it would appear that the question
need not include any particular number of facts, it may assume any
one or more facts whatsoever, and need not cover all of the factors
which the questioner alleges in his case. The questioner is entitled
to the witness' opinion in any combination of facts that he may
choose. It is often convenient and even necessary to obtain that
opinion upon a state of facts falling short of what he or his opponent expects to prove because the questioner cannot tell how much
of the testimony the jury will accept; ...For reasons of principle
then, and to some extent of policy, the natural conclusion would be
that the questioner need not cover in his hypothesis the entire body
of testimony put forward on that point by him or by the opponent,
but may take as limited a selection as he pleases and obtain an
opinion on that basis. Such is the orthodox doctrine as applied to
most courts. 4 On the other hand, other authorities are of the opinion that generally speaking a hypothetical question should state all
the facts relevant to the formation of an opinion ...there is no
exclusive formula . ..and the matter of form is largely discretionary to the trial court5
At this point may I, as a layman, offer a word of caution as to
the length of the hypothetical question. Often one hears a question
covering several pages of foolscap and containing so much material
that the attorney himself cannot remember it. Under these circumstances it is difficult to believe that the jury at its conclusion is in
any better position. Limited to essential facts, clearly and intelligently cited, upon which the jury may know the premises upon
which the opinion is to be given, it appears to be more effective.
One prominent trial lawyer tells me that he adopts the rule of writing the question carefully and as concisely as possible, committing
4 1 WiGMoRE, EvmErcE, § 682, p.
5 3 JoNEs, EvIDENCE, p. 2427-28.
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it to memory and then tearing up the written version. His argument is that unless he can remember it, he is certain that the jury
cannot do so. The effect of medical expert testimony upon the jury
has intrigued me. After speaking to many jurors, I am now convinced that its effect is greater than I formerly believed. This, of
course, depends a great deal upon the manner in which this evidence is given, and is concerned with the apparant honesty of the
witness, the firmness of his conclusions and, above all, his employment of language as intelligible as possible to laymen serving as
jurors. Many expert witnesses forget that the jury exists, and address their answers to the questioner. His replies should be directly
aimed at the jury, and he should, if necessary, change his position
in the witness chair in order that they may hear distinctly what he
says.
At this point let me discuss that individual who is at once the
trial and despair of judges and opposing counsel, and the white
haired boy of the trial attorney who engages his services.
THE ExPERT WITNESS

It must be born in mind that a physician who qualifies as an expert
must expect to be judged by a different standard than the physician who
gives evidence as an ordinary witness. By this is meant that from
the latter we have no right to expect more than average knowledge
of the issues in the case. From the former we have a reason to demand an opinion based upon a larger personal experience and scientific familiarity with the issues involved. An interesting point occurs in connection with this latter statement. Objection may be
raised to an expert witness as to the bookish source of his knowledge; first, because it implies a lack of skill and experience as affecting his expert capacity for judgment; and second, because it
involves accepting as a knower of a given fact one who has not
really observed it for himself, but is trusting in the opinions of
others. In other words, it is an objection against the witness' experience on the quality of his knowledge. To deny the competency
of a physician who does not know his facts from personal observation in similar cases is to reject medical testimony almost in its
entirety ... Medical science is a mass of transmitted data; general
relations are rare which are the result of one man's personal observations exclusively; and the law cannot expect its petitioners to obtain
these rare persons. 6
There appears to be no precise general rule as to how the skill
of a witness must be acquired. According to decisions in Michigan
61 WIGMOR.,

EviDEN E, § 687, p. 782.
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a witness may express an opinion upon certain matters even if his
knowledge is derived from study alone.7 Wigmore agrees with the
above rule, feeling apparently that the knowledge however acquired
is a question relating only to the weight of the evidence given.8
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that the opinion of an expert must, in addition to knowledge, be derived from experience.
The logic of this position is that since books themselves cannot be
read in evidence, extracts from them should not be permitted from
the lips and memory of the expert. 9 I raise this question because of
an occurrence in a personal injury suit within my knowledge. The
question involved a case of a rare pathological condition of the eye
in which an expert from Milwaukee was called to testify by the
plaintiff. Upon admission that the witness had never seen a similar
case in his experience, a plea of lack of competency was upheld and
the witness was not permitted to testify. The decision of the trial
court as to .competency lies within its own discretion, and unless
founded upon some error of law, serious mistake or abuse of discretion, its ruling is not reversible.I0 Relative to competency, it
must be remembered that section 147.14(2) (Wis. Stat. 1941) provides
"that no person shall have the right to testify in a professional capacity
except when duly licensed in Wisconsin; except those licenced in other
states may testify in Wisconsin, when such testimony is necessary to
establish the rights of residents of this state in a judicial proceeding
and expert testimony of licensed practitioners of this state sufficient for
the purpose is not available.
Another difficulty encountered by the expert witness is the objection that his opinion given as the result of his examination of
the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, is in part based upon
hearsay; in that he must rely upon the patient's own statements as
to the history and symptoms and that such hearsay testimony is
not valid. Such limitation is apparently the rule in Wisconsin, although in other states the rigidity of this practice does not pertain.
As Wigmore logically states, the exclusion of information so obtained and its basis in the formation of the expert's opinion does in
strictness exclude all medical testimony based upon personal examination." Thus the witness is confined in testifying only as to the
objective symptoms. A qualified expert can, however, overcome
7People v. Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66 N.W 562 (1896).

8 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 569.

9 Soquet v. State, 72 Wis. 659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888) ; Zuesdorf v. Grotsky, 195
Wis. 253, 218 N.W. 186 (1928).
103 JONES, EVIDENCE,
I1

§ 1317-1318.

WIGMORIE, EVIDENCE, § 688, p. 783-784... "Those who object to testimony
of the sort where considered must expect to surrender the medical witness
stand to veterinary surgeons exclusively."
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this handicap by enumerating many of the subjective findings and
by increasing -his powers of observation and giving proper expression to them. It would appear to be a case of much ado about nothing as an experienced attorney can readily present the history,
symptoms and any other missing facts in hypothetical form for the
expert's conclusions.
PREREQUISITES FOR THE MEDICAL EXPERT

It goes without saying that he should be absolutely honest and
unbiased in his testimony, and thoroughly familiar with the medical aspects of the case in which he is testifying. This should be done
by preparing himself by looking up the general literature on the
matter and for his own information familiarizing himself with the
opinions of authorities who may have written upon the subject. To
this must be added his professional background and standing in the
community in which the action rests, or his medical reputation
throughout the state if he is from the outside. He should display
ready understanding and even anticipation of the questions propounded, and possess sufficient ability to take care of himself as far
as possible without protection from the attorney engaging his services. He must, however, avoid the delusion that he is a medical
jurist. He should at all costs retain great composure and control of
his temper, and be definitely courteous and patient under cross examination. He should, as previously stated, speak distinctly and
slowly, and in terms as intelligible as possible to the jury. Technical terms, unless explained, are lost upon jurors and nullify the effect of his testimony. In enumerating the qualifications I would
emphasize preparation. To my mind this is very essential. One
should never enter a lawsuit as an expert witness without thoroughly acquainting himself not only with the gross medical facts
involved, but with the anatomy, physiology and other allied subjects connected with them. My personal preparation includes an
effort to anticipate the possible questions that may be asked me by
the opposing attorney. Needless to say most of these questions are
never asked, but should they be, I expect to be in a position to have
a ready answer. It may appear paradixical, but it is nevertheless
true that many intelligent and well educated physicians fail to make
good witnesses. This results from shyness, fear, or lack of ability
to express themselves logically. On the other hand, many physicians
of mediocre attainments, with alert minds and plenty of self assurance may make a good showing. The danger in the latter case lies
in the possibility of disaster at the hands of an attorney who is well
prepared medically and with experience in this type of cases. Wise
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cracking and other forms of subtle humor should be strictly
avoided by the witness. On the other hand an attitude of abject
humility or what may be termed the "Uriah Heap complex" is equally
to be deplored.
TE QUESTION oF PARTISANSHIP
The question of partisanship, as evidenced by the invariable conflict of opinion by experts on both sides of the case, has often been
discussed. A physician should refuse to testify in cases where any
doubt exists in his mind as to the correctness of the position assumed by attorneys or other medical witnesses. I am glad to say
that having advanced my views and objections to the medical-theory of the case, no attorney has ever insisted in his demands for my
services or attempted to influence my convictions or decisions to
testifying. As a general rule no one has a right to question the honesty of the medical witness. It is true that one may unconsciously
become partisan, due, no doubt, to the fact that he is certain that
whatever conclusions he testifies to will be contradicted by the doctor testifying on the opposite side. There may be, and are, many
honest differences of opinion in medical matters, and it is very hard
to get away from one's own convictions. Some witnesses become
dogmatic and are unwilling to admit that any opinion other than
their own can possibly be correct. The contradictory form of expert
testimony as evidenced by those testifying on opposite sides of the
case has become proverbial, and several suggestions have been
made for its correction.
I find that under Section 357.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the
judge of the trial court in criminal cases may, after notice to the
parties and a hearing, appoint one or more disinterested qualified
experts, not exceeding three, to testify at the trial. Under this section, these experts are-required to subscribe to a special oath and
their compensation is fixed by the court and paid by the county
upon the court's order constituting a part of the costs of the action.
They are, of course, subject to cross examination by both parties
who may also summon other expert witnesses at the trial. Why
this practice cannot be extended, even in modified form, in civil
cases is hard to fathom. For many years efforts by eminent members of the bar and the several professions have endeavored to have
enacted by the various legislatures, laws authorizing the court to
appoint its own experts, especially when there appears, as is frequently the case, wide differences between the experts for the
plaintiff and defendant, differences which tend to completely confuse and confound both the court and the jury.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

In certain foreign countries, as in Germany for example, the expert is chosen by the court from a list of scientific and highly qualified members of the various professions. A penalty is attached for
disregarding the summons, and the commonwealth provides a- moderate fixed compensation, together with expenses, for appearance
and testimony in court. The medical expert's position becomes
thereby an official one; in fact he is thus made an officer of the
court. It is regarded an honor and distinction to be so designated,
and there is attendant on the office every courtesy and dignity to
which its responsibilities entitle it. The utmost care is observed in
the selection of physicians and surgeons as official experts, so that
only men of known special scientific attainments, personal integrity
2
and possessing the ability to clarify complex problems, are chosen
Section 1871 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"When it shall be made to appear to any court or judge thereof,
either before or during the trial of any action or proceeding, such
court or judge may, on motion of any party, or on motion of such
court or judge, appoint one or more experts to investigate and testify at the trial of such action or proceeding relative to the matter
or matters as to which such expert evidence is, or will be, required,
and such court or judge may fix the compensation of such expert."
The commission on the administration of justice in New York State
has.proposed similar legislation, and it would appear that the trend
is definitely in the direction of the appointment of experts by the
courts.
QUALIFICATIONs ADMITTED

I believe that many attorneys err -in failing to emphasize the
qualifications of their expert. "Qualifications admitted" has come to
have a familiar sound to me. This short cut method of qualifying
an expert has two principal objections. First, the counsel whose
witness you are misses an opportunity to impress the jury with any
qualifications including medical training, membership in recognized
medical societies, period of practice, general experience; as well as
familiarity with the issues in similar cases. Secondly, "It must be
born in mind that once having stipulated the witnesses qualifications the opposing attorney is barred from later attempting to impeach the competency of the expert and complaint cannot be made
on appeal that he was not qualified."
- California State Bar Journal, May, 1937.
13 McGuire v. Baird, 9 Cal. (2d) 353, 70 P. (2d) 915 (1937).
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CROSS EXAMINATIONS OF EXPERTS
Unless properly prepared the average attorney is gambling with
odds in the cross examination of a competent medical expert insofar, at least, as the technical medical details of the case are concerned. Attorneys frequently engaged in personal injury cases are
of course an exception to this statement. Proper preparation with
the aid of some competent medical man prior to the cross examination is imperative. I do not mean y this that the opposing attorney
should entirely refrain from cross examination. Inconsistencies and
contradictions and conclusions clearly illogical should be questioned
and questioned severely.
"YES OR No"
The medical witness is frequently instructed to answer a question "yes" or "no." Compliance with such a demand may be impossible. If such is the case, the witness should so state. If ordered by
the court to do so without being permitted to give the reasons for
his answer, it is a simple matter for counsel to ask him on redirect
to give the reasons for such an answer, and to explain the conclusions or premises which required him to do so. Such an opportunity
cannot be withheld.
The common law rule is that scientific books may not be read
to the jury as evidence, because the statements therein contained
are wanting in the sanctity of an oath, are made by one not present,
and who is not liable to cross examination. While the common law
rule has been modified by statute in many states to allow certain
scientific books to be received in evidence, the rule of exclusion
still prevails as to medical books.14 Mortality tables for estimating
of the probable life of a party, the given age, chronological tables,
tables of weights, measures and currency and the like, are admissible to prove facts of general notoriety and interest in connection
with such subjects as may be involved in the trial of a cause.' But
medicine is not considered as one of the exact sciences: it is of the
character of inductive sciences which are based on data which each
successive year may correct and expand, so that what is considered
a sound induction last year may be considered an unsound one this
year' 6 In some jurisdictions it has been held that the medical witness may reinforce his opinion from a stated condition by showing
that certain textbooks upon the subject are in accord with his
views.' 7 Such a practice in my opinion is dangerous, for the witness
1M UNDo, THE EXPERT WITNESS, p.

87.

15 Wagar v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. 553 (1827).
'16 WHARTON, EVIDEN cE, § 665.
'7 Louisville R. Co. v. Howell, 147 Ind. 266, 45 N.E. 584 (1896); Pinney v.
Cahill, 48 Mich. 586, 12 N.W. 862 (1882).
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may be discredited upon cross examination from extracts read from
such authorities and contradictory statements or those subject to
varying interpretations are to be found in the same textbooks. It is
generally held, however, that the use of medical texts to prove a
fact in issue is improper. It has been my lot on several occasions to
face attempts by opposing counsel to read statements from textbooks by authorities about whose standing there could be no question, and then requested to state whether I agreed or disagreed
with the theories they embrace. A competent witness will refuse
to be drawn into any such trap. Counsel must be expressly limited
in references to only such treaties as have been used or referred to
by the witness upon his direct examination.' 8 The witness may
refresh his memory by referring to X-rays, charts made by him or
under his direction and notes taken by him at the time when the
matter was fresh in his memory. The rule respecting notes is that
the witness is allowed to refresh his memory by anything written
by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, immediately thereafter or at any time when the fact is fresh
in his memory. Unless necessary, notes should not be used. If notes
are used, they must be produced so that the adverse party may see
them and cross examine the witness upon them as he chooses. They
may be read to the jury.'9
Before leaving the subject of expert testimony, may I suggest
the abandonment of a policy which I think is undesirable. I have
reference to having counsel's own medical witness sitting behind
him and coaching him during the examination of the other attorney's medical expert. Physicians regard this as not being strictly
ethical, and there is no question in my mind that it has a distinctly
injurious psychological effect upon the jury. Not only is it unsatisfactory in technique, but it is an admission of counsel's own weakness, and gives the impression of not being good sportsmanship.
THE LAWYER FROM THE LAYMAN'S VIEWPOINT

May I begin by saying that collectively and individually I hold
the members of the legal profession in the highest regard. In my
contacts with them throughout the state, I have been impressed by
their high character and honesty of purpose. It is my belief that
the State of Wisconsin is outstanding in the caliber and professional
integrity of its Bar. This is in great part due to the judiciary, for
the character and ability of the judge reflect upon the members of
18 Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 386-387, n. 1, 388, 389.
3.

Mundo, op. cit., p. 47; Braxten v. Brown, 197 Minn. 511, 267 N.W. 489 (1936);
Wright v. Upsilon, 303 Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 208 (1922) ; People v. Schepps, 217
Mich. 406, 186 N.E. 508, 21 A.L.R. 658 (1922).
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his circuit. Among lawyers there appears to me to be a great degree
of consideration for each other and a large absence of the petty
jealousy that exists in other professions, including the medical
fraternity. Personally, I have experienced nothing but courtesy and
kindness from the Bar as a whole, and while I know that to many
of them I have at times been very trying, they have never failed to
treat me with respect and consideration. Therefore, anything that
I may say will indicate no desire on my part to be disrespectful or
unkind. It is sometimes interesting, however, and even profitable
to see ourselves as others see us. Hence these observations of a
layman.
PREPARATION

One thing is apparent with some attorneys, and that is their
lack of preparation. This arises either from the fact that they are
too busy and have insufficient help, or from neglect. They enter
court without definite strategic plans and even familiarity with the
legal angles involved, as well as an absence of understanding as to
what their own witness will testify to. In some cases cross examination has all the ear marks of a fishing expedition and some of
them should be members of the Isaac Walton League. Many attorneys of mediocre ability can make a confrere with definitely greater
legal experience look sick by the simple expedient of thoroughly
preparing his case. The most successful members of the Bar of my
acquaintance are usually those with whom preparation is a ritual.
I would much prefer not to-be associated with the attorney who
calls me up the night before a case to discuss the important matter
of the medical testimony. On the other hand, it is a joy to work
with one who is sufficiently interested to discuss these details two
or three times before putting me on the witness stand.
OVER EXAmiNATION

Another matter that has intrigued me greatly is the yen some
attorneys possess for over examination. How frequently one sees
witnesses tied up completely and with the record in excellent shape,
only to have the effect of their answers destroyed by continued
questioning. Having obtained an answer that is entirely satisfactory to his case, some attorneys persist in asking the same question
in several different forms, until finally the answer is so modified as
to be hardly recognizable. A satisfactory answer is an asset worth
preserving. Why attempt to paint the lily? Equal danger appears
to lie in failing to sufficiently examine the witness. This was
brought forcibly to my mind in a murder case in which I was retained by the state. An eminent psychiatrist and excellent witness
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was on the stand. In spite of advice to the contrary, the prosecutor
read to him two long detailed hypothetical questions, and instructed
him to answer "yes" or "no" to both. His strategy was then to turn
him over to counsel for the defense in the full expectation that he
would be cross examined, and in this way enabled to elaborate his
answers. These were the only two questions asked him. The result
was unfortunate. The attorney for the defense simply said, "No
questions, doctor" and the witness left the stand. Thus the testimony of an outstanding expert, brought many miles for the specific
purpose of tearing the defense apart, was completely thrown away.
Moral: don't depend on the other fellow to try your case.
Another thing that is noticeable to an onlooker is the eternal
leading that goes on in the examination of witnesses. My rough
guess is that a large majority of the questions asked are leading.
This has become such a habit with some attorneys that when they
are called on it, they are often at a complete loss to frame the question in a non-leading manner, and are often aided by the court in
their dilemma.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

A psychological understanding of the judge, as well as the jury
would appear essential. Many attorneys acquire psychological
knowledge from experience, but often at the expense of many disasters that might have been avoided. No doubt legal psychology is
a part of the curriculum of every law school. If not, it should be,
and also emphasized. Some attorneys seem to have an affinity for
objecting and objecting eternally. To one who is not versed in legal
lore, most of these objections appear to be trivial. An experienced
trial attorney of my acquaintance, when asked by me why he did
not object to a certain question, informed me that no matter how
irrelevant or immaterial, he never objected so long as the question
did no harm to his case. He felt that he got along with the judge a
great deal better by following this rule. It is used by some attorneys to confuse and confound opposing counsel. Whether this is
effective or not I do not know. It is not only the constant objections which delay the trial and tire the judge, but the exceptions to
the judge's ruling one occasionally hears that are irksome and
annoying. Since exceptions are, in this state deemed taken to adverse rulings, they are unnecessary-why rub his Honor's fur the
wrong way?
With the passing of the years, it has been noticeable that the
explosive and noisy type of oratory is gradually fading from the
scene; it seems to have disappeared with the crinoline and the political torch light parades. Occasionally one still hears it, but it has
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lost much of its former effectiveness. Side remarks made by one
attorney to another, remarks that are intended to be humerous but
which are frequently bitter and vindictive are still with us. Beyond
causing momentary amusement, they have little favorable effect
upon the average juror. This type of vaudeville would never be permitted in an English court room. It tends to lower the dignity of
the court. Some judges, strange to say, are very tolerant in this
regard.
CROss EXAMINATION, MATERIAL AND OTHERWISE

An expert witness needs a long memory, for one is not infrequently confronted with prophecies made at previous trials. A
somewhat amusing, but nevertheless tragic, incident occurred a
short time ago which illustrates this point. It occurred in federal
court in a case with which I was associated. One of the witnesses
for the government, an eminent and distinguished professor of one
of our large universities, was on the stand. The opposing counsel
(with no text books in sight) read to him a long statement which
he had written on his scratch pad. The question covered a theory
closely related to the issue in the case. When he had finished he
asked the witness whether he did not believe that the statement
was a fair one, and covered the situation thoroughly. The witness
could hardly wait for the completion of the statement and question,
and immediately replied, "I utterly disagree with that theory-in
my opinion it is not correct." The attorney looked at him intently
for a moment and then said, "You are sure, doctor, that you disagree entirely with that statement ?" The witness answered, "Yes."
"That is strange, doctor, because that is an exact copy of a paragraph contained in a text book of which you are the author, and
which is in general use among medical students and practioners."
The judge immediately called for the book, which was produced,
and the witness was required to read the paragraph in question and
state whether it did not coincide word for word with the excerpt
which had been read to him.
I have had my full share of questions that are irrelevant and
immaterial. It has often amazed me not only that these questions
should be asked, but that they should be permitted by the trial
judge. Some of them call for a facetious answer, although this
should be avoided if possible. The classic answer of Dr. Joseph
Collins of New York is an example: Q. "As a matter of fact, doctor,
you are an alienist pure and simple?" A. "Yes, an alienist moderately pure, but not simple." Let me quote one or two irrelevant
queries which come to my mind. Q. "You testify in all of Attorney
Jones's cases, don't you doctor ?" A. "I am not in a position to an-
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swer that question intelligently, because I am not aware of how
many cases Attorney Jones has. Q. "How far North, how far South,
how far East and how far West have you traveled to testify for
Attorney Smith?" Where is the relevancy in a question of this
type? Q. "You are a personal friend of the attorney on the other
side, are you not doctor?" The implication in such a question is
obvious, and the answer equally illuminating. The question as to
the size of the fee the expert witness expects to get in a given case,
while not frequent, occassionally present itself. Its object is evidently to demonstrate interest and bias, and in that respect is, of
course, proper. In the majority of cases, the matter of compensation has not been discussed between the attorney and the witness
at the time of the question, but an answer to this effect does not
appear to be sufficient. Then comes the query, "How much are you
in the habit of receiving for testifying in court ?" This would appear
irrelevant, as the compensation received in some previous trial has
certainly no bearing on the present case. The best way to handle
this question is to answer it frankly and responsively, and let the
matter end there. Occasionally one runs into trick questions and
the witness must be on his guard. In a certain case I had testified
that in my opinion the injury in question was permanent, and I
knew of no treatment or operation that could correct it. On cross
examination the opposing attorney asked me these questions "You say, doctor, that nothing can be done to cure this man ?" My
answer was "Yes"--"You don't believe that Christian Science
could do anything for him ?". My answer was-"I really couldn't
say, for though I have a deep respect for Christian Science, I am
not familiar with its operation in conditions of this nature." This
apparently did not satisfy him. "Will you say positively that Christian Science could not cure -him ?" My answer was-"I would make
no such statement, because as I have already stated, I am not familiar with it, although I have heard of some remarkable results that
it has accomplished." As I stepped down from the stand and passed
the attorney I whispered to him--"How many Christian Scientists
have you on the jury ?" He smiled and answered--"Only two." This
was a clear case of fishing, but my legal friend had forgotten the
repeated admonition and cardinal rule for fishermen, enunciated by
the late Isaac Walton,-"First, know your fish." (-the gentleman
apparently mistook me for a sucker.) The question was, of course,
improper and should have been-objected to. No expert of one school
of healing can be questioned about any other school with which he
is unfamiliar.
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My purpose in presenting this paper has been to record some of
the experiences, impressions and reactions derived from a close
observation of court procedures over a period of many years. It is
only proper that a medical expert witness should be concerned with
those phases of the law regarding competency, the use of medical
texts, opinion evidence, hypothetical inquiry and other legal questions which directly affect him as a witness. Such knowledge, even
though lacking in profundity, is in my opinion necessary to enable
a medical expert to perform his function intelligently and effectively provide his services, and to aid the court and jury in promoting justice.
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GOOD SYSTEM-GOOD CITIZENSGOOD GOVERNMENT

T

HIS is a continuation of the discussion started by Mr. Rix, and
continued by Mr. Seasongood. As suggested by the former, I shall
attempt to widen the horizon by discussing our national government
in some of its aspects. Basic governmental philosophy, if not national
politics, (largely eliminated in local affairs), should underlie all government in America.
One of the increasing difficulties is the number of people in administrative positions in government, public utility or other employment,
who under the law or civil service rules, or the rules of the organizations they serve, can take no active part in political affairs. But of
those who are entirely free to do so, comparatively few give any attention to government, except to criticise its officials or their official acts.
As to the claimed corruption and inefficiency of government and
the indifference of citizens to political duties, may I say, that, in my
experience and observation, the great mass of people have their time
largely taken up by their daily tasks necessary to earn the money with
which to live, and feel justified in using their spare time in some recreation, perhaps involving wife or children, or some avocation, art, or
personal project, or in attending meetings or performing duties with
respect to some religious, fraternal, or charitable organization or
service club, which commands their especial interest. They therefore
have little time left in which to give any attention to local, state or
nation politics and the party organizations on which they are based,
but on the honest and proper management of which their right to live
in peace as a free citizen of a free country depends. They just have
not time. And, too, "Politics is such a dirty pool" that it is to be
avoided by them. Often they pride themselves on being non-partisan.
Some fear loss of business.
Thus they rationalize to themselves and others, in order to excuse
themselves from doing their duty as voters, which on a little thought
should be plain to them. And they account themselves as among the
best citizens and, to enable their organization to function in harmony,
they exclude discussion of political subjects at their meetings.
These "best citizens" must be induced to prove themselves and to
give the necessary time to help make self-government function satisfactorily, or some day they will find themselves living under some autocratic government which does not need their organizations or their
services, but only requires their slavish obedience to orders given by it.
I do not think it will be denied, however, that any system of government, whether the one we have, or some other kind set up in its
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place in the years to come, for any reason, will be operated by the same
kind of human beings we have now, (but let us hope with improvement and more interest in government), with the same traits and
motives, and the same tendencies to do wrong under some conditions,
but possibly with better control of themselves. A sound system, however, tends to minimize the faults and keep our liberties.
Because of these human traits and tendencies, a people who desire
individual freedom require a system which holds the extremists and
political wrongdoers in check. just as both former editorials suggest,
however, the people must be aroused in some way to the danger, not
only of corruption in local government, (of which we have little in
Milwaukee), but of the far greater danger, as it seems to me, of losing
our liberties entirely by a change of systems. They must be aroused
to elect honest and courageous statesmen to Congress, and also honest
and courageous men to office, high and low. That must help in obtaining good government, locally or nationally, or anywhere between.
Both they and we, however, must not forget that corruption, bungling, and inefficiency are the price of liberty. But more corruption,
more bungling, and more inefficiency-are the price a free people pay
for their indifference to government affairs. The greatest danger, however, to self-government is the failure of the most intelligent, educated
and cultured citizens, (those having the greatest stake in a government
of free men), to really understand the philosophy of their government,
or, if they do, to take any proper interest in political matters, except
possibly for a few days before election, when they suddenly find themselves compelled to make their. choice between two unwanted candidates who are the result of a primary in which they took no interest
whatever.
These are some of the things which make' self-government "walk
with a crutch," and cause it to b so severely criticized in its results.
Washingtons do not invite themselves to run for public office. The
best citizens should be able to find among themselves the best men for
official positions, and should pledge support and induce them to serve
and also to make the necessary financial and other sacrifices; but this
is seldom done. Most candidates act on their own inspiration.
Because of these human weaknesses or faults, and this general
indifference, is it not plain that the most important thing in selfgovernment is a good systemf Should we not see that we keep the
best system which has ever been known for free men, especially in
view of the general neglect of political affairs?
It seems clear to me at least, after many years of experience, and
with political affiliations which depend on principles instead of any
party label, that the American system of government is the best ever
known for a people who want to be free and to govern themselves.
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This is because of the way in which our government was organized to balance or minimize those human traits which tend to interfere
with good government,--by the separation of powers granted, and
also by the careful balancingof power against power.
The basis of all our government, national, state and local, is our
Constitution, whose basic theory is this balancing of power, as stated.
Perhaps it is pertinent to recall that among those balances as to the
national government are :All states to have equal representation in the Senate, proportional
in the House;
The Senate balances the House in making laws, and vice versa;
All financial measures must originate in the House;
The resident balances both Houses by veto power;
The Congress balances the President by passing laws over his veto;
but
As the supreme balance against both Congress and resident, there
was authorized to be created an independent judiciary, every
judge of which must take an oath to make that Constitution the
Supreme Law of the Land, just as it is declared to be.
Plainly, no valid law can be made which conflicts with that Constitution, or the law instead of the Constitution would be the Supreme
Law. It is the plain and sworn duty of the judge to declare it void for
that reason. By this system of guaranties and balances of power, the
guaranties of liberties of the Constitution are made real in the lives
of free men.
What is this government? A Democracy? Never was it so intended
or conceived. It was just what Franklin said it was, when asked that
question,--"A Republic if we can keep it."
That is what we call it when we salute the flag, and we say, "and to
the Republic for which it stands." It may be preferable and permissible
to some to call it a democracy, provided they means a democracy which
has tied its own hands by our Constitution, as well as those of its
elected representatives, against depriving individuals or minorities, of
rights guaranteed to them by that instrument, namely, a DEMOCRACY WITH SELF-CONTROL. IT IS THIS SOUND SYSTEM
WHICH KEEPS US FREE,--A REPUBLIC.
But some will ask, Are we in any danger of losing
our national
system of good government?
I will answer that anyone who has done any reading in the past
ten years especially, must be aware of the great strides which have
been made in this country in convincing people that our capitalistic
form of government is only for the benefit of the rich men and the
owners of great industries, and that the Constitution protects them,
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and not the poor men. Many lawyers themselves have been guilty of
the failure to vigorously combat this fundamental falsehood, for
different reasons, a few for the sake of honest sympathy with poor
men, but mostly, I believe, for political advantage because of the
votes they would receive for some office.
Many people believe that the will of the majority is or should be
supreme. The President once announced his belief that the three
branches of the government should be a "three-horse team" pulling
together, and complained that the Supreme Court was not cooperating;
that the people in the last election had spoken the will of the majority
in America, and that its will should be accepted by all, the Courts
included. This would mean that laws made by Congress, and not the
Constitution, would be the Supreme Law.
The people have been told by many political leaders in order to
win their favor and get their votes, that for a court to declare a law
void because in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution was an
usurpation of power by them. What wonder should it be then if people
very generally believed that our government was a democracy in which
the will of the majority in any matter whatever, regardless of the
Constitution, should prevail; that any interference with that result was
wrong.
In recent years, too, they have been told that there must also be
"democracy in industry" in order to make democracy in government
work properly. This means, if it means anything, that the private ownership of industries should be more or less subject to the will of those
employed in it. Whatever it means, must we not ask, What effect has
such a theory upon the continuatio nof private enterprise and the right
of private property? Does it dissuade men from investing in industry?
If the ultimate end is to destroy private industry, then what becomes
of the free government (or democracy) which cannot live unless based
on the existence of private property?
Also, for some years, we have seen city and county officials, and
employees also, organized into unions and affiliated with the great
national labor unions. Strikes called by them is in a neighboring city
some time ago paralyzed the local government until their demands
were met.
The question therefore in such city at least, is whether citizens elect
public servants to act according to law made before their election, or
elect public masters who are above the law; officers who organize to
serve their own interests above those of the people who elected them.
If so, what has become of self-government, locally, at least, in
such cities? Are these activities progress in American life and good
local government? Are they evidence of good government, or are they
a step toward the loss of self-government? If these activities are not

1943]

EDITORIAL

in harmony with good government, it might be expected that those
promoting them would, after due consideration, avoid them. Let us
hope they will.
Lawyers, by their education and training, if they will do it abstractly
and impersonally, are best able to solve those questions, and they must
more and more take upon themselves that duty, and fearlessly speak
their conclusions, regardless of its possible influence on any professional business. If we lose Constitutional Government, lawyers will not
be needed by anyone, and their business will be gone. Then, the only
important advice will be given by an agent of the government who
has been instructed what advice to give. Lawyers, of all citizens,
should take a keen interest in political affairs.
In order to meet the stupendous tasks ahead,--winning the war and
preserving our free institutions,--both vital to the very soul of American life, we need the active cooperation of every loyal American, lawyers and laymen, taking inspiration and encouragement perhaps from
some lines from the pen of Edward Everett Hale:"I am only one
But still I am one.
I cannot do everything,
But still I can do something.
And because I cannot do everything
I will not refuse to do the something
That I can do."
If we keep this Constitution and its system for America, we shall
need to revive the spirit of those who gave it to us. "Liberty or death"
should be the motto of every real American, for he would not care to
live without he could live in freedom.
DeTocqueville, in his book on "The Society of France prior to the
French Revolution," well described the "attraction of freedom" as
follows:"* * * its native charms independent of its gifts-the pleasure
of speaking, acting and breathing without restraint, under no
master but God and the law. He who seeks in freedom aught but
herself is fit only to serve."
With the adoption as a people of the spirit of those quotations, combined with our political and economic system which gives freedom
a chance to exist here, in spite of human faults, we should have reasonably good government everywhere in America, such as should be
acceptable to all who are privileged to live under it.
GEORGE E. MORTON.*

*LL.B., University of Wisconsin; member of the American and Wisconsin
Bar Association; Chairman of the Constitution and Citizenship Committee of
the Milwaukee County and Wisconsin Bar Associations.

NOTES
IMPLEADIER-A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
WISCONSIN AND THE FEDERAL PRACTICE
One of the procedural devices available to both the plaintiff and defendant in an action in state courts, including Wisconsin, is that of
Third Party Practice or "Impleader." It becomes available to a party to
an action upon a motion to bring into the suit a third party who is liable
for all or a part of the claim asserted against the moving party.
"A defendant, who if he be held liable in an action, will thereby
obtain a right of action against a person not a party may apply
for an order making such a person a party defendant and the
court may so order."'
The provisions of Rule 14 (a) of the Feneral Rules of Procedure
covering Impleader in the federal courts are much more extensive than
Impleader in the state practice, in that the Rule permits the defendant to
ask for bringing in not only of a person liable to him, but also of a person "liable to the plaintiff" * * * for all or a part of the plaintiff's
claim." Under this provision the original defendant, by the third party
complaint, may tender to the plaintiff another defendant, who, it is
alleged, is liable for all of the claim asserted against the original defendant.
Impleader, although a comparatively modern innovation in law and
equity, prevailed for many years in admiralty practice under the Admiralty Rule 56. Under the Conformity Act, Impleader was applied in
Federal Courts in actions at law when it was allowed in state procedure.
Impleader is permitted in four distinct instances: (1) In cases of
vicarious liability ;3 (2) in cases of contribution; (3) in subrogation
cases under the equitable principles; and (4) in indemnity cases as in
4
the case of liability insurers.
Commencing with the decision in Ellis v. Chicago and North Western Railroad,5 the Wisconsin courts have efficiently put into operation
this advanced advanced system of procedure in contribution cases. In
that case a judgment was rendered against both a railway company and
a traction company for damages on account of personal injuries sustained as a result of a collision between a train and an interurban car;
the court based its decision upon the reasoning that although both were
negligent, the one in failing to ascertain that the train was coming, and
1Wis.

Stat. (1941) Sec. 260.19(3).
sFedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal. (1923) 204 App. Div. 741, 199
N. Y. Supp. 9.

2 Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 14(a).

4Tullgren v. Jasper. D. C. Md. 1939, 27 F. Supp. 413.
v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).

5 Ellis
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the other in running the train at an unlawful rate of speed, yet it appeared that there was no wilful or conscious wrong upon the part of
either negligent party, and that therefore the company which pays the
judgment might compel contribution from the other. The Wisconsin
Court considered the decision in the English case of Merryweather v.
Nixon,6 which held that the law would not imply contribution between
wrongdoers, but followed the reasoning which distinguishes between
wrongs intentionally committed through inadvertance and negligence.'
In respect to offences in which there is involved any moral delinquency
or turpitude, all parties are deemed equally guilty and courts will not
inquire into their relative guilt. But where the offense is merely malum
prohibitum and is in no respect immoral, it is not against the policy of
the law to inquire into the relative delinquency of the parties and to
administer justice between them although both parties be wrongdoers. 8
Before 1939 when the present statute was enacted, the Wisconsin
courts allowed a defendant, who would show by an affidavit that if he
would be liable in an action he would have a right of action against a
third person not a party to the action for the amount of the recovery
against him, upon due notice to such person and the opposing party, to
make an application to the court for an order making such third person
a party defendant in order that the final rights of all parties might be
completely settled in one action. Then the court in its discretion might
make such an order. 10 The present statute enacted in 1935 still continues
this discretionary power. An examination of the statute in Wisconsin
reveals that the defendant in an action may not bring in a third party
who would be solely liable to the plaintiff, but the defendant himself
must be liable in part and seek a partial recovery from the party whom
he seeks to implead. 1" However under the present day practice in Wisconsin, which differs in this respect from that of New York and other
code states, 12 a defendant is not forced to rely upon a joint judgment
before he can seek contribution from a joint-tortfeasor.
In the Federal Courts, by the provision of Rule 14(a) Impleader is
more extensive than in the most liberal code-state practices.'3 The purpose of Impleader is to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of the
entire subject matter in one litigation and to accomplish ultimate justice
with the least number of trials possible. For this reason, under the
Federal Rule 14(a), the defendant may bring in not only a person who
6 Merryveather v. Nixon, 8 T. R. 186.

76 K. C. L. 1055.

8 Supra, note 7.
9 Wis. Stat. (1935) c. 541 s. 10.

10 Supra, note 9.

Supra, note 1.
N. Y. Stat. (1935) 211(a)
13 Supra, note 2.
3"
12

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

may be liable to him for a part of the judgment rendered against him,
but also a person claimed by the defendant to be solely liable to the
plaintiff for the entire amount of the plaintiff's claim. In Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company,'14 the plaintiff sought to hold the
defendant insurance company liable in alternative causes of action:
first, upon an oral promise to pay if she would refrain from prosecuting
her claim against the decendent's personal representative; and second,
on a claim of having been induced to abandon her cause of action by
practice of fraud on the part of the defendant insurance company. 15
The defendant made its motion for Impleader, to make the plaintiff's
attorney, a third party, on the ground that it was through his negligence
that the plaintiff lost her right of action against the personal representative of the deceased, and that such a third party is liable to the plaintiff
for all of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant and the third party
plaintiff. The judgment that was demanded was one against the third
party for all sums that might be adjudged against the defendant and
payable to the plaintiff. The holding of the court sustaining the motion
was based upon the reasoning that since the plaintiff might have joined
the third party defendant originally, in proceeding against both him and
the insurance company in the alternative, the defendant insurance com16
pany might bring in the attorney as a third party defendant.
Under the Federal Rule, it was further held that a store sued for
injuries could file a third party complaint against the owner of the
store on the ground that the owner and mortgagee were solely liable for
the injuries.7 And in an action by an occupant of an automobile against
a township and a county for injuries resulting from improper construction and maintenance of a highway across a railroad track, the occupant
could not object to the addition as third party defendants of the railroad
company and the owner of the automobile, on the ground that Rule
14(a) did not permit joinder of third party defendants if the substantive law of the state does not permit reimbursements, as between tortfeasors, where the township and county did not ask reimbursement but
merely that any judgment recovered be against the railroad company
and the owner of the automobile and not against the township and
county.'
The plaintiff himself is not compelled under either state of Federal
practice to assert a claim against a third party defendant impleaded by
the original defendant. He has the privilege of amending his complaint,
but not the obligation to do so. If he does not avail himself of the
'4 Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 26 F. Supp. 715. (1939).
:15 Supra, note 14.
26 Supra, note 14.
37 Kravas

v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. D. C. P. 1939, 28 F. Supp. 66.
18 Satink v. Township of Holland, D. C. N. J. 1939, 28 F. Supp. 67.
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privilege he may assert his claim against the third party defendant in
an independent action. However the procedure followed if the plaintiff
does amend his complaint so as to include the third party defendant as a
co-defendant is precisely the same as if the plaintiff had sued them as
co-defendants originally. If the plairitiff does not amend, the defendant
may file his cross-claim and the sued defendant prosecutes the third
party on the cross-claim exactly as the plaintiff in turn prosecutes him;
the same witnesses and testimony are used in this prosecution because
the purpose of the cross-litigation is to prove the third party's negligence
toward the plaintiff. The two claims are litigated at the same time and
all issues are submitted to the jury. 19 Any rights of appeal which exist
between the plaintiff and the original defendant are also available to the
third party defendant, but the plaintiff is not hindered from withdrawing from the action and executing his several judgment as soon as
possible. Under such practice the plaintiff cannot complain that he is
being deprived of his right to sue the party whom he wishes, and again
he is not precluded from subsequently asserting his claim in an independent action. 20 When an impleaded joint tort-feasor is dismissed from
an action in which no issue of contribution was raised between the defendant and the third party, the judgment is not res adjudicata on the
2
issue of contribution between the defendant and the third party. '
The plaintiff in an action also has a right to bring in a third party
when a counter-claim is asserted against him by the defendant, this
practice being allowed under any circumstances when the defendant

would be similarly entitled to do

So.

22

The device of Impleader arises only from a common liability and
therefore the Wisconsin court, in Zutter v. O'Connell, refused the de-

fendant's motion where a third party to be impleaded was the father of
the minor plaintiff who actually concurred in the negligent act for which
the defendant truck driver was being sued. 23 However, since a wife may

bring a suit against her husband in Wisconsin, in Wait v. Pierce,the defendant could have contribution from the plaintiff's husband conditioned
24
upon the payment of more than one half of the judgment.
The Wisconsin, as well as the Federal practice of Impleader is a
logical development of the idea of disposing of all of the subject matter

incident to a cause of action based upon the same facts in a single litigation with economy of litigation by avoiding two actions which should be
tried together.

RAzY G. KLETECKA

Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202. 210 N. W. 822.
Scharine v. Huebsch, 203 Wis. 261, 234 N. W. 358 (1931).
21 Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 378 (1918).
22
Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper. D. C. N. Y. 1939. 25 F.
'9
20

23
24

Supp. 1021.
Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N. W. 74 (1930).
Supra, note 22.
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McNABB V. U. S.-THE FEDERAL RULE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
A new rule of evidence to be followed in Federal Courts has been
enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in two recent
appeals of criminal convictions.1 The decisions deal with convictions
resulting from confessions obtained while the parties accused were
illegally detained without arraignment before a judicial officer in contravention of certain statutes.
In neither case, did the decision rest upon the ground that the confessions were not voluntarily made, and that hence the prisoners were
compelled to testify against themselves contrary to the provisions of
the fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; in fact, the Court,
speaking through Justice Frankfurter, specifically laid the argument of
constitutional questions to the side and declared that it would exclude
the confessions in the exercise of its powers of supervisory control
over inferior Federal tribunals. How great a change in the rules
governing the admissibility into evidence of confessions in criminal
cases is wrought by these decisions can only be estimated by first
considering the facts of each case.
The McNabb case involved three members of a mountaineer clan
accused of shooting a Federal Alcohol Tax Division officer. Freeman
and Raymond McNabb were arrested shortly after the shooting; the
third of the trio surrendered the next day. All three were young,
possessed of only a fourth grade education, and none had ever traveled
beyond the limits of the McNabb settlement. None of the three were
arraigned before a judicial officer as required by the alcohol tax administration acts2 or by the provisions of the general criminal code.2 All
were held incommunicado and subjected to protracted questioning both
singly and as a group. Finally Benjamin, told by officers that his
cousins had accused him of having fired the fatal shot, repudiated his
earlier denials, admitted the shooting and claimed he had done it at
the instigation of the other two. In the face of this confession, the
brothers admitted that they were present at the time of the shooting.
The confessions constituted the government case, and though they
were repudiated in open court, a conviction was obtained upon the
strength of them and the conviction was sustained in the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Upon certiorari, counsel for the appellants laid stress in
1 McNabb v. U. S., 63 S.Ct. (1942) ; Anderson v. U. S., 63 S.Ct. 599 (1942).
2 Liquor tax law violators are required to be taken before a judicial officer in the

county where apprehended.
s "It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other officer who may arrest
a person charged with crime to take the defendant before the nearest U. S.
commissioner or nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction for hearing, commitment, or the taking of bail." 18 U.S.C. 595.
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the oral argument on the constitutional issue involved, contending that
the forcible detention of the prisoners without arraignment until they
had confessed amounted to duress, and that in admitting the confessions the court had compelled the prisoners to give testimony against
themselves.
The court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, found that it was
not necessary to decide the constitutional issue thus raised, but that the
court would order the confessions excluded in the exercise of its supervisory power over inferior Federal courts. In this connection it was
said:
"Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the Federal courts implies the duty of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. Such
standards are not satisfied by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as 'due process of law' and below which we reach what
is really trial by force."
The reasoning of the tribunal seems to be that legislation directed to
bringing the accused before a magistrate immediately upon his being
taken into custody, while it does not confer any right rising to the
dignity of a constitutional right, does evince a legislative intent to
protect an individual from examination by authorities until cause has
been shown for holding him. To admit a confession obtained in violation of provisions requiring speedy arraignment would make the courts
accomplices in a willful breach of the spirit of the law. The word
"spirit" is used advisedly because Congress has not forbidden the use
of confessions obtained in this manner.4
Anderson v. United States, supra, decided concurrently with the
McNabb case, originated in the Federal court for the District of Tennessee, and involved a prosecution of eight miners for violence growing out of a labor dispute. Federal authorities joined with local police
in investigating the case because of the destruction of power cable
towers belonging to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The prisoners
were arrested by the local sheriff without warrant, though such arrests
couid not be summarily made because the destruction of power lines is
merely a misdemeanor. 5 Parties thus arrested were held in custody
and questioned individually for periods varying from 5 days to overnight, until under the impression that the others had confessed all had
signed statements admitting guilt. In excluding these confessions and
reversing the convictions obtained the court made two extensions upon
the doctrine of the McNabb decision. Confessions so obtained are to
be excluded though obtained by state officers with the mere tacit con4 See Justice Frankfurter's statement to this effect in opinion.
5Sec. 11515 Michie's code, 1938.
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sent of federal authorities; and convictions of those implicated in
confessions obtained in this manner will be reversed as readily_ as the
convictions of those who themselves made the confessions.
While the court rested its decision in the Anderson case upon its
reasoning in the former decision the following language used in describing the prisoners seems to be a reversion, perhaps unconsciously, to
the idea that the confinement was a species of duress:
"Unaided by relatives, friends or counsel, these men were
unlawfully held, some for days, and subjected to long questioning in the hostile atmosphere of a small, company dominated
mining town."
Such language is at least as consistent with the theory of unconstitutional duress as with the announced basis of the McNabb decision.
Where does this decision place the Federal courts in relation to state
courts? It has been a quite frequent occurrence that prisoners accused
of crimes have, under prolonged police questioning before arraignment, made confessions which have subsequently been repudiated in
open court. Because in such circumstances charges of duress are frequently made when the prisoner has merely suffered a change of heart
after making a voluntary confession, the problem has received, as
might be expected, rather full judicial consideration.
It has been said6 that the courts have taken three positions as to the
admissibility into evidence of a confession made by a party illegally in
custody. They may be summarized as follows:
1. The practice of holding a prisoner without arraignment
is so reprehensible that any confession obtained under such circumstances is inadmissible;
2. While such practice is undesirable, statements which have
been freely made cannot be rejected by the court;'
3. The procedure is not only to be condoned, but is useful
and desirable.
The second view is the rule of England 8 and of the vast preponderance of American states; though a New York decision under a similar
statute makes it incumbent upon the trial judge to charge the jury
that "any unnecessary delay in arraignment is forbidden by law, and
is to be considered by them in determining what weight they will give
the confession." 9 The second view was also accepted as the law in
the Inferior Federal courts 0 and seems to have been tacitly admitted
6Reg. v. Elliot, 31 Ont. Rep. 14.
72 Jones Evidence 893 (1926).
82 Hawkins' Pleas to the Crown (8th ed.)595 sec. 34. But see Reg. v. Thornton
1 Moody C.C. 27 (1824) holding in seven to three decision that confession was
admissable on a fact situation comparable to present cases.
9 People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N. E. 289 (1934).
10 Murphy v. U. S., 285 Fed. 801, cert. den. 261 U. S. 617, 67 L.Ed. 829, 43 S.Ct.
362 (1923) ; Purpura v. U. S. 262 Fed. 473 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919).
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to be the law by the Supreme Court in decisions involving the question
of unconstitutional duress.' 1 Such view is born out by the emphasis
which apparently was laid in the oral argument of the present case
upon the constitutional question involved.
By the present decisions, the Federal courts are now committed to
a recognition of the first doctrine rather than the second.
The effect of this decision, insofar as the Federal courts are concerned, would seem to be to burden a confession obtained while authorities held a party unreasonably long before arraignment with an irrefutable presumption that it was obtained under duress and consequently
the same result is obtained as if the admission thereof would be in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Inasmuch as the reversals were
put on the power of the Supreme Court to supervise the procedure in
inferior Federal courts rather than on constitutional grounds, the
decision will affect directly only the Federal courts, no question being
raised about possible extension to the State courts by the 14th amendment; although the decision may have great persuasive power in state
courts. "The due process clause does not impose upon the states a duty
to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice,"'12 and it
seem probable that state courts will continue to operate much closer to
Justice Frankfurter's "minimal standard" by continuing to inquire
solely into the voluntary nature of the confession.
WILLIAM SMITH MALLOY.

12

Bram v. U. S., 168 U. S. 532, 42 L.Ed. 568, 18 S.Ct. 183 (1897).

12 Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 41 S.St. 435, 65 L.Ed. 837, 17 A.L.R. 873

(1921).
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SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act in defining the
term "employee" to include any employee save farm labor, domestic
help, and individuals employed by their parents or spouses impliedly
places supervisory employees under the Act. However, section 2(2) of
the same Act in defining the term "employer" to include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, would seem to
exclude supervisory employees from the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act. Therefore, there has been, since the enactment of
the Act in 1935, considerable doubt and controversy as to whether or not
plant superintendents, foremen, and other supervisory employees have
the legal right to participate in a collective bargaining unit or to organize
themselves into one, to become members of the union representing the
employees of their particular industry or to form a union themselves.
Is the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice who discharges or
demotes a supervisory employee because of union membership or activities? Is such an employee within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board?
By its decision in the Maryland Drydock Company case,' given May
17, 1943, the National Labor Relations Board reversed previous rulings
and ruled negatively as to the questions above propounded. In this case
the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers petitioned
the Board for the right to represent temporary supervisory employees
either in the same unit to which subordinate employees belonged or in
separate units. The Board dismissed the petition, finding that supervisory employees are not proper parties of a separate unit for collective
bargaining nor of an all-embracing unit, on the grounds that such practice would disrupt managerial and production techniqie and might, very
well, have a coercive effect on the rank and the file of the employees.
The soundness of this ruling is apparent from the following cases, which
preceded Maryland Drydock Company v. National Labor Relations
2

Board.

In National Labor Relations Board v. Christian Board of Publica-

tions3 the Court sustained a Board ruling which held that supervisory
employees may be included in an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. Here, the defendant was charged with an unfair labor practice in
that the supervisory employees formed a company collective bargaining
unit which stifled all true union activity. The defendant pleaded that
since the supervisory employees were within section 2(3) of the NationI N.L.R.B. release R-5517.
2 113 F(2nd) 678 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940).

a44 N.L.R.B. 31.
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al Labor Relations Act, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not in
this instance apply. The Board admitted the status of the supervisory
employees but denied the defendant's contention.
National Labor Relations Board v. Skinner and Kennedy Stationery
Company4 placed supervisory employees under both section 2(3) and
section.2(2) of the Act. Here, Eckert, a foreman of the defendant, was
discharged because of union activities. The defendant demurred to the
jurisdiction of the Board on the grounds that Eckert was not an employee under the Act, but more properly was an employer. The Board
ruled that Eckert was an employer under section 2(2) of the Act as to
those under him, but that he was also an employee under section 2(3)
of the Act and for that reason had the right to become a member of an
employees' union.
The question of whether or not supervisory employees come under
the employee provisions of the National Labor Relations Act was explicitly decided in the affirmative by In the Matter of the Union Collieries Coal Company and the Mine Officials Union of America; and
the controversy seemed to be finally determined. Here, supervisory employees, foremen, weigh bosses, and fire bosses, were authorized by the
Board to form their own union for purposes of collective bargaining. It
was ruled that section 2(3) of the Act was sufficiently broad to include
all supervisory employees. The Board felt that this was necessary to
prevent coercion of such employees by employers and through them of
subordinate employees.
However, in General Motors Sales Corporation v. U. M. W. of
America, Local 2166 the National Labor Relations Board came to its
decision by a process of reasoning which would eventually, and naturally, result in the ruling of the Maryland Drydock Company case.7 In
the instant case the defendant demoted Franke, a shipping supervisor,
because of his refusal to relinquish union membership. During a strike
Franke had engaged in union activities in that he caused shippers to
boycott the Company under the threat: "If you pick up any goods now,
after the strike I will see to it that you get no more." .

.

. Franke al-

lotted consignments to the shippers. While granting that Franke was an
employee under the Act, the Board ruled that the act of the defendant
was not discriminatory nor an unfair labor practice. This because
Franke had abused his position of trust and responsibility with the
Company to work against its interest. The Board recognized the right
of the Company to require adherence of supervisory employees to its
policies.
4 113 F(2nd) 667 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940).
534 N.L.R.B. 1052.

6 127 F(2nd) 109 (C.C.A. 4th, 1942).
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The decision in the Maryland Drydock Companys case that supervisory employees may not join or form a collective bargaining unit is for
the best interests of industry, labor, and the public. As the facts of the
General Motors' case made so evident, membership of supervisory employees in unions tends to destroy the sense of responsibility and company loyalty which managerial and production techniques require of
such employees. The industrial discipline and morale necessary for a
continued advance of the labor movement would be seriously impaired
by the presence of foremen, supervisors, plant superintendents and the
like within collective bargaining units. Supervisory employees must be
responsible agents of the particular industry or the welfare of the public will not be served. It is difficult for supervisory employees to maintain a sense of responsibility to their employers and to be loyal to their
particular union.., the interests of the two are so often divergent. Today, when the war effort demands the maximum in production achievement, supervisory employees, because they are in charge of so many vital
operations, should not be permitted to become involved in labor controversies.
THOMAS MCDERMOTT.

8 Supra, note 2.
934 N.L.R.B. 1052.

RECENT DECISIONS*
Code Practice-Directed Verdicts Under the Comparative Negligence Statute.-Action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Transport Company for personal injuries sustained from a collision between a truck driven by the plaintiff and defendant's trolley bus.
Plaintiff's truck was east-bound on East Knapp street and defendant's
trolley bus was north-bound on North Milwaukee street in the city of
Milwaukee. The collision occurred at the intersection of these streets.
A stop sign governs traffic of vehicles running east and west on East
Knapp street. The jury found the operator of the trolley bus guilty of
negligence as to the rate of speed at which he entered the intersection
and as to the manner in which he controlled the movement of the trolley
bus after it entered the intersection. Plaintiff was found negligent as to
the manner in which he controlled his truck after he entered the intersection. The proportion of the plaintiff's causal negligence was set at
33 1-3 per cent, defendant's at 66 2-3 per cent. Upon appeal the defendant Transport Company claimed that the plaintiff's causal negligence was, as a matter of law, equal to or greater than that of the defendant's operator. The Supreme Court held that no rule of thumb can
be laid down with respect to the apportionment of neglignece between
a plaintiff and a defendant and that in this case the court could not hold,
under the evidence, that the plaintiff's negligence was as a matter of
law equal to that of the defendant. Campanelli v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Transport Co. 8 N. W. (2d) 390 (1943).
The rule set down by the court in the instant case is consistent with
every decision handed down since the passage of the Comparative Negligence Statute Sec. 330.045 Wis. Stats. in 1931. The general rule with
respect to directed verdicts under this statute is, perhaps, best stated in
the language of the court in Hansburyv. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626,284 N. W.
556 (1939) : "It is true that the court may *beable to determine from
the record that two items of negligence of the same character are equal
in quality or that as a matter of law one of them is greater than the
other. This is more apt to be possible in cases where speed, lookout, o?'
violation of some particular rule of the road is involved. It is less apt to
be possible in cases involving findings of negligence with respect to
management and control. In any event, it must be possible from all the
circumstances of the case as disclosed by the record for this court to be
able to say that the negligences are equal in quality and that is why this
court has said that it can rarely come to this conclusion. We are satisfied, however, that the court may not adopt a rule of thumb that will
check off automatically lookout against lookout, control against control,
etc., holding these items equal in every case."
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While it is certainly clear from the language quoted above that each
case must rest upon its own facts and circumstances, the cases, looked
upon as units, point to a few general rules. The first, and, perhaps, the
broadest of these is that whenever the character and quality of the
negligence of the plaintiff and defendant are different it is a matter for
the jury alone. In the case of Honore v. Ludwig, 211 Wis. 354, 247 N.
W. 335 (1933), the defendant was found negligent as to speed, lookout,
and control, and the plaintiff as to lookout, control and disregard for
other users of the highway. The court held that although the charges of
negligence were equal in number, the character of the charges were
different and the matter should, in such cases, be left for the jury. The
same conclusion was reached in the following cases: Brown v. Haertel,
210 Wis. 345, 244 N. W. 630, (1932) ; Steidle v. Caliebe, 215 Wis. 582,
254 (1934) ; McGuiggan v. Hiller Brothers 209 Wis. 402, 245 N. W.
97, (1931); Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N. W. 290; Doepke v.
Reinter, 217 Wis. 49, 258 N. W. 345 (1935).
Another group of cases indicate that where the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent in an equal number of respects, the negligence of
one will be held equal to that of the other so long as the quality of the
one does not outweigh the other. In the case of Peters V. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RR. Co., 230 Wis. 299, 283 N. W. 803,
(1939), the plaintiff was found negligent in failing to look out before
entering upon a railroad crossing, and the defendant was found negligent in failing to give a signal. The court held the negligence of both
equal as a matter of law. Again, in Geyer v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co.,
230 Wis. 347, 284 N. W. 1, (1939), the negligence of the plaintiff in
failing to yield the right of way was held equal to that of the defendant
who failed to keep a proper lookout. Decisions to like effect are: Sikora
v. Great Northern RR. Co., 230 Wis. 283, 282 N. W. 588, (1939);
Evanich v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 237 Wis. 111, 295 N. W. 44,
(1941) ; DuBois v. Johnson, 238 Wis. 161, 298 N. W. 590, (1941). In
cases where the charges of negligence are equal in number but where
the particular kind of negligence on the part of one outweighs that of
the other, the courts will hold such negligence to be greater as a matter'
of law. Such was the case of Beatti v. Strosser, 240 Wis. 65, 2 N. W.
2nd 713 (1942), in which the plaintiff, a minor child, ran out between
parked cars and, was struck by the defendant's car. Both parties were
found negligent as to lookout but thenegligence of the plaintiff because
of its peculiar character was held greater as a matter of law.
Still another group of cases may be viewed as a unit to discover that
even though one party may be found negligent in the greater number of
respects, yet his total negligence will be held less as a matter of law than
one who is guilty of the fewer charges of negligence but whose negli-
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gence is of such outrageous character as to completely outweigh all the
charges against the other. A good example within this class of cases is
Hustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N. W. 595, (1939). In this case,
the plaintiff was an experienced milk man. He stepped from his wagon
without looking for traffic and was found negligent in this respect. The
defendant whose automobile struck the plaintiff as he did so step off his
wagon was found negligent as to speed, lookout and management. The
court held that the plaintiff's negligence, by its very character, was as a
matter of law greater than that of the defendant. The following cases
are similar in effect: Wedecky v. Grimes 229 Wis. 448, 282 N. W. 593,
(1938) ; Noyes v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. 141, 294 N. W.

63, (1941).
Lastly there are a few cases which stand as individual holdings and
do not, from the point of their outcome, fall into any of the groups of
cases indicated herein. In Patterson v. Chicago, St. Pa., Milwaukee &
0. R. Co. 236 Wis. 205, 294 N. W. 63, (1940), the plaintiff was at a
place to board the defendant's train. In order to do so he had to cross
certain tracks. He was struk and injured. Plaintiff was found negligent with respect to lookout. The defendant was found negligent in failing to keep a proper guard for the protection of the defendant. The
court held that the negligence of the plaintiff was as a matter of law
equal to that of the defendant. There was a strong dissent by three
judges in this case. A like decision with a dissent is Hoskins v. Thenell,
232 Wis. 97, 286 N. W. 555, (1939).
ANTHONY J. PALAsz.

Federal Jurisdiction-Common Law Crimes Against the United
States.-In United States v. Jerome, 87 L. Ed. 433 (1943),--U.S.-,
S. Ct. -, the defendant was charged with violating section 2(a) of the
bank robbery act (May 18, 1934) 48 Stat. 783 c. 304 (August 24, 1937)
50 stat. 749, c. 747, 12 U.S.C.A. 588b which provides in part that "whoever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank or any building used in
whole or in part as a bank with intent to ocmmit in such bank or building
or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny shall be fined not more
than $5,000.00 or imprisoned for more than tw.enty years or both." The
defendant was an army officer who while attempting to borrow money
from a National Bank was informed that he would be required to obtain
the signature of an officer of at least equal rank as surety upon his note.
The defendant forged the signature of an officer of superior rank. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals and quashed the indictment on the grounds
that the crime of forgery, although a felony under the laws of Vermont,
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was not a felony within the meaning of the statute, it not being a felony
under the statutes of the United States. The Court said, "We must generally assume, in absence of plain indication to the contrary, that congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the Federal act dependant on the state law. That assumption is based on the
fact that Federal legislation is nationwide,and at times on the fact that
the Federal program would be impaired if the state law were to control."
The court indicated that caution should be exercised in extending the
provision of a Federal statute to state crimes because the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment does not stand as a 'bar to Federal prosecution though a state conviction on the same cast has already
been obtained.
The United States Supreme Court has therefore affirmatively decided in favor of a second punishment where an act is both a crime
against the state and against the United States. Said Chief Justice Taft
in United States v. Lenza, 260 U. S.377, 382; 43 S.Ct. 141, 142; 67 L.
Ed. 314: "We have here two sovereignties deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject under the same
territory. Each may without interference from the other enact laws to
secure prohibition with the limitation that no legislation can give validity
to act prohibitive by the same amendment. Each Government in determining what shall be an offense against its dignity and peace is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."
It has been consistently held that there are no common law crimes
against the United States. All Federal crimes must be specifically provided for by statute. While there are no common law offenses against
the United States resort may be had to the common law for the definition of terms by which offenses are designated by statute, Pettibone v.
United States (1893) 148 U. S.197; 13 S.Ct. 542; 37 L. Ed. 419.
The regulations issued by the several Governmental departments and
administrative agencies cannot make acts criminal which congress has
not made criminal. In United States v. George (1913) 228 U. S. 14; 33
S. Ct. 412; 57 L. Ed. 712, the defendant was indicted for perjury,
charging him with falsely and corruptly taking his solemn oath in a proceeding wherein a law of the United States authorized an oath to be
administered before the register of the United States land office. The
particular statute under which the defendant was charged provided that
"If ... the person making such entry.., proves by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for
a period of five years ... and makes affidavit that no part of such land
had been alienated... and that he, she, or they will bear true allegiance
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to the Government of the United States, then in such case he, she, or
they... shall be entitled to a patent. The Secretary of the Interior in
this instance required the applicant to take such oath himself wherein it
will be noted the statute merely required proof by two credible witnesses. The defendant falsely swore that he had made certain improvements on the land. The defendant demurred to the charge alleging that
where the charge is of crime it must have clear legislative basis. The
court held that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to demand
such oath where it was not required by statute. The court said "It is
manifest that the regulation adds a requirement which that section does
not require and is not justified."
In United States v. Eaton (1892) 144 U. S. 677; 12 S. Ct. 764; 36
L. Ed. 591, the defendant, a wholesaler, was indicted for failure to keep
books showing receipts and sales for oleomargarine. The statute provided that all manufacturers were required to keep such records, but
contained no such provisions for a wholesaler. The court ruled that "the
Secretary of the Treasury cannot Alter or amend a revenue law to regulate the mode of providing to carry into effect what congress has
enacted."
Although the principle that there is no common law of the United
States has long been recognized in the field of Federal criminal law it
has only recently been recognized in Federal civil law. Plaintiff in Erie
Railway Company v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 364; 58 S. Ct. 17; 82 L. Ed.
1189 (1937), was injured while walking along defendant's right of way
by a boxcar door that was negligently left open, said injury occurring in
the state of Pennsylvania. The action was brought in the federal district
court in New York. Under the laws of Pennsylvania plaintiff was a
trespasser and defendant owed plaintiff no duty except not to wilfully
injure him. The lower court gave judgment to the plaintiff holding that
under the common law of the United.States it was the duty of defendant
railway not to negligently injure plaintiff. Reversing the judgment the
Supreme Court of the United States said, "Except in matters governed
by the Federal constitution or by acts of congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state
shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in
a decision is not a matter of Federal concern. There is not Federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature
or 'general,' be they commercial law or part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the constitution purports to confer such power on the Federal
Courts."
JORN L. GRAY
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War-Exemption from Military Service.-The appellant, a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious organization, failed to report for induction on the ground that he should have been exempted
from military service by virtue of his position as minister. The court
held that he was not a minister within the meaning of the statute; 50
U.S.C.A. 305(d). that ordination is not sufficient to bring an individual within such meaning; that the term "minister" implies the same
relationship to the Jehovah's Witness organization as in older denominations; and that the commission of each member of this group to make
converts does not constitute such member eligible for exemption within
the meaning of Congress. Seele v. United States, 133 F.(2d) 1015
(C.C.A. 8th, 1943).
At the basis of the decisions is the fact that exemption from military service because of religious convictions or activities is not a constitutional right. The power of Congress to declare war and to raise
and support armies embraces authority to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying such power into execution. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
sec. 8. Implied in the power is the right of Congress to draft any men
who may be needed. Speaking of the deferment of ministers and the
consideration shown conscientious objectors, it has been said, "Immunity
arises solely through Congressional grace in pursuance of a traditional
American policy of deference to conscientious objection and holy calling." Rase v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 204 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942). Since
exemption is a privilege rather than a right, the burden is not upon the
government but upon one claiming exemption to bring himself clearly
within the excepted class. Seele v. United States, supra.
It follows also that the obligation of a local draft board to grant
the registrant a fair hearing does not mean a trial in any strict or formal judicial sense. In the case of error, the remedy of appeal is provided
within the administrative set-up. Review by the courts is granted only
when the local draft board has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. United
States v. Grieme, 128 F. (2d) 811 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1942). This is in keeping with the doctrine that when Congress establishes fact finding bodies,
the decision of the director are final. The courts will only review if the
action is arbitrary and without basis on the theory that the board has
exceeded its authority. Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24
S.Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 894.
Seele's case was heard in the District Court on an appeal from
criminal prosecution. This is not the only means of obtaining judicial
review. If the registrant has exhausted his administrative remedies, on
proof that the investigation has not been fair or that the board has
abused its discretion by a finding contrary to all substantial evidence,
relief may be granted by the courts under a writ of habeas corpus. Rase
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v.. United States, supra. A registrant who has already been inducted into
military service may by writ of habeas corpus obtain a judicial determination as to whether the local draft board acted in an arbitrary manner. United States v. Grieme, supra. The case cited held that the writ of
habeas corpus was the only way to obtain judicial review of the decision of the local draft board, that the only point in issue in a criminal
prosecution for failure to report for induction was whether the regisstrant intentionally failed to report, that arbitrary action of the draft
board was not a defense to a criminal prosecution for failure to comply
with the order. United States v. Grieme, supra.
The theory underlying the decision in the case of United States v.
Grieme would seem to be that the registrant must submit himself to the
order of the draft board. Therefore, a writ of habeas corpus would be
in order. The theory of the Seele case in allowing the point of the validity of the draft board decision to be brought into issue would seem to
be that the registrant has some degree of choice as to whether or not he
will submit himself to the order of the draft board. Whatever the underlying theories, both methods of getting a review are well established
and probably will be continued in use, though seemingly in contradiction
with one another.
MERmIEM LumC.

War-Rights of Enemy Aliens in Our Courts.-Petition for a
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of the United States to compel
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of
California to vacate a judgment dismissing an action on the ground
that the petitioner, a resident of the United States, is an alien enemy,
and to proceed to trial of his action.
The petitioner in this case, one Kumezo Kawato, was born in Japan,
but became a resident of the United States in 1905. On April 15, 1941,
he brought an action in libel against the vessel RALLY in the District
Court for the Southern District of California, claiming damages for
wages due him for services as seaman and fisherman on the RALLY.
He also alleged that he had sustained severe injuries while engaged in
the performance of his duties and sought an allowance for maintenance and medical expenses.
The owners of the vessel RALLY moved, on January 20, 1942, to
abate the action on the ground that Kawato, by reason of the state of
war then existing between Japan, his native country, and the United
States, had become an enemy alien and therefore had no right to "prosecute any action in any court of the United States during the pendency
of said war." The District judge granted the motion.
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The petitioner sought mandamus in the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth District to compel the District Court to vacate its judgment and proceed to trial of his action. This motion was denied. Leave
was then granted to file in the United States Supreme Court. In the
Supreme Court the writ of mandamus was issued, thereby granting the
petitioner the right to proceed with trial of his action, the court upholding the plaintiff's contention that he had the right under the common
law and treaties to proceed with his action, and that his right is not limited by the statutes. Ex parte Kumezo Kawato, 63 Sup. Ct. 115 (1942).
This decision raised a very pertinent question-that of the rights of
resident enemy aliens in our courts while a state of war exists between
the United States and their native country.
An enemy alien has been judicially defined as "one who owes allegiance to an adverse belligerent nation." Dorsey v. Brigham, 52 N.E.
303,304; 177 Ill. 250, 1898. Thus, for example, a citizen of Japan, residing in the United States at the time of the beginning of hostilities, automatically becomes an "enemy alien" and is subject to the restrictions
imposed on such class. A distinction must be made, however, between
enemy aliens and enemies of the United States. Thus, it was held in
Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust Company, 10 F. (2d) 19, App. D. C.
California, 1926, that an immigrant from Germany returning to Germany in 1915, and entering the service of the German army as a Red
Cross surgeon was not an enemy of the United States. German citizens,
residents of the United States during war were held not to be enemies
of the United States within the Trading with the Enemy Act. Reising
v. Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft Hansa, 15 (2d) 259; (E.D. New
York, 1926).
The term "alien enemy," as used in the Trading with the Enemy
Act, is deemed to mean:
(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of
any nationality, resident within the territory (including that
occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with
which the United States is at war, or resident outside the
United States and doing business within such territory of any
nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated
within any country other than the United States and doing
business with such territory.
(b) The government of any nation with which the United States is
at war, or any political or municipal subdivision thereof, or any
officer, official, agent, or agency thereof.
(c) Such other individuals, or body or class of individuals, as may
be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the
United States is at war, other than citizens of the United
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States, wherever resident or wherever doing business, as the
President, if he shall find the safety of the United States or the
successful prosecution of the war shall so require, may, by
proclamation, include within the term enemy. Trading with the
Enemy Act, Section 2: Definitions, 50 U.S. C.A. 189.
At common law an enemy alien resident could prosecute a civil
action. Petition of Bernheimer, 130 F (2d) 396 (E.D. Penn. 1941).
Again a distinction must be made, however, between resident aliens
and non-resident aliens. In the case of the Industrial Commission of
Ohio v. Rotar, 179 N. E. 135 (1931), the court said "it is an elementary
fact that, when a state of war exists, an alien enemy cannot prosecute
any claim in the courts of a country at war with his country." In this
case, the plaintiff, the widow of an employee killed in the 'course of
employment and seeking an award from the Industrial Commission,
was a resident of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with which the
United States was at war. It was this fact which prevented her bringing
an action in the courts of the United States until hostilities had ceased.
In this case the court reasserts the common law rule that if the parties
to the litigation are residents of belligerent nations, one residing in one,
the other in the opposing contry, then the right of action is suspended
until the close of the war, at which time it may be asserted by the alien.
In Stumpf v. A. Schreiber Brewing Company, 242 Fed. 80 (W.D.
New York, 1917), the court held that the plaintiff, who became an alien
enemy, cannot continue an action at law or equity, or institute further
proceedings, until the war is ended, save in certain exceptional instances, as, for example, where commerce between nations at war is
continued, or where the plaintiff in actions for debt becomes an enemy
alien after verdict and judgment has been rendered. In the case here
mentioned, the plaintiff was a resident of Germany. His action was
begun before war was declared between Germany and the United
States, but the judgment in the case had not been rendered when a
state of war was declared to exist between his native country and the
United States. This decision is in accord with the principle that a suit,
properly brought by an alien against a citizen, will not be dismissed
because of a subsequent declaration of war between the United States
and the government of which the plaintiff is a subject, but may be suspended during the war. Plettenberg, Holthaus & Co. v. L I. Kalmon
& Co., 241 Fed. 605 (S.D. Georgia, 1917).
The reason for a former rule denying a resident alien who is a citi.zen of a country with which the United States is at war the right to
bring an action in the courts of the United States, namely, that the
money recovered would be withdrawn and added to the funds available
to aid the alien's country in the prosecution of the war no longer exists
I
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in view of legislation providing for seizure of property belonging to
enemy aliens situated in the United States with licensing restrictions
governing their subsequent access to it. According to the Trading with
the Enemy Act, Section 6, the President may appoint an alien property
custodian who shall be empowered to receive all money and property
within the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of the
enemy, which may be paid, conveyed, transferred, assigned, or delivered
to said custodian under the provisions of the Act. 50 U.S.C.A. 189.
The generally accepted rule, with which the present case is in accord,
is that the courts of the United Sattes remain open to citizens of an
enemy nation who are residing peaceably in the United States and under
its laws. Only non-resident aliens are barred from prosecuting action.
Uberti v. Maiatico, 44 F. Supp. 724 (D.C. of D. of C., 1942) ; Anastasio
v. Anastasio, 44 F. Supp. 725 (D.C. of D. of C., 1942); Stern v.
Ruzicka, 44 F. Supp. 726 (D.C. of D. of C., 1942).
One final point might be made in connection with the terms "enemy"
and "ally of the enemy." In the case of Sundell v. Lotmar Corp., 44 F.
Supp. 816 (S.D. New York, 1942), it was held that since Finland,
although formally at peace with the United States, was actively in concert with Germany in war against Russia which was an ally of the
United States, residents of Finland were "allies" of the enemy and
enemies of the United States and could not prosecute actions in the
United States for injuries sustained by negligence.
The principal case, then, is in accord with the weight of authority
in the United States, and restates several fundamental principles regarding alien's right as they are restricted in times of war:
(1) Any person, residing in the United States but not a citizen of
the United States, automatically becomes an "enemy alien"
upon declaration of a state of war between the United States
and his native country.
(2) Resident enemy aliens may still enjoy the right of the use of
the federal and state courts of the United States, even though
a state of war exist between the United States and their native
country.
(3) Non-resident enemy aliens may not begin an action in any
court of the United States while a state of war exists between
the United States and their native country.
(4) Actions pending in any court of the United States between a
non-resident enemy alien and a citizen of the United States
when a state of war is declared to exist are abated until the war
is over and may then be revived.
I
KENNETH E. MILLER

BOOK REVIEWS
Burby on Real Property, by William E. Burby, Professor of Law,
University of Southern California. Published as a textbook by West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. Containing 656 pages, including the index; bound in red frabricoid.
This book contains a concise up to date statement of the modern law
of real property with sufficient of the historical background to make it
understandable to the average student. Theoretical discussion is conspicuously absent, although upon points on which the courts are not in
agreement, the conflict is stated with the leading cases that sustain each
point of view. The footnotes, while ample, do not contain a mere cumulation of cases in an attempt to cite all the available ones. This policy
has proved of advantage in keeping down the size of the volume, while
retaining the advantage of citing all the cases necessary to illustrate the
text.
A further inovation is a departure from the blind footnote idea;
sufficient facts of many of the footnote cases are stated to make resort
to the report unnecessary to determine whether the decision is in point.
The editors have confined the scope of the book to the main topics
which are taught in most law schools as the course on real property; the
topics usually treated in separate courses such as mortgages, trusts and
wills being omitted. This is advantageous in avoiding an unnecessarily
large volume and duplication of subject matter which is available in
separate texts. Other assets worthy of mention include a useful table of
cases and an excellent index. The book should be a convenient teaching
tool, and where the case method is in use should be helpful for review
and filling in any gaps that may occur. I have personally found it very
useful in finding cases to supplement my case book.

WILnIs E. LANG.*
Traffic Courts, George Warren. Published under the joint auspices
of the National Conference of Judicial Councils and the National Committee on Traffic Law Enforcement, by Little, Brown and Co., Boston,
Mass., 1942. Price $4.00.
This book represents an effort to correct a major problem in the
administration of justice-that part lying within the scope of courts
trying traffic violations cases. With figures gathered from personal observations in the courts of municipalities of the forty-eight states and
from the answers to questionnaires submitted to magistrates, chiefs of
police, and prosecutors, Mr. Warren has compiled and presented without sensationalism a survey of the factors which have made the traffic
*Professor of Law, Marquette University.
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courts the terra incognitaof the judicial field. He has gone farther and
has shown what the maladministration has cost, both in material losses
of life and property in traffic accidents, and in the less tangible loss
of respect for all law in jurisdictions where the practices of the traffic
law courts do not command respect. He has traced back to their fountainhead in the thought processes of the bar and public and in physical
factors the conditions which he found prevalent; and, finally, he has
embodied in 57 concrete recommendations a program of improvement
vhich has won the support of various organizations interested in traffic
law enforcement.
No better measure of the worth of the book can be gained than by
consideration of the importance of the traffic courts to the whole of the
field of the administration of justice. The opening chapter of the author,
and the prefacing remarks of Mr. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, chairman of
the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
point out that the traffic courts are "visited" annually by an estimated
one out of every eight persons in the country. In the great majority of
cases, the parties haled before the magistrate have no other contact
with judicial tribunals. Consequently, their impressions, derived in the
traffic courts, have been universalized into respect or disrespect for all
judicial institutions; and the factors which the survey disclosed have
done little to inculcate respect in the minds of the public. At the other
end of the scale, the practice of "fixing" tickets has had a blighting
effect on law enforcement. In the words of Mr. Vanderbilt: "the field
is one which cannot be neglected without grave risk to the body politic."
The book is not merely a statistical treatment of conditions as the
author found them. Interesting as the picture which they present is, the
great contribution is Mr. Warren's recommendations for the improvement of this phase of the machinery of justice. His 57 resolutions cover
traffic laws, courts, violations, bureaus, personnel, court procedure, and
the elimination of the "fix." Approval of their scope has come not only
from the sponsoring organizations but also from the American Bar
Association, the National Safety Council, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
All in all, Mr. Warren's book presents a highly readable, painstakingly careful, and comprehensive research into the problems of a
heretofore neglected field. It is a distinct contribution to the bringing
of the element of enforcement into line with advances in engineering
and education in the joint undertaking to reduce the terrific cost of
traffic accidents. An even higher recommendation is that it is written
by a man sincerely anxious to make traffic court procedure conform to
standards which will breed respect for all American judicial institutions.
WILLIAM SMITH MALLOY.

